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Abstract (German) 
 
Der europäische Arzneimittelmarkt steht seit vielen Jahren im Fokus der Politik. So-
wohl die Finanzierung von Gesundheitssystemen als auch der Zugang zu solchen 
werden auf nationaler Ebene durch steigende Ausgaben für Arzneimittel gefährdet. 
Der pharmazeutische Sektor ist häufig Gegenstand nationaler Interventionen zur 
Kostendämpfung, da dieser in der Regel schneller als das Bruttoinlandsprodukt und 
der gesamte Gesundheitsmarkt wächst. Nationenübergreifend wächst die Rolle der 
Europäischen Union, die versucht, die Innovations- und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der 
strategisch wichtigen europäischen Pharmaindustrie zu stärken. Ziel dieser Disserta-
tion ist es, die wachsende Rolle der EU im europäischen Arzneimittelmarkt, insbe-
sondere in Hinblick auf Akteure und Mitgliedstaaten zu untersuchen. Dies erfolgt in 
drei Schritten, die im Folgenden zusammenfassend erläutert werden: (1) ein Review 
der Rollen und Trends der Akteure des europäischen pharmazeutischen Marktes, 
einschließlich der EU und ihrer Mitgliedsstaaten; (2) Entwicklung von Zukunftsszena-
rien für die europäische pharmazeutische Politik; und (3) eine Analyse der Auswir-
kung dieser Szenarien auf die verschiedenen Akteure im europäischen Arzneimittel-
markt.  
Im ersten Teil werden die Akteure und der konzeptionelle Rahmen, in dem sie inter-
agieren, dargestellt. Die nationalen Maßnahmen zur Kostendämpfung resultieren in 
niedrigeren Gewinnmargen auf Anbieterseite (Pharmaunternehmen, Großhandel 
und Apotheken). Vergleicht man Indikatoren der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der for-
schenden Pharmaindustrie (Forschung und Entwicklung, Lohn- und Nebenkosten, 
Anzahl von neuen innovativen Arzneimitteln) zwischen den USA und Europa, liegen 
diese in Europa (deutlich) unter denen der amerikanischen Konkurrenten. Pharma-
zeutische Großhändler standen in den 1990er Jahren einem dramatischen Konsoli-
dierungskurs gegenüber. Derzeit versuchen sie ihre Konkurrenzfähigkeit durch eine 
Erweiterung ihres Dienstleistungsangebots (vertikale Diversifikation, bspw. durch 
Logistikdienstleistungen für Pharmaunternehmen) zu sichern. Die Apothekenbranche 
ist verglichen mit anderen Industriebereichen eine der am stärksten regulierten 
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Branchen überhaupt. Sie weist zudem eine enorme Heterogenität in der Apotheken-
dichte auf und steht zusätzlich den Herausforderungen neuer Apothekenketten und 
Online-Apotheken gegenüber. 
Verglichen mit der Anbieterseite, ist die Nachfrageseite (Verschreiber, Patienten und 
Kostenträger) durch eine asymmetrische Informationslage gekennzeichnet. Zwar 
haben Verschreiber (Ärzte) in der Regel mehr pharmazeutisches Wissen als Patien-
ten, dennoch hat sich das Arzt-Patienten-Verhältnis aufgrund neuer Informations-
technologien, die einen schnellen Zugang zu medizinischem Wissen ermöglichen 
(z.B. Internet), verändert. Innerhalb Europas existieren weiterhin erhebliche Unter-
schiede hinsichtlich Verschreibungs- und Konsumverhalten von Arzneimitteln, die 
auf kulturelle Unterschiede und nationale Regelwerke zurückzuführen sind. Für ge-
wöhnlich liegt das Interesse der Patienten nicht darin, ein möglichst kostengünstiges 
Medikamente zu erhalten. Doch durch nationale Maßnahmen wie z.B. Zuzahlungsre-
gelungen wird versucht das Bewusstsein der Patienten dafür zu steigern. Die Kosten-
träger (z.B. Krankenkassen) bieten ihre Leistungen innerhalb eines national stark 
regulierten Umfelds an und haben bisher selbst keine große Rolle in der Eindäm-
mung von Arzneimittelkosten gespielt, was nicht zuletzt an existierenden Gesund-
heitssystemstrukturen liegt, in welchen es an Instrumenten zur Einflussnahme auf 
Preis und Volumen von Arzneimitteln mangelt.  
Die regulierenden Instanzen auf dem europäischen Arzneimittelmarkt sind die euro-
päischen Union (EU) und ihre Mitgliedsstaaten. Die Arzneimittelpolitik der EU wird 
überwiegend von Seiten der Industriepolitik beeinflusst. Sie ist bestrebt den Arznei-
mittelmarkt zu liberalisieren und einen europäischen Binnenmarkt (SEM) zu realisie-
ren. In den vergangenen 40 Jahren zeigte die Arzneimittelpolitik einen beachtlichen 
Trend in Richtung Europäisierung. Dennoch können die 1995 eingeführten verbindli-
chen europäischen Zulassungsprozeduren und die Aufsichtsbehörde EMEA als letzte 
große Errungenschaft bezeichnet werden. Die Europäische Kommission hat sich 
stattdessen der Umsetzung von Empfehlungen der hochrangigen G-10-
Arzneimittelgruppe zugewandt. Sie versucht sich auf die Koordination von Ergebnis-
sen zu konzentrieren, statt auf europäisches Sekundärrecht wie z.B. Richtlinien. Ent-
scheidungen des europäischen Gerichtshofs beziehen sich beispielsweise auf das 
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Recht an geistigem Eigentum, Markenzeichen, Patentschutz, Parallelimporten und 
Online-Apotheken. Sie beeinflussen wiederum die Gestaltung nationaler Politik in 
Richtung einer Liberalisierung nationaler Märkte.  
Obwohl Marktzulassung, Pharmakovigilanz, Klassifizierung von Arzneimittel sowie 
deren Distribution immer mehr von der EU mitbestimmt wurden, erhielten die euro-
päischen Mitgliedsstaaten mit Hilfe des Artikels 152 des EG-Vertrags Kompetenzen 
bei Preisbildung und Vergütungen innerhalb ihrer Gesundheitssysteme. Zudem ent-
wickelten Mitgliedsstaaten innerhalb der letzten 25 Jahre zunehmend gleichartige 
(von einander kopierte) Maßnahmen, um die steigenden Ausgaben für Arzneimittel 
zu kontrollieren, die oft kurzfristig wirkten, dann allerdings langfristig ohne Erfolg 
blieben.  
Im zweiten Teil der Arbeit werden Zukunftsszenarien der europäischen Arzneimittel-
politik beschrieben. Dazu wurden Schlüsselbegriffe und Variablen europäischer Arz-
neimittelpolitik aus Publikationen zusammengestellt. Als nächstes wurde ein Delphi 
Fragebogen entwickelt, mit welchem 41 europäische Experten bezüglich der erarbei-
teten Schlüsselthemen befragt wurden. Die Ergebnisse der Delphi Befragung stellten 
die Bausteine zur Entwicklung eines konsolidierten „Experten Szenarios“ dar. Darauf-
hin folgte eine kontrastierende Gegenüberstellung mit einem eher pessimistischen 
Szenario („Europäisches Krisen Szenario”) und  einem eher „optimistischen“ Szenario 
(„Europäisches Szenario“): 
(1) Das Experten Szenario: Im Bereich des europäischen Arzneimittelmarktes, in wel-
chem die europäische Gesetzgebung den potentiell größten Einfluss hat, wird eine 
weitere Europäisierung vorausgesehen. Marktzulassung, Pharmakovigilanz, Einstu-
fung von Arzneimittel, Großhandelsvertrieb und Werbung zeigen einen graduellen 
Trend in Richtung europäischer Konvergenz. Regulierung und Implementierung von 
Preisbildung, Abgabe, Verschreibung und Vergütung von Arzneimitteln verbleiben 
vornehmlich auf nationaler Ebene. Die von den Experten erwartete Europäisierung 
der vergleichenden Evaluation von Arzneimittel stellt dahingehend eine Ausnahme 
dar, da sie innerhalb der einzelnen Gesundheitssystems stattfindet, wo eher eine 
Dominanz der nationalen Kompetenzen vorausgesehen wird.   
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(2) Das Europäische Krisen Szenario: Der europäische Prozess erfährt einschneidende 
Rückschläge. Hauptsächliche Ursachen hierfür liegen im stockenden Expansionspro-
zess, einem vorhandenen Imageproblem, einer andauernden europäischen Verfas-
sungskrise und einer pharmazeutischen Krise, die durch ein von der europäischen 
Zulassungsprozedur genehmigtes Arzneimittel ausgelöst wird. Dies führt zur Rückbe-
sinnung auf nationale Regulierungen und einer Einfrierung des europäischen Prozes-
ses.   
(3) Das Europäische Szenario: Durch die erfolgreiche Ratifizierung des europäischen 
Verfassungsvertrages wächst das Vertrauen der Bürger in das europäische Projekt. 
Das finanzielle Gleichgewicht der einzelnen Gesundheitssysteme wird jedoch durch 
immer mehr grenzüberschreitende Patienten gefährdet. Um dem entgegenzutreten 
erarbeiten die einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten einen gemeinsamen europäischen Leis-
tungskatalog. Dieser führt zu einer Europäisierung der verschiedenen nationalen 
Gesundheitssysteme, welche ironischerweise nicht durch die europäische Kommissi-
on, sondern durch die Mitgliedstaaten selbst initiiert wurde.  
Die im dritten Teil der Arbeit behandelten Auswirkungen der Szenarien auf die un-
terschiedlichen Akteure stellen sich wie folgt dar: trotz der europäischen Bemühun-
gen die Pharmaindustrie wettbewerbsfähiger zu machen, ändert sich in Zukunft eher 
wenig an der wirtschaftspolitischen Lage der forschenden Pharmaindustrie. In kei-
nem der Szenarien scheinen größere Veränderungen hinsichtlich freierer Preisbil-
dung und Vergütungsentscheidungen (d.h. weniger Möglichkeiten Investitionen zu 
refinanzieren) wahrscheinlich. Dennoch ermöglicht die Größe des europäischen 
Marktes mit zunehmend harmonisierten Märkten Synergieeffekte, z.B. Marktzulas-
sung und Marketing betreffend.  
Für die Generika-Industrie stellt sich die Zukunftsaussicht durchaus positiver dar. 
Zunehmende nationale Maßnahmen mit dem Ziel den Generika-Gebrauch zu stimu-
lieren, erleichtern der Generika-Industrie den Zugang zu vornehmlich ‚unreifen’ ge-
nerischen Märkten. Dennoch erhöht der sich weiter europäisierende Arzneimittel-
markt den Wettbewerbsdruck über nationale Grenzen hinaus und führt zu einem 
internationalen Konsolidierungsprozess auch innerhalb der Generika-Industrie. In-
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nerhalb des Europäischen Krisen Szenarios könnte dieser Wettbewerbsdruck aller-
dings langfristig geringer bleiben. 
Auch Biotechnologieunternehmen, für die das Europäische Zentrale Marktzulas-
sungsverfahren obligatorisch ist, haben großes Interesse an einer Weiterentwicklung 
des europäischen Marktes. Es wäre für sie finanziell sehr aufwändig, für neue Pro-
dukte Marktzulassungsverfahren in allen 27 Mitgliedstaaten einzeln durchlaufen zu 
müssen (wie im Europäischen Krisen Szenario angenommen). Biotechnologieproduk-
te werden jedoch auch zunehmend eingeschränkten Vergütungsentscheidungen 
unterworfen, die auf vergleichender Evaluation von Arzneimittel basieren. In Anbe-
tracht ihrer hohen Kosten für Forschung und Entwicklung ist der Unternehmenser-
folg dieser Unternehmen von Refinanzierung der Forschungs- und Entwicklungskos-
ten besonders abhängig. 
Im Großhandelssektor wird sich eine internationale Konsolidierungstendenz – sowohl 
horizontal als vertikal– weiter fortsetzen. Der nationale Großhandel wird in zuneh-
mendem Maße auch über die Staatsgrenzen hinaus operieren, was durch harmoni-
sierende Arzneimittelmärkte ermöglicht wird. Der Großhandelssektor wird darüber 
hinaus versuchen, seine Dienstleistungspalette zu erweitern und nach Partnern unter 
Pharmaunternehmen suchen. Nur unter dem Europäischen Krisen Szenario sind sie in 
der Lage, ihre führenden nationalen Positionen infolge unterschiedlicher nationaler 
Regelwerke und Warenangebote beizubehalten. 
Apotheken werden in Zukunft mit vielen Herausforderungen konfrontiert sein, die zu 
einer Veränderung des gesamten Sektors führen werden. Sie sind in zunehmendem 
Maße der europäischen Marktliberalisierung und nationalen Maßnahmen zur Kos-
tendämpfung ausgesetzt. In der Annahme, dass sich das Europäische Krisen Szenario 
nicht verwirklicht, ist es also wahrscheinlich, dass das „goldene Zeitalter“ der Apo-
theken zu einem Ende kommt. Resultate dieser Veränderungen könnten unter-
schiedliche Eigentümerschaften (z.B. Krankenversicherer, Nicht-Apotheker), neue 
vertikale Kombinationen, Apothekenketten, Abschaffung von Staatsmonopolen (wo 
noch präsent) und ein größerer Marktanteil von Online-Apotheken (auch ermöglicht 
durch eine europäisch harmonisierten Produktpalette) sein. 
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Die Nachfrageseite des europäischen pharmazeutischen Marktes zeigt noch sehr 
große Divergenz zwischen den Mitgliedsstaaten. Die Verschreiber stehen allerdings 
überall unter wachsendem Druck, rational zu verschreiben, was ihre Verschreibungs-
freiheit in zunehmendem Maße einschränkt. Wenn Mitgliedsstaaten das Kosten-
dämpfungspotenzial des rationalen Verschreibens ausschöpfen, werden sich die Un-
terschiede im Konsum von Arzneimitteln zwischen Mitgliedsstaaten wahrscheinlich 
im Laufe der Zeit angleichen. Der beobachtete Vertrauensverlust im Arzt-Patienten 
Verhältnis wird wahrscheinlich weiterhin anhalten, nicht zuletzt da Informationen 
aus dem Internet (leider auch von zweifelhaften Quellen) leicht verfügbar bleiben 
werden. Das Europäische Szenario verstärkt dabei die Notwendigkeit, sich auf euro-
päischer Ebene den gemeinsamen Herausforderungen in einen Europäischen Ge-
sundheitsmarkt zu stellen, während unter einem Europäischen Krisen Szenario die 
Notwendigkeit weniger ausgeprägt ist.  
Die Patientengruppen sollten ihre Organisationen stärken, um die stark ausgepräg-
ten Informationsasymmetrien zu vermindern, und sich auf Europaebene eine leis-
tungsfähige Teilnahme zu sichern.  Die zusätzlichen Erwartungen der Nationalregie-
rungen, dass Patienten einen Teil ihrer Behandlungskosten übernehmen, betont die 
Notwendigkeit, die Entwicklungen hinsichtlich Gerechtigkeit (Fairness) des Zugangs 
zu überwachen. Im Moment scheint es weiterhin ein Potenzial für grenzüberschrei-
tende Lieferungen von preiswerteren oder in den Heimatstaaten nicht abrechenba-
ren Arzneimittel zu geben. Patientengruppen können diese Möglichkeiten in der Zu-
kunft stärker berücksichtigen und diese Informationen an ihre Mitglieder weiterge-
ben. Durch die sich dadurch wahrscheinlich anschließenden Rechtsstreite könnten 
sie so eine bahnbrechende Rolle in der Schaffung eines klaren europäischen Regel-
werkes spielen. Das dies, wie im Europäischen Szenario angenommen, letztendlich zu 
einem paneuropäischen Gesundheitssystem führt, ist nicht undenkbar, allerdings 
spielen dabei noch eine Vielzahl anderer Faktoren eine Rolle. 
Sowohl im Experten Szenario als auch im Europäischen Krisen Szenario ist die Auswir-
kung auf die Kostenträger eher geringfügig, da sie in ihrer Entwicklung eher von Ent-
scheidungen nationaler Art abhängig sind. Dies beinhaltet bereits sichtbare Initiati-
ven, die zu mehr Wettbewerb im Versicherungsmarkt geführt haben. Würde sich 
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dagegen das Europäische Szenario durchsetzen, könnten Arzneimittel eine katalysie-
rende Rolle im Hervortreten eines europäischen Gesundheitsmarktes spielen, was 
wiederum zu einem europäischen Krankenversicherungsmarkt, in dem internationa-
le Versicherungskonzerne Policen für einen europäischen (Basis-) Leistungskatalog 
anbieten, führen könnte. Diese Entwicklung könnte eine internationale Konsolidie-
rung der Krankenversicherer auslösen. 
Obwohl im Experten Szenario das (europäische) pharmazeutische Regelwerk insge-
samt zunehmend europäisch geprägt wird, behalten die einzelnen Mitgliedsstaaten 
die Entscheidungskompetenz hinsichtlich Preisregulierung und Vergütung. Jedoch 
werden nationale Gesetzgebungen, die nicht-abrechenbaren Arzneimittel und Arz-
neimitteldistribution unter verstärkter europäischer Beobachtung stehen. Folglich 
sollten Mitgliedsstaaten ihre gesetzlichen Rahmen prüfen und sie in Übereinstim-
mung mit europäischem Recht bringen. Die Erwartung, dass abgesehen von den 
nicht-abrechenbaren Arzneimitteln auch der Generika-Markt zunehmend liberalisiert 
wird, sollte Mitgliedsstaaten motivieren ihre Preispolitik zu untersuchen, um so ei-
nen wettbewerbsfähigen Generika-Markt zu ermöglichen. Die Erwartung, dass eine 
vergleichende Evaluation von Arzneimitteln zunehmend auf Europaebene stattfin-
den wird, heißt nicht notwendigerweise, dass die nationalen Entscheidungskompe-
tenzen bei der Arzneimittelvergütung vermindert werden. Eine verstärkte Zusam-
menarbeit der Mitgliedsstaaten bei der europäischen (vergleichenden) Arzneimit-
televaluierung könnte zu einer deutlichen Effizienzsteigerung führen.  
Falls sich das Europäische Szenario mit einem paneuropäischen Gesundheitssystem 
durchsetzt, könnten Mitgliedsstaaten zu einer weiteren Zusammenarbeit in Hinblick 
auf einen europäischen Basiskatalog gezwungen werden, möglicherweise mit zusätz-
lichem Raum für nationale Kataloge. Anstatt die Idee eines europäischen Basiskata-
loges kategorisch abzulehnen, wäre es für die europäischen Mitgliedsstaaten sicher-
lich vorteilhafter, sich auf diese Entwicklung vorzubereiten. 
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Abstract (English) 
 
The European pharmaceutical sector has received continuous political attention for 
many years. On a national level, rising expenditures on drugs pose a threat to fi-
nancing and accessing health care. The pharmaceutical sector, which is frequently 
growing faster than the GDP and the health sector as a whole, has been the subject 
of many national cost-containment strategies. On a supranational level, the Euro-
pean Union (EU) has an increasing role. Not only does the EU ensure the satisfactory 
delivery of public health, it is also concerned with encouraging the innovativeness 
and competitiveness of this strategically important sector. The main objective of this 
thesis is to examine the impact of future EU regulation and policy on the various 
stakeholders in the European pharmaceutical market, with a focus on industry and 
Member States. To achieve this goal, research was conducted in three steps:  (1) a 
review of the roles, historical contexts and trends of the actors in the European 
pharmaceutical market, including the EU and Member States; (2) the development 
of future scenarios for EU pharmaceutical policy and (3) an analysis of the impact of 
these scenarios on the various stakeholders in the EU pharmaceutical sector.  
The first section discusses all actors using a conceptual framework. Stringent cost-
containment measures result in smaller profit margins for suppliers of pharmaceuti-
cals (the pharmaceutical industry, wholesalers and pharmacies). When compared to 
the US, the European innovative pharmaceutical industry lags behind in competi-
tiveness on such factors as research and development (R&D), labour costs and the 
number of new chemical entities launched. In the wake of the dramatic consolida-
tion trend in the 1990s, European wholesalers tried to cope with the competitive 
environment by expanding their range of services (e.g. logistics for industry). The 
pharmacy sector is one of the most heavily regulated sectors and there are substan-
tial differences across Europe in the number of pharmacies per capita. The pharmacy 
sector is also facing the challenge of competing with pharmacy chains and internet 
pharmacies  
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The demand side of the pharmaceutical market (prescribers, patients and payers) is 
characterized by information asymmetry, in comparison with the supply side. Al-
though a prescriber (doctor) has more pharmaceutical knowledge than a patient, 
new technologies, particularly the internet, help patients access detailed medical 
information, which has changed the doctor-patient relationship. Across Europe, pre-
scribing practices and the consumption of pharmaceuticals differ greatly along cul-
tural and national boundaries. Traditionally, there is little incentive for patients to 
choose less expensive pharmaceuticals, but national policies, such as co-payments, 
try to increase patient interest. The payer (e.g. sickness funds) must design an insur-
ance policy in a heavily government-regulated environment and thus far have not 
played a major role in the containment of pharmaceutical costs. This may be due to 
the existing health care structure in which payers may lack the tools to influence the 
price and volume of pharmaceuticals. 
The regulators in the European pharmaceutical markets are the EU and Member 
States. European pharmaceutical policy has been dominated by EU industrial policy, 
which seeks to liberalize the market and create a single European market (SEM) for 
pharmaceuticals. A remarkable Europeanization trend has been observed over the 
last 40 years; however, the introduction of legally binding European authorization 
procedures in 1995 and the establishment of a governing body (the European Medi-
cines Agency, EMEA) may be considered the last major accomplishments. Instead, 
the European Commission devotes itself to the recommendations of the G10 Medi-
cines Group and focuses on coordinating results rather than secondary legislation, 
such as directives. The judgements of the European Court of Justice concerning, for 
example, intellectual property rights, trademarks, patent protection, parallel trade 
and internet pharmacies have affected national policies and liberalized national mar-
kets. 
Although market authorization, pharmacovigilance, classification and distribution 
have gravitated towards European regulation, Member States have kept the compe-
tence inside their health systems with regard to pricing and reimbursement follow-
ing Article 152 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC). Over the 
last 25 years, Member States have increasingly adopted similar measures to cope 
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with rising pharmaceutical expenditures, which often showed short-term rather than 
long-term effects.   
The second section describes future scenarios for pharmaceutical policy. Key issues 
and variables of European pharmaceutical policy were selected from published lit-
erature. Next, 41 European experts were selected to participate in a Delphi ques-
tionnaire. The results of the questionnaire were used to fill in the Expert Scenario, 
which was then contrasted with a more pessimistic scenario (the European Crisis 
Scenario) and a more optimistic scenario (the European Scenario). 
 (1) The Expert Scenario: Further Europeanization is predicted for the European 
pharmaceutical market in areas where Europe has most competence and European 
law has the largest influence. Authorization, pharmacovigilance, classification, distri-
bution and advertising show a gradual trend towards European regulation. Pricing, 
dispensing, prescribing and reimbursement remain predominantly a national com-
petence and, as a result, limited Europeanization is expected. However, post-
licensing evaluation, which takes place within national health care systems as a com-
petence of the Member States, is an exception and it is not expected to remain a 
solely national matter. It is increasingly adhering to European regulation.  
(2) The European Crisis Scenario: There are many major setbacks in the European 
process, which are largely caused by stalls in the expansion process, a pervasive im-
age problem, an enduring European constitutional crisis and a crisis involving phar-
maceuticals authorized through a common European procedure. Due to the number 
and the magnitude of obstacles, the end result will be a return to national regulation 
and a freezing of the European process.  
(3) The European Scenario: Citizens will have greater trust in the European project 
after the successful passing of the European Constitution. Member States increas-
ingly suffer from border-crossing patients. This threatens the financial balance of 
their health care systems and action is required. Member States will collectively de-
velop a common European benefit basket, leading to a Europeanization of the vari-
ous national health care systems. Ironically, this will not be instigated by the Euro-
pean Commission, but by Member States. 
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The third section analyses the impact of these scenarios on the various actors. De-
spite European efforts to make the pharmaceutical industry more competitive, cur-
rent problems facing the innovative industry may remain in the future. In each of the 
scenarios, it seems unlikely that pricing will become less restrictive or that reim-
bursement decisions will be changed. In the absence of such developments, there 
may be less opportunity to make returns on investments. Nevertheless, the sheer 
size of the increasingly harmonized European markets may enable synergy in terms 
of marketing and market launching.  
The outlook may be more positive for the generic industry. They will be helped by 
favourable generic policies (e.g. generic substitution and faster market access) and 
the existing potential of immature generic markets. Competitiveness is also likely to 
increase as a result of increasing pressure from foreign competitors, leading to 
greater international consolidation. There will likely be less competitive pressure 
under the European Crisis Scenario.  
Highly innovative new biotechnology firms (NBFs), which require centralized authori-
zation, have a vested interest in the continuous development of a European market. 
They may lack the means to file 27 different authorization procedures, which would 
be the case under the European Crisis Scenario. However, biotech products are also 
subjected to restrictive reimbursement decisions that are increasingly based on cost-
effectiveness studies. Considering their high R&D costs, biotech products are espe-
cially vulnerable.  
The European wholesaling sector will continue to consolidate internationally, both 
vertically and horizontally. Wholesalers not only purchase and distribute within na-
tional boundaries, they also increasingly engage in cross-border purchasing and dis-
tribution, enabled by converging pharmaceutical markets. The wholesaling sector 
may cope by expanding their range of services and by searching for partners in the 
pharmaceutical industry. Only under the European Crisis Scenario are they able to 
retain their leading national position, mostly owing to divergent national frameworks 
and product ranges.  
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Pharmacies will be faced with many challenges, leading to a completely different 
operating environment. They are increasingly the subject of European market liber-
alization and national cost-containment policies. It seems likely that their golden 
days will gradually come to an end, based on the assumption that the European Cri-
sis Scenario does not materialize. The result will be a variety of forms of ownership 
(e.g. insurer-owned and non-pharmacist-owned pharmacies), new vertical combina-
tions, the chaining of pharmacies, the abolishment of state monopolies and the 
emergence of internet pharmacies enabled by increasingly harmonized products sold 
in Europe.  
There are significant differences between Member States in terms of the demand 
side of the European pharmaceutical market. Prescribers will be under growing pres-
sure to prescribe conservatively and their freedom to prescribe as they see fit may 
be increasingly challenged. Differences in consumption patterns are likely to con-
verge over time when high consumption countries realize the cost-containment po-
tential of rational prescribing. Furthermore, the observed loss of trust in the patient-
prescriber relationship is unlikely to abate. Information is readily available on the 
internet and it will only increase, unfortunately not always from credible sources. 
The European Scenario reinforces the necessity to organize at the European level in 
order to effectively face common challenges. Such a necessity is not emphasized un-
der the European Crisis Scenario and, therefore, may be less essential. 
The various patients groups should improve their organizations in an effort to coun-
ter information asymmetry and to participate more effectively in discussions on a 
European level, discussions that may have far reaching consequences. The growing 
expectation, on behalf of national governments, that patients should be increasingly 
responsible for pharmaceutical costs stresses the need to monitor developments 
regarding equity of access. There seems to be, as of yet, the potential to obtain 
cheaper and, in the home state, non-reimbursed pharmaceuticals through the cross-
border delivery of pharmaceuticals. Patient groups can look into such opportunities 
and inform their members. They could play a pioneering role, also through litigation 
and the articulation of these options and force clarity in these frameworks. It is con-
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ceivable that this would lead to the emergence of a European health care system as 
assumed in the European Scenario, but it depends on many factors.    
The impact on the payer is negligible in both the Expert Scenario and the European 
Crisis Scenario. Payers will develop in accordance with decisions made at a national 
level. Their development is likely to contain visible national trends, which would re-
sult in some form of managed competition in the insurance market. Furthermore, in 
the event that the European Scenario materializes, pharmaceuticals would play a 
catalysing role in the emergence of a European health market and, possibly in the 
future, a European health insurance market in which international insurers offer 
health insurance policies for a basic European health basket. This could also provoke 
an international consolidation trend between health insurers.  
Although the Expert Scenario predicts a Europeanization of the European pharma-
ceutical framework regarding, for example, authorization, classification (although 
nationally implemented) and wholesaling, Member States would retain regulatory 
authority on vital decisions concerning their respective health care systems. How-
ever, all national legislation that interferes with non-reimbursed medicines is likely 
to encounter intensified European scrutiny. Furthermore, the regulatory framework 
for the pharmacy and wholesaling sector is expected to liberalize over the next 20 
years. Therefore, Member States should assess their respective pharmacy and 
wholesaling frameworks in an effort to improve their adherence to European law. 
The expected liberalization of the generic market, with the exception of non-
reimbursed medicine markets, should motivate Member States to assess their pric-
ing policies in order to facilitate a competitive generic market. The possibility that 
post-licensing evaluation will become increasingly regulated at the European level 
would not necessarily threaten the national competence of a particular Member 
State. Therefore, for efficiency’s sake, it is in the best interest of Member States to 
collaborate in this field.  If the European Scenario materializes and a European health 
care system develops, Member States could be forced into collaborating on a basic 
European benefits basket, possibly with additional national catalogues. Instead of 
categorically refusing the idea, it would be prudent to study the various options and 
potential outcomes in order to be prepared.  
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Introduction 
 
The European pharmaceutical sector has received continuous political attention for 
many years. On a national level, the rising expenditures on drugs pose a threat to 
financing and accessing health care. The pharmaceutical sector, which at times is 
growing faster than the GDP and the health sector as a whole, has been the subject 
of many national cost-containment strategies. 
Although pharmaceutical policy is primarily considered a national concern (pricing 
and reimbursement), the role of the European Union is expanding. Not only does the 
EU ensure the satisfactory delivery of public health, it also encourages innovation 
and competition. The pharmaceutical sector, a high growth and innovation-intensive 
industry, is a main provider of employment, the main contributor to the European 
trade balance and, consequently, it is of high strategic importance. Subsequent re-
ports drafted for the Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry state that Eu-
rope is lagging behind in competitiveness when compared with the US (Gambardella 
et al. 2000; Pammolli et al. 2004). Indicators like research and development (R&D), 
size of the European industry and growth rate point out that the European pharma-
ceutical sector is losing out to its main competitors. Furthermore, EU policy and Eu-
ropean law, including the Four Freedoms (the free movement of goods, workers, 
capital and services), EU competition law and the EU Social Chapter, have resulted in 
the expansion of regulations, such as anti-trust laws and an increasingly harmonized 
marketing authorization procedure. The rulings of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) also significantly influence the organization of the health care systems of Mem-
ber States. 
Although the ultimate goal of the EU is the creation of a single European market 
(SEM), the plan has been modified in an attempt to liberalize the market. Member 
States are unwilling to give up their regulatory authority out of fear the outcomes 
will negatively impact domestic industry (i.e. job loss) and their respective health 
care systems (i.e. more reimbursable products and/or higher prices for pharmaceuti-
cals), depending on state-specific goals. The persistency of this fear is exemplified by 
the use of the subsidiarity principle.  
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The High Level Group on Innovation and Provision of Medicines (G10), constituted in 
March 2001 by the European Commission, resulted in a series of recommendations 
regarding the European pharmaceutical sector. This report examined how the EU can 
achieve the seemingly dichotomous goal of innovation (competitiveness) and provi-
sion (accessibility) and it provides a direction for EU policy. The G10 recom-
mendations can be seen as a break from the traditional approach, which stresses 
harmonization in favour of a more realistic approach of co-ordinating national results 
instead of the underlying rules themselves. However, it remains unclear how the G10 
recommendations and traditional EU policy will affect the various stakeholders in the 
European pharmaceutical sector. This uncertainty weakens national support and 
threatens to constrain the development of a single European market for pharmaceu-
ticals.  
This thesis seeks to estimate the impact of the increasing role of EU policy on the 
Member States in the European pharmaceutical market. What are realistic and fea-
sible scenarios for the future of pharmaceutical policy? What will be the implications 
for the delicate balance between the social nature of health services and national 
competence on the one side and internal market legislation and European compe-
tence on the other? What will be the impact on the organization of the pharmaceu-
tical sector? This thesis will also attempt to answer whether EU policy will result in 
more competitive industry and better pharmaceutical provision. Do national gov-
ernments have legitimate reasons to be concerned about the impact of EU policy on 
national policy? Will EU policy lead to job loss, more expensive medicines and re-
stricted access because of changes to the list of reimbursed pharmaceuticals?  
Objectives 
The main objective of this thesis is to examine the impact of future EU regulation and 
policy on the various stakeholders in the European pharmaceutical market, with a 
focus on industry and Member States.  
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Scope of the thesis 
This thesis includes all EU Member States. However, since the EU has only recently 
begun expanding eastward, emphasis is placed on the original EU15 Member States 
and their historical contexts. Furthermore, all actors in the pharmaceutical market 
are included but emphasis is placed on supply side actors and Member States. The 
period 1960 to 2025 is used as the timeframe. 
In achieving this goal, research was conducted in three steps: 
1. A literature review of the roles, historical contexts, characteristics and visible trends 
of the actors in the European pharmaceutical market, including the European Union 
and Member States 
2. The development of future scenarios for EU/Member State pharmaceutical policy 
3. An analysis of the impact of these scenarios on the various stakeholders in the EU 
pharmaceutical sector  
Research strategy, methods used and structure of thesis 
This thesis takes a qualitative approach. A literature review provides the background 
information for the scenarios. A scenario is a compilation of trends that provide a 
possible outcome for the future. Scenarios are useful tools for uncovering new in-
formation and showing how interacting sets of trends may lead to a range of condi-
tions (Garrett 1999). The following fundamental components are involved in creating 
scenarios, as described in the World Health Organization (WHO) commissioned 
“Health futures: A handbook for health professionals” (Garret 1999): 
 Clarifying issues 
 Acquiring information 
 Analysing the system 
 Describing the past and present 
 Imagining future trends 
 Framing the scenarios 
 Filling in the scenarios 
 Evaluating the scenarios 
 Applying the results 
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Such a structured approach decreases the chance that important issues are over-
looked, therefore, contributing to the validity and reliability of the research. Applied 
to the three-step approach, the following plan was developed and implemented: 
Part I: Literature review 
Tasks: 
 Clarify issues: Which issues need to be addressed and which issues will be given pri-
ority? This step was necessary to ensure that nothing was overseen and that the 
scope of the research was clear. This step is described in the introductory chapter. 
 Acquiring information: A literature review was conducted and search criteria were 
drafted, which were applied accordingly:  
o Searching grey sources of information. Searching the internet using conven-
tional search engines 
o Searching online databases. Searching PubMed, EconLit, IBSS, Decomate II 
and Medline 
o Searching European Commission documents and ECJ rulings 
o Manual search of relevant journals such as Pharmacoeconomics, Health Eco-
nomics, Journal of Health Economics, Health Planning and Management, and 
Health Policy 
o Systematically tracing back relevant references  
 Analysing the system: In this step, information was analysed in order to understand 
the structure or system under consideration (Garret 1999). Activities consisted of 
determining the structure of the pharmaceutical market, identifying which input var-
iables are important and identifying the actors and the strategies that they used. 
What are their goals, activities, resources, limitations, behaviours, interests, mecha-
nisms, schemes and relations? The results of this step created the conceptual 
framework of the pharmaceutical market presented in Chapter 1.  
 Describing the past and present: A review was written on the current state of the Eu-
ropean pharmaceutical market, including actors (Chapter 2), the European Union 
and European pharmaceutical policy (Chapter 3) and national pharmaceutical policy 
(Chapter 4). This review provided the foundations for the scenarios.  
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Part II: Building scenarios 
Tasks: 
 Imagining future trends and events: A list of uncertainties and trends for the future 
was formed through systematic scanning of social, economic, technological and po-
litical factors. Then, projections were made of current trends in key variables. The 
results of this component include any projections regarding trends in key variables, 
in addition to the generated list of possible future trends and events. Applied to the 
European pharmaceutical market, trends and/or events were the full adoption of 
G10 recommendations or more national autonomy, which made the key variable 
ranging from EU regulation to national regulation.            
 Framing the scenarios: This step involved making assumptions. These assumptions 
are often expressed as conditional phrases, such as “if G10 recommendations are 
adopted” or “if SEM for medicines could be achieved, the future would look like …”. 
A base scenario (a scenario based on current trends) was constructed, which was 
then contrasted with a more pessimistic and a more optimistic scenario. Another 
approach would have been to generate two axes of uncertainty (a spectrum), using 
the information uncovered at the previous step (imagining future trends and 
events). These axes could then have been used to build a matrix (two axes crossing), 
which would result in four different quadrants and four different scenarios. How-
ever, in order to conduct a feasible research and analysis, this approach was dis-
carded. The Delphi technique was used to make assumptions. It is a method of ob-
taining a reliable consensus from a group of experts through a series of question-
naires interspersed with controlled feedback (Garret 1999). In the Delphi question-
naires, experts were asked to predict the nature of selected topics, for example, in 
2010, 2015 and 2025. After two rounds, a consensus on the various trends became 
apparent, providing the foundations of a (base) scenario. The chosen methodology is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 5 and its results are outlined in Section 6.1. 
 Filling in the scenarios: The scenarios were filled in after a decision was made about 
the frame. The frame was set according to the assumptions and key variables pre-
dicted for the future. The construction process involved finishing these assumptions 
and discussing what would happen if the assumed conditions, in fact, developed in 
the future. This included outcomes on key issues, those addressed in Clarify Issues 
(Step 1), as well as narrative descriptions (Section 6.2), for which the literature re-
view was consulted (Chapters 3 and 4). 
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Part III: Analysis 
Tasks: 
 Evaluating the scenarios: The impact of the scenarios on the various stakeholders 
was made on key issues (Chapter 7) through systematic analysis and the interpreta-
tion of the scenarios and using the information from Step 1. What threats and op-
portunities could these imagined scenarios present?  
 Applying the results: After the scenarios have been created and their implications 
identified, the results of work can finally be applied (Garret 1999). In the application 
stage, the results of the evaluation were interpreted, after which advice and rec-
ommendations were given in the form of a discussion. 
  21 
Methodological background  
It is important to note that the analysis in Part III is based on certain hypothetical 
assumptions. These assumptions, which were made while framing the scenarios, are 
based on the interpretations of the data provided by international experts in the 
European pharmaceutical policy questionnaire. To boost the validity of these sce-
narios, experts have been selected according to several criteria and questioned on a 
variety of pharmaceutical policy-relevant topics (see Part II). The interpretations of 
the data (see Figure 1 for a schematic depiction), which came in the form of numbers 
on a five-point Likert scale, was done using the knowledge and findings of an exten-
sive review of European and national policies (see Chapters 3 and 4 of Part I). In Part 
III, these scenarios are interpreted in the light of the findings from Chapters 1 and 2 
(Part I). To increase the transparency of the analysis, references are used where the 
analysis bases itself on previous research and on references from Part I of this thesis.   
 
Figure 1. Schematic structure of the thesis. 
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PART I: REVIEW  
1 Conceptual model of the European pharmaceutical   
market 
 
The pharmaceutical market is a complex market shaped by competing policy goals 
and interests and frequent public intervention. The number of conflicting actors 
makes this market an extremely intricate system. Not only do different policy goals 
and perspectives exist between the various actors in the market, differences also 
exist within actors. National governments, for example, have to fulfil both health 
care and industrial policy goals. Due to the high number of actors, it is useful to or-
ganize them according to a conceptual model. Therefore, this chapter will discuss a 
simple model of the European pharmaceutical market, which is used as the basis for 
analysis and is based on the pharmaceutical value chain and the medical care triad. 
Next, the other actors are identified together with their policy perspectives and func-
tions. The model clearly demonstrates that the European pharmaceutical market, in 
fact, consists of three markets on different levels (Schut 1993). The vertical chain of 
producer, wholesaler and pharmacist forms the supply side of the pharmaceutical 
market or the pharmaceutical value chain, while consumers (patients), prescribers 
(physician) and payers comprise the demand side. European and national regulations 
impact all levels. 
The value chain consists of several links (see Figure 2). The first link consists of the 
manufacturers, the pharmaceutical industry and the importers of pharmaceuticals. 
Manufacturers and importers form the first market, from where they deliver their 
products to wholesalers. There are roughly three types of manufacturers: manufac-
turers of innovative pharmaceuticals, manufacturers of generics and new biotech-
nology firms (NBFs).  
Innovative, branded pharmaceuticals are mostly on-patent, which allows the com-
pany to sell the product without competition and regain investments made in costs it 
made in R&D. As soon as the pharmaceutical loses its patent, other producers can 
produce the drug, set their own price and try to compete for market share. These 
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off-patent drugs, known as generics, are nearly perfect substitutes and are often 
more affordable alternatives to patented pharmaceuticals (Mrazek and Frank 2004). 
The innovative industry has higher R&D costs but it can receive a high return on in-
vestment when new drugs are licensed and reimbursed. Another important aspect of 
this market is that it is highly international. Many innovative companies are multi-
nationals that deliver their products internationally. The generic industry, however, 
mainly operates within national borders.    
In the second market, wholesalers distribute pharmaceuticals to pharmacies. There 
are two types of wholesalers: full-line wholesaler and short-line wholesaler. While 
the former provides a full range of drugs and operates on a national or regional level, 
the latter provides a specialized limited range, often at competitive prices. Not all 
European countries allow short-line wholesalers (e.g. France and Italy) because there 
is a perceived public interest (Taylor et al. 2004a). In contrast with globally-operating 
manufacturers, most wholesalers traditionally conduct business within their domes-
tic market, although there is an observed consolidation trend, fuelled by the pursuit 
of economies of scale. Various sizes and forms of pharmacies exist within the EU. 
Most important European variants are community pharmacies and hospital pharma-
cies. Mail-order and online pharmacies are growing in popularity. Due to public 
health priorities and its key position in controlling pharmaceutical expenditures, 
pharmaceutical distribution is subject to strong national regulation. It is worth noting 
that the lines between manufacturers, wholesalers and community pharmacies be-
come blurred in cases where there is vertical integration between them (Taylor et al. 
2004a). This second market has many international characteristics, though not to the 
same degree as the first market.  
In the third market, the drug gets dispensed to the consumer. The physician pre-
scribes the drug and the consumer collects the pharmaceutical and receives reim-
bursement from the payer. Strong information asymmetry exists between the de-
mand side (consumer, payer and prescriber) and the supply side (manufacturer, 
wholesaler and pharmacist). Furthermore, it is an insurance market in which the 
payer has to facilitate access to drugs for the most vulnerable groups in the popula-
tion, as individual expenses can be quite substantial. The insurance system removes 
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the incentive for the consumer to opt for less expensive pharmaceuticals, which 
greatly increases the chances for moral hazard. The prescriber’s chief duty is to pre-
scribe the pharmaceutical he/she deems appropriate, regardless of price. This third 
market is primarily national and is subject to various strict national regulatory 
frameworks. The medical care triad depicts the health insurance market in a funda-
mental way to illustrate that payers mediate between the provider and patients. The 
triad constitutes the bottom part of the model and forms the demand side of the 
pharmaceutical market. 
The pharmaceutical market is far more intricate than these three markets suggest. 
These markets consist of smaller, highly fragmented markets for specific therapeutic 
classes of pharmaceuticals in which certain manufacturers are strongly represented 
and often dominate during the duration of their patents. The pharmaceutical mar-
ket, therefore, is characterized by monopolistic and oligopolistic market structures. 
Other relevant classifications are prescription-only medicines (POMs), which mainly 
consist of publicly reimbursed innovative and generic drugs and over-the-counter 
drugs (OTCs), also referred to as non-prescription pharmaceuticals. This is not an 
exhaustive list as more classifications and definitions will be discussed in due time.  
National governments and the European Commission are not a direct component of 
the pharmaceutical value chain, but both have had an increasingly important role 
within the European pharmaceutical market. National governments and the Euro-
pean Commission exert influence on all levels as the most important policy makers 
and legislative powers. One cannot conceive a national government or the European 
Union as one single actor. Both have different departments and institutions, which 
represent different stakes and views. All these departments and institutions influ-
ence the actors according to their specific policy objectives. Generally, there are two 
main competing pharmaceutical policy interests: health policy and industrial policy 
(see Table 1). However, there are also two potentially conflicting perspectives within 
health policy: the health care perspective and the public health perspective. 
At the national level, health policy is dictated by the health ministries of Member 
States. The Ministry of Trade and Industry advocates for industrial policy. At the su-
pranational level, the Directorate-General for Health and Consumer Protection main-
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ly advocates for public health policy objectives, less so for health care perspectives. 
Industrial policy is the domain of the Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry.  
Table 1. Competing policy objectives regarding pharmaceuticals. 
Health policy Industrial policy 
Health care perspective Public health perspective  
Containing cost and improv-
ing efficiency in health ser-
vices and care 
Safe medicines Promoting local research and 
development capacity 
Cost-effective medication High-quality preparations Protecting intellectual prop-
erty rights 
Regulating doctor and con-
sumer behaviour regarding 
medicines 
Efficacious treatments Supporting local scientific 
community 
Generic promotion and/or 
substitution 
Innovative cures Generating and protecting 
employment 
Improving prescribing Patient access to medicines Promoting small and medi-
um enterprise policies 
Ensuring access to medicines  Contributing to positive 
trade balance 
  Sustaining the university 
research base 
Source: Permanand and Altenstetter (2004). 
The European Medicines Agency (EMEA) and the respective national licensing au-
thorities are responsible for the admission of pharmaceuticals to European markets. 
A pharmaceutical company can submit a pharmaceutical to more than one Member 
State through the centralized procedure (EMEA) or the decentralized procedure 
(through a national licensing authority). When a pharmaceutical company seeks to 
submit a pharmaceutical to only one Member State, it is accomplished through a 
solely national procedure (by a national licensing authority). The EMEA is regulated 
by the DG Enterprise and Industry. The European Court of Justice also wields consid-
erable influence. It is the function of the ECJ to uphold the principles of European 
law, including the free movement of goods and free competition. Its rulings can sig-
nificantly impact national policies.  
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The following chapters of Part I elaborate on the actors of the pharmaceutical mar-
ket. Chapter 2 describes the supply and demand sides of the European pharmaceuti-
cal market, whereas Chapters 3 and 4 discuss the respective roles of the European 
Union and Member States.  
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Figure 2. Stakeholders in the European pharmaceutical market: functions  
and policy objectives. 
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Based on: Nyfer (1997) and Permanand and Altenstetter (2004). 
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2 The European pharmaceutical market: A description 
 
In this chapter, the European pharmaceutical market is described according to the 
model outlined in Chapter 1. This chapter seeks to describe the characteristics and 
trends of the actors, such as size and market behaviour. The regulation that applies 
to these stakeholders is discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
The European pharmaceutical market (see Table 2) is one of the largest in the world, 
covering roughly between 26% and 30% of the world share in the last decade. More-
over, the pharmaceutical sector provides a significant contribution (over €22 billion 
in 2001 and over €30 billion in 20041) to the EU trade balance and is the fifth largest 
industrial sector in the EU, amounting to 2.8% of the total manufacturing production 
for the EU15 and to 2.71% for the EU25 (Eurostat in: Pammolli et al. 2004). Although 
roughly the same size at the beginning of the 1990s, the European market is no 
longer growing at the same rate as the North American market. Nonetheless, Euro-
pean pharmaceutical trade involves many people on different levels and is of consid-
erable economic importance to almost all European Member States. 
Table 2. Size of the market for pharmaceuticals, 1989–2003.  
 1989 1990 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total (USD billion) 
World  155.3 165.8 280.3 300.6 332.6 357.3 389.4 424.8 491.7 
Regional share (%) 
North 
America  
34.0 32.4 31.2 39.2 41.5 44.0 47.2 48.4 46.7 
Europe  31.0 26.5 29.6 28.4 26.3 23.7 24.0 25.0 27.5 
Africa/ 
Australia/ 
Asia  
30.0 35.1 32.4 25.1 25.9 25.8 22.9 21.7 21.4 
Latin 
America  
5.0 5.9 6.8 7.4 6.2 6.5 6.0 4.9 4.5 
Source: IMS International in: Pammolli et al. (2004). 
In Europe (2003), the largest markets are Germany (€24 631 million), France (€22 
583 million), Italy (€15 592 million), Spain (€10 794 million) and the UK (€10 386 mil-
                                            
1
 According to Eurostat on DG Enterprise site, accessed 01/08/2007. 
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lion). They are the largest global markets after the US (1st) and Japan (2nd; IMS In-
ternational in: Pammolli et al. 2004). The following sections discuss the supply and 
demand of the European pharmaceutical market. 
2.1 Supply side 
The supply side of the pharmaceutical market (i.e. the pharmaceutical value chain) is 
often referred to as the “golden chain” due to the potential for high profit achieved 
by manufacturers, wholesalers and pharmacists. However, the operating environ-
ment has changed over the last decade. Governments have been putting greater 
emphasis on cost-containment, which puts pressure on the profit margins of phar-
maceutical suppliers. Another important development is new technology, most no-
tably the emergence of life sciences and the rising role of the internet. The former 
enables new processes of drug discovery and development for the pharmaceutical 
industry, while the latter is challenging distribution and the pharmacy sector with 
online pharmacies.  
2.1.1 European pharmaceutical industry 
Historically, big pharmaceutical industries and major innovations were the domain of 
German and Swiss companies, a position that was increasingly challenged after the 
Second World War by firms based in the US and UK. In the years following the war, 
the pharmaceutical industry experienced a boom, also spurred by new research op-
portunities created by advances in the field of synthetic drugs. This ushered in the 
first golden age of the pharmaceutical industry and, as a result, it became known for 
being a growing innovation-intensive industry, one crucial to a country’s economy 
and public health. However, the thalidomide disaster of the 1960s (see Chapter 3), 
waning innovation in the 1970s and growing criticism regarding the burden of phar-
maceutical cost on health budgets (Feick 2000) contributed to a decline in the indus-
try’s image.  
The thalidomide disaster highlighted the need for stricter pharmacovigilance. Con-
sequently, national regulatory mechanisms were put in place throughout Europe 
during the 1960s. In the early years, these regulatory systems mainly safeguarded 
the quality and accessibility of pharmaceutical provision (i.e. public health perspec-
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tive). However, as early as the 1980s, containing pharmaceutical expenditures (i.e. 
health care perspective) became more and more a policy objective in European 
States, making the operating environment of the pharmaceutical industry even more 
difficult. The results were more stringent pricing and reimbursement regimes, which 
affected the structure of demand in all major markets.  
Furthermore, new technological developments in the field of life sciences caused not 
only a complete overhaul of the processes of drug discovery and development, but 
higher R&D costs. This development, along with increased pressure from cost-
containment policies, caused more globally-operating companies to seek economies 
of scale, often through mergers, joint ventures and acquisitions and to conduct lar-
ger, costlier internationally-based clinical trials. Developments in legislation and in 
the legal interpretation of intellectual property rights, as well as the recent openness 
of domestic markets to foreign competition, have influenced patterns of industrial 
competition and have altered the structure of the industry (Gambardella et al. 2000). 
These developments suggest an increase in the resources needed to develop new 
drugs and have led to a reorientation towards core competencies like R&D and inno-
vation, in addition to marketing and distribution. 
Industry structure 
Two types of pharmaceutical producers exist within the European pharmaceutical 
industry: manufacturers of patented (innovative) drugs and manufacturers of generic 
drugs. The innovative industry consists of globally-operating, multinational compa-
nies, which cover between 40% and 60% of most national markets in advanced coun-
tries (Gambardella et al. 2000). These companies are typically represented in many 
countries on different continents. Although they have a good share of activities and 
sales in their respective domestic markets, they also set divisions and activities in 
other countries and regions, particularly in Europe and the US. These are highly R&D-
intensive companies with large R&D and marketing divisions. Investments can be re-
earned through patents, which allow companies to have a temporary monopoly. 
The generic industry typically exists of smaller national companies, operating almost 
exclusively in their domestic market. They are specialized in the sales of off-patent 
(generic) and non-R&D-intensive pharmaceuticals. They conduct mainly manufac-
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turing and commercialization activities and do not invest in R&D (Gambardella et al. 
2000). Off-patent drugs are free for other companies to produce and, consequently, 
there is more price competition in their segment and prices can be expected to be 
lower than in-patent drugs.  
In the last twenty years, the so-called new biotechnology firms (NBFs) have emerged 
among national companies. These research-intensive companies developed from 
opportunities presented by the life sciences. These companies specialize in biotech-
nology and their activities range from the discovery and development of new drug 
compounds to the development of new drug screening and research tools and to the 
development of technologies in related fields, such as genomics and bioinformatics. 
In order to develop products, NBFs must compete for financing and the attention of 
large multinationals, which are the market incumbents and have the necessary sales 
channel. The multinationals are eager to put the biotech products in their portfolios 
through biopartnering (EuropaBio 2005).  
The European pharmaceutical industry is a high growth manufacturing stronghold in 
many Member States, with the largest pharmaceutical production in France, which 
generated a production value of €34 495 million in 2001, followed by Germany with 
€23 251 million and the UK with €17 224 million (see Table 3).  
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Table 3. Production value, pharmaceuticals (NACE 24.4), constant million, €, 1995–2001. 
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
France  23554 26002 27891 29868 33065 34495  
Germany     20870 22158 23251 
United Kingdom  10265 13111 12979 14375 15782 17224 
Italy 11954 14696 13732 14703 15843 15342 15674 
Spain 6190 6411 6117 6165 6427 6872 7528 
Belgium 4143 4033 4051 4041 5059 5672 6655 
Netherlands 3283 4069 4601 4853 5217 5494 5489 
Denmark 2216 2505 2866 3081 3467 3318 3910 
Ireland 1732 1699 2086 2337 3618 3932 3898 
Austria 1468  1657 1919 1777 2432 1781 
Finland 665 652 732 688 704 755 826 
Portugal 921 811 915 740 813 790 729 
Slovak Republic 175 197 196 164 144 143 158 
Czech Republic 314 295 311 248 244 313 329 
US 67394 70671 74917 82214 95446 117460 114039 
Source: Eurostat and OECD in: Pammolli et al. (2004).  
The leading pharmaceutical corporations in the European market are also among the 
leading corporations in the world (see Tables 4 and 5). After the heavily contested 
2004 takeover of the German-French-owned Aventis by the French Sanofi-
Synthelabo, the new Sanofi-Aventis is the largest competitor in the European phar-
maceutical market, with a market share of 8.5% (2005), followed by the American-
owned Pfizer with 7.2% and the Swiss-owned Novartis with 5.9%. The largest ten 
companies in Europe have a market share of 47.2%. 
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Table 4. Leading pharmaceutical corporations (turnover) worldwide, 2005. 
Rank Corporation Millions (€) Market share (%) 
1 Pfizer 39 341 8.4 
2 GlaxoSmithKline 28 820 6.2 
3 Sanofi-Aventis 24 553 5.3 
4 Novartis 23 212 5.0 
5 Johnson & Johnson 21 100 4.5 
6 AstraZeneca 19 917 4.3 
7 Merck&Co 19 516 4.2 
8 Roche 16 276 3.5 
9 Abbot 13 073 2.8 
10 Wyeth 12 230 2.6 
 Subtotal 218 039 46.8 
Total worldwide 466 016 100.0 
Source:  IMS in: GIRP (2005).  
 
 
Table 5. Leading pharmaceutical corporations (turnover) in Europe, 2005. 
Rank Corporation Millions (€) Market share (%) 
1. Sanofi-Aventis 10 051 8.5 
2. Pfizer 8564 7.2 
3. Novartis 7041 5.9 
4. GlaxoSmithKline  7024 5.9 
5. AstraZeneca 5671 4.8 
6. Roche 4559 3.8 
7. Merck&Co 3835 3.2 
8. Johnson & Johnson 3723 3.1 
9. Wyeth 3016 2.5 
10. Lilly 2642 2.3 
 Subtotal 56 124 47.2 
Total Europe 118 794 100.0 
Source: IMS in: GIRP (2005).  
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According to the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations 
(EFPIA) in 2004, the research-based pharmaceutical industry accounted for about 
3.5% of the total EU manufacturing value added and for 15% of the total R&D ex-
penditures of EU businesses. Furthermore, the European research-based industry 
employs 588 000 people, of which 100 500 are in R&D units. R&D investment in 2002 
was €20 200 million (up from €7900 million in 1990) and the trade surplus amounted 
to €36 000 million in 2002. According to the European Generic Medicines Association 
(EGA), their members (i.e. the European generic industry) employed over 100 000 
people in 2003. 
The European biotechnology industry is comprised of 1976 companies, mainly in 
Germany (525), the UK (455) and France (225) and employs 94 000 people, of whom 
35 000 are in R&D (EuropaBio 2005).2  
The Pammolli Reports on the competitiveness of the European pharmaceutical sector 
In 2000, a Pammolli report, “Global Competitiveness in Pharmaceuticals: a European 
Perspective”, was drafted for the Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry 
(Gambardella et al. 2000) addressing the global competitiveness of the European 
industry. It states that the European pharmaceutical industry has been a stronghold 
of the European industry, providing by far the largest contribution to the European 
trade balance in high-technology, R&D intensive sectors. It is a main source of em-
ployment and a producer of pharmaceuticals, which are greatly important in achiev-
ing public health policy goals in all countries. For these reasons, the European phar-
maceutical industry is regarded as a strategically important area for the welfare of 
the European Union. However, this sector has begun to show cracks in its founda-
tions. The report shows that the European pharmaceutical sector is losing out to the 
United States and it provides four conclusions: 
1. The European pharmaceutical sector is more labour intensive than the US or Japa-
nese industries. The US and Japanese industries rely on non-labour inputs, such as 
capital or R&D. Consequently, specialization is less pronounced in R&D activities and 
non-R&D-intensive firms have a larger presence in European industry. Furthermore, 
                                            
2
 The 2005 EuropaBio study only surveyed 15 European countries, namely the EU15, excluding Lux-
embourg and Greece but including Norway and Switzerland. Therefore, this number does not take the 
new EU accession countries into account. 
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the European pharmaceutical industry grew less than the US industry in the 1990s, 
which was mostly due to the growth of American non-labour inputs (including R&D). 
Also, these developments should not be separated from the effects of national regu-
latory regimes (e.g. pricing policy). 
2. Globally-operating multinationals largely compete for new innovative products or 
new chemical entities (NCEs), which require substantial R&D investments. In the 
1990s, US companies had become clear leaders in NCE sales. European multination-
als, on the other hand, tend to have older portfolios of products than US firms. US 
firms enjoy a comparative advantage when selling their new drugs. The US market 
grew rapidly in the 1990s after being roughly the same size as the European market 
at the beginning of the decade. Although these multinationals operate internation-
ally, the bulk of their sales are within their own domestic market. 
3. The US also became the leader of innovation in pharmaceuticals during the 1990s, 
whereas Europe remains unable to produce a full-fledged industry of innovation-
specialized companies and technology suppliers. Furthermore, European companies 
increasingly rely on the US for sources of research capabilities and innovation. The 
US biotechnology industry created a large number of new jobs and produced many 
new world-class drug companies (e.g. Amgen, Chiron, Genzyme), several new drug 
tool companies and a stream of revenues in the form of royalties from licenses or 
R&D contracts and collaborations.   
4. While some are more competitive than others, national European markets need to 
improve in overall competitiveness. This is demonstrated by the data on prices and 
market share after patent expiration as illustrated in the report. In a competitive 
market, a price drop, often caused by the entry of cheaper generics, is a typical con-
sequence of patent expiration but in many European markets, there is no substantial 
change. This nurtures inefficient behaviour and a lack of competitiveness.  
The Pammolli report was one of the main reasons for the instalment of the G10 
Medicines Group. The European Commission adopted the vision displayed in the 
report on headlines. Strengthening the competitiveness of European pharmaceutical 
industry has since been an important EU industrial policy objective (see Chapter 3).  
A 2004 update by Pammolli et al. made clear that the European pharmaceutical in-
dustry is still behind in R&D and in other factors, excluding labour (e.g. on capital). 
Even if the European industry has experienced a substantial reduction in the share of 
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labour cost on the value of production in 2000 and 2001, the European industry is 
still labour-intensive compared to the US. Moreover, the share of added value over 
production is still lower in Europe than in Japan and the US. US firms still lead in 
terms of innovative activities, sales and geographical diffusion of NCEs launched in 
the market place. Although European corporations have increased their market 
shares and the share of total sales from newly introduced products, they are still 
behind US firms.  
These patterns were, as far as the biotechnology sector is concerned, confirmed in 
the 2005 report “Biotechnology in Europe: 2005 Comparative Study” drafted for the 
European Association for Bioindustries (EuropaBio). The report states that the Euro-
pean biotechnology sector does not compete with the US sector in terms of any 
measurable value (e.g. number of employees, R&D, revenues and venture capital 
raised, with the notable exception of company numbers) and that European entre-
preneurs establish companies at a 50% higher rate than the US. The report identifies 
“the financing gap” as the main obstacle for a competitive European biotechnology 
industry, which results in a high amount of collapsed companies after three to five 
years.   
2.1.2 Wholesalers 
The wholesaling sector has undergone the same trends as those in the pharmaceuti-
cal industry sector. Due to competitive pressures, stringent national market regula-
tion and decreasing profit margins (approximately 27% since the beginning of the 
1990s), a dramatic consolidation trend occurred in the last decade, which slowed 
down to some extent between 2000 and 2004 (Clement et al. 2005). This trend 
leaves winners with a new strategic orientation and large market shares. In the early 
1990s, there were approximately 600 nationally operating full-line wholesalers in the 
EU15 countries, compared to 151 as of 2004 (Clement et al. 2005). There are consid-
erable differences in the number of wholesalers in each country. Of the 600 national 
full-line wholesalers in 1992, 70% were based in Italy and Spain (Taylor et al. 2004a), 
but the consolidation trend is visible throughout Europe. For example, from 1992 to 
2002, the number of wholesalers in Italy went down from 259 to 149, from 25 to 16 
in Germany, from 19 to 11 in France, from 20 to 14 in the UK, from 41 to 27 in Bel-
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gium and from seven to four in the Netherlands. In Poland, a new accession country, 
the number went down from 600 to 250 in the same period (Long 2002).  
The effect of this development is that in many European markets the three largest 
wholesalers have huge market shares varying from roughly 40% to 95%. In 2002, the 
actual percentages varied from about 36% (Spain), 43% (Italy), 62% (Germany), 75% 
(France), to as high as 85% in the UK (Long 2002). This makes the wholesale market 
in many of the Member States an oligopoly. As of 2004, the EU223 had 673 regional 
and national full-line wholesalers (cf. EU15 holds 418 of this total), which operate a 
network of 1458 warehouses (Clement et al. 2005). The European countries that still 
have a relatively high number of wholesalers, mainly the new Member States, will 
probably continue to observe the consolidation trend, whereas further concentra-
tion may be met with anti-trust law in the markets of other Member States. 
Another strategic response to coping with increased competitive pressures is vertical 
integration (where legally permitted), which creates new combinations and blurs the 
traditional division between actors in the pharmaceutical value chain. Many combi-
nations are observed: integration between wholesalers and the pharmaceutical in-
dustry with the pharmaceutical company owning the wholesaler (e.g. Italian manu-
facturer Angelini and Italian wholesaler Adivar) or a wholesaler having generic pro-
duction facilities, wholesalers owning their own pharmacies (e.g. OPG in the Neth-
erlands) or pharmacy associations owning their own wholesaler (e.g. Sanacorp in 
Germany). An example of far-reaching vertical integration is the retail chain Boots,4 
which maintains manufacturing, purchasing, distribution and retailing capabilities. 
Another interesting example is the planned takeover of the mail-order pharmacy 
DocMorris by the wholesaler Celesio, in the hopes of facilitating the establishment of 
the first pharmacy chain in the German market (IHT 2007). Celesio expects that 
pharmacy chains, which are forbidden in Germany, will become a reality through the 
liberalizing effects of EU law. This also applies to other countries, such as Austria and 
Spain.   
                                            
3
 EU25 minus Cyprus, Malta and Slovakia  
4
In July 2006, Boots Group and wholesaler Alliance UniChem merged to create Alliance Boots.  
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As the process of horizontal and vertical integration reaches its limits in some coun-
tries, wholesaling companies will also seek a competitive advantage by increasing 
the range of services beyond their traditional logistics function. These additional ser-
vices create an added value for manufacturers as well as for distribution partners 
(retail pharmacies) and they may be provided for free. For example, full-line whole-
salers increasingly offer pre-wholesaling services (e.g. warehousing, storage, distri-
bution and financial administration) to pharmaceutical manufacturers (Clement et al. 
2005). 
While these companies began as national wholesalers, many of them are also en-
tering foreign markets through takeovers and mergers. According to the European 
Association of Pharmaceutical Full-line Wholesalers (GIRP 2003), the leading pan-
European companies (those present in more than 10 European countries) are: Alli-
ance UniChem, Celesio and Phoenix. Other major, more domestically-oriented Euro-
pean companies are Anzag, Noweda and Sanacorp (Germany), Cerp Rouen (France), 
OPG (Netherlands), United Drug (Ireland) and Galenica (Greece). In 2004, the three 
leading European wholesaling companies held a market share of 43.4% in the EU15 
and a 46.5% market share in the EU22 (Clement et al. 2005). Although major whole-
salers purchase pharmaceuticals on a European level, the wholesaler-pharmacy rela-
tionship is conducted within national boundaries. Even in the case of multinational 
wholesalers, pharmacies are supplied by the locally based subsidiary. This is not only 
because of differing controls on product price mark-ups (Taylor et al. 2004a), but 
also because of different packaging, leaflets and language requirements due to pre-
viously non-harmonized national legislation. 
Parallel trading 
Parallel trading is now well-established among the main European wholesalers. Ini-
tially, wholesalers were reluctant to participate in this trade, mainly fearing profit 
loss and a bad relationship with their supplier (i.e. the pharmaceutical industry), 
which actively opposes parallel imports. Wholesalers find themselves backed by the 
EU and its support for parallel trade. However, an ECJ ruling challenged the Commis-
sion’s ability to force the pharmaceutical industry to provide unlimited volumes of 
medicines to parallel importing wholesalers; in 1996 it overturned a European Com-
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mission fine worth 3 Million ECU on the Bayer Group for limiting the supply of Adalat 
(also see 3.4.2).5  
The benefits of parallel trade in terms of benefits for patients and health budgets are 
heavily debated. Three major studies have dominated public debate on parallel 
trade. The first study, commissioned by the parallel trade-promoting European Asso-
ciation of Euro-Pharmaceutical Companies (EAEPC)6 and carried out by the York 
Health Economics Consortium, found evidence that parallel imports have indirect 
competitive effects by forcing down the price of domestic counterparts, resulting in 
direct and indirect savings from parallel trade (West and Mahon 2003). A second 
study by the London School of Economics (LSE), partially funded by the pharmaceuti-
cal company Johnson and Johnson, draws an opposing conclusion. It states that ben-
efits to patients and health care systems are negligible and that the main benefi-
ciaries are the parallel-importers (Kanavos et al. 2004). In an attempt to settle these 
opposing views, the EAEPC commissioned the University of Southern Denmark to 
review the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence. The report concludes that 
parallel distribution generates considerable savings, direct saving to both patients 
and health payers, up €441.5 million in 2004 in Denmark, Germany, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom. Furthermore, the level of savings and differences between coun-
tries depend, to a large extent, on the way countries have incentives in place to 
stimulate the use of imported products over local product and also in the way meas-
ures are in place (e.g. claw backs) so that savings are passed on to the health system 
and eventually to the patient. To overcome the losses through parallel trade, manu-
facturers have developed defensive strategies, such as controlled supply of raw ma-
terials (licences), restrictive distribution agreements, product differentiation, multi-
ple small batches and supply restrictions, i.e. limiting sales to win market share (En-
emark et al. 2006) 
                                            
5
 Case T-41/96 R. Bayer AG vs. The Commission of the European Communities (Adalat). 
6
 The European Association of Euro-Pharmaceutical Companies (EAEPC) is the professional and repre-
sentative body of pharmaceutical parallel trade in Europe that is aimed at promoting the free move-
ment of medicinal products. Its membership amounts to over 70 firms from 16 countries in the Euro-
pean Economic Area (EEA). 
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2.1.3 Pharmacies 
The pharmacist has traditionally been responsible for the safe dispensing and, in 
some cases, manufacturing of medicines. Herein, his/her role is strictly separate 
from the doctor’s responsibility of prescribing the pharmaceutical. However, some 
considerable exceptions exist and have existed. For example, until the late 1940s, 
many English GPs dispensed the medicines they prescribed. GPs in more rural areas 
in Austria were also involved in dispensing. In the Netherlands, there are still about 
490 pharmacy-owning GPs, which are called Apotheekhoudende Huisartsen (RIVM 
2004a). This number is down from about 636 in 2000 (RIVM 2004b), which was 
about 6% of the total number of GPs in the Netherlands and they were mainly estab-
lished in rural areas.  
There are about 117 000 community pharmacies across the EU15 Member States 
(see Table 6). In each country, there are significant differences in the number of 
pharmacies per capita. Greece, for example, has more than seven times as many 
pharmacies per million inhabitants than the Netherlands.  Belgium also has about 
five times more pharmacies per million inhabitants than the Netherlands. In general, 
Southern European countries have more pharmacies than Northern European coun-
tries. In most countries community pharmacies outnumber hospital pharmacies by 
12:1 (Belgium, Denmark) to 25:1 (Spain and Germany). In the Netherlands, this ratio 
is about 6:1 (Taylor et al. 2004a).  
Significant developments are the chaining of pharmacies and the emergence of mail-
order pharmacies. Where permitted, pharmacies are chaining in varying degrees in 
Belgium, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK. The development of mail-order 
and online pharmacies was highly controversial and continues to be opposed by 
many pharmacists, who think that medicines should be dispensed under supervision 
in a conventional pharmacy and fear decrease in revenues. However, after initial 
warnings concerning the purchase of medicines over the internet (PGEU 1999), the 
Pharmaceutical Group of the European Union (PGEU), which represents community 
pharmacists in 29 European countries including most EU Member States, approves of 
online pharmacies and wants to collaborate on the development of e-health and e-
enhanced pharmacy applications (PGEU 2001).  
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Table 6. Number of pharmacies in the EU15. 
 Number of pharmacies Pharmacies per million 
inhabitants  (ranking) 
Austria 1086 134.1 (14) 
Belgium 5273 517.0 (2) 
Denmark 1556 293.6 (6) 
Finland 795 152.9 (13) 
France 22 689 383.9 (4) 
Germany 21 590 263.0 (9) 
Greece 8348 787.5 (1) 
Ireland 1186 320.5 (5) 
Italy 16 382 287.4 (7) 
Luxembourg 79 197.5 (12) 
Netherlands 1600 101.3 (15) 
Portugal 2778 277.8 (8) 
Spain 19 439 493.4 (3) 
Sweden 1889 212.2 (10) 
United Kingdom 12 311 207.6 (11) 
EU15 total 117 000  
Source: Paterson et al. (2003). 
The notion that all national and European regulation should apply equally to online 
services is key. A Finish study from 2005 (Mäkinen et al.) illustrated that internet 
pharmacies often work under illegal conditions and it distinguished three groups of 
online pharmacies operating in Europe: legally practising online pharmacies, (often 
illegal) lifestyle pharmacies and (always illegal) rogue sites. Examples of the first le-
gally practising internet pharmacies are new online pharmacies such as the Dutch 
company DocMorris,7 the largest online pharmacy on the German market and Phar-
macy2u,8 the largest mail-order and online pharmacy in the UK. Some of these 
emerging online pharmacies in various constructions are affiliated with pharmaceu-
tical industry, insurance companies or wholesalers.  
                                            
7
 See: www.docmorris.com  
8
 See: www.Pharmacy2U.co.uk 
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Furthermore, there are two dimensions that need to be taken into account when 
discussing internet pharmacies: internet pharmacies that work on a national level 
(i.e. within national boundaries) and pharmacies that engage in cross-border activity. 
In the latter case, a whole new complicating dimension applies as national pharma-
ceutical markets are still divergent with regard to regulatory framework and, as a 
result, issues such as what is on sale, which pharmaceutical receive authorization, 
how is it classified and how leaflets are labelled. This could pose serious difficulties 
especially with regard to the free movement rules. For example, if market authoriza-
tion was obtainable online, manufacturers would then be able to obtain authoriza-
tion in the Member State with the least stringent legislation and release products 
without authorization into the markets of Member States (De Clippele 2004). Fur-
thermore, the existence of barely legal and non-regulated internet pharmacies, 
which supply drugs from unknown sources that are possibly counterfeits, could pose 
grave safety risks for consumers. Needless to say, this is an unacceptable situation 
for Member States.  
 The situation surrounding DocMorris may shed some light on these complex prob-
lems. DocMorris was established in the Netherlands in 2000 in order to circumvent 
restrictive regulations concerning mail-order pharmacies and prescription drug pric-
es in Germany. In its short history, DocMorris has had to overcome many problems 
posed by German legislation and the fierce resistance, often through litigation, of the 
German Pharmacists’ Association (ABDA). DocMorris managed to force a break-
through in the German pharmaceutical retail market by using a favourable ECJ ruling 
from 11 December 2003,9 based on the free movement rules and an already planned 
change of German legislation in 2003 concerning mail-order services to its ad-
vantage. The ECJ made clear that cross-border mail-order pharmacy services are 
compatible with EU law, but also held that a national prohibition on mail-order sales 
of prescription drugs can be justified. This did not affect DocMorris as the German 
prohibition was (as planned) abolished in 2004 by the amended German Pharmaceu-
tical Act. Nevertheless, DocMorris continues to see strong opposition in the German 
                                            
9
 Case C-322/01, ‘Deutscher Apothekerverband eV versus DocMorris NV  
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market, especially in their attempts to establish a pharmacy chain, which is problem-
atic under current German ownership regulations.   
2.2 Demand side of the pharmaceutical market 
The demand side of the pharmaceutical market is characterized by information 
asymmetry in comparison with the supply side. But also on the demand side, i.e. 
within the medical care triad, information asymmetry exists. In general, a doctor has 
more pharmaceutical knowledge than a patient. However, new technologies, such as 
the internet, help patients access detailed medical information, which has changed 
the doctor-patient relationship. The payer must design an insurance policy often in a 
heavily government-regulated environment and deal with agency problems, such as 
moral hazard. 
2.2.1 Prescribers 
The prescriber, a specialist or general practitioner (GP), is responsible for prescribing 
the right pharmaceutical, which is a crucial role in the provision of pharmaceutical 
products. Historically, the doctor’s main priority and interest is to provide the best 
possible advice and treatment and, if necessary, to prescribe a medicine of good 
quality, irrespective of costs. However, developments in pharmaceutical expendi-
tures raised awareness among both policy makers and professionals that a rational 
prescribing behaviour could be a method of cost-containment. Therefore, many na-
tional governments now have measures or collaborating initiatives aimed at influ-
encing prescribing behaviour (see Chapter 4). 
A doctor’s knowledge of pharmaceutical products may exceed that of a patient, but 
there is still huge information asymmetry compared to the supply side of the phar-
maceutical market. This makes doctors a possibly profitable marketing target. This is 
supported by direct visits from pharmaceutical company detailers. Since the 1992 EU 
directive, national governments have constrained the marketing activities of phar-
maceutical companies, particularly those targeted at professionals with the aim of 
plugging their latest products.10  
                                            
10
 Directive 92/28/EEC on the advertising of medicinal products for human use, now integrated in 
2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use. 
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Furthermore, there are significant differences in numbers of prescriptions and thus 
consumption between countries. This is the result of differing cultural attitudes and 
health care systems (see Figure 3). According to Yuen (1999), France leads with an 
average of 52.2 prescriptions dispensed per capita in comparison to about five pre-
scriptions dispensed per capita in Italy and roughly six prescriptions dispensed per 
capita in Finland and Sweden.  
Table 7 illustrates the divergence of percentages of diagnoses made followed by a 
prescription and reflects different prescribing behaviours. In more recent but rough 
data for 2003, Italy’s percentage of diagnoses with prescription was well over 90%. 
For Belgium and Spain it was more than 80%, for France more than 75%, for England 
and Germany around 70% and for the Netherlands slightly over 60% (IMS Health in: 
Nefarma 2004).   
 
Figure 3. Prescriptions dispensed per capita in selected European countries, 1996. 
 
Source: Yuen (1999). 
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Table 7. Share of diagnoses with prescription in selected European countries, 1996. 
 % diagnoses with prescription 
Netherlands 56 
Germany 70 
UK 74 
Spain 79 
France 83 
Belgium 87 
Source: IMS Health in: PriceWaterhouseCoopers (1999). 
2.2.2 Patients 
Due to developments on the patients’ side, the doctor-patient relationship is chang-
ing. Patients become more involved in their choice of treatment and have access to 
an abundance of medical information, largely due to the internet. Another important 
development is the observed loss of trust in the medical profession. There is an 
emerging trend across Europe to put more information and more power in the hands 
of patients with regard to accessing and using medicines (Bradley et al. 2004). A case 
in point is the fact that more pharmaceuticals have been made available over-the-
counter in many countries and, therefore, have to be paid for out of pocket, which 
increases patient responsibility. 
Furthermore, the consumption of pharmaceuticals varies widely across cultural and 
national boundaries. Different attitudes toward pharmaceuticals exist, which can 
represent their respective cultural values. These result in differences up to twice the 
total drug consumption per capita within the EU (see Figure 4). For example, total 
drug consumption through pharmacies in France is €503 per capita, whereas in 
Denmark this number is only €230. Belgium consumes pharmaceuticals worth €359, 
which is 1.3 times more than its neighbour, the Netherlands (€275).  It is important 
to note that these differences are jointly determined by a price and volume compo-
nent. Hence, both factors are subjected to country-specific national frameworks (e.g. 
price and volume regulation) and are not necessarily determined by cultural factors 
alone. Another determinant worth mentioning is the level of generics entering the 
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market, which varies significantly between Member States and could have a miti-
gating effect on pharmaceutical expenditures. Nevertheless, it does provide an indi-
cation of the magnitude of the differences in consumption patterns in the EU.  
 
Figure 4. Pharmaceutical expenditure (€) per capita through pharmacy, 2004. 
 
Source: SFK (2006). 
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with an outpatient antibiotic use of 24.54 DDD per 1000 inhabitants, 2.5 times that 
of the neighbouring Netherlands. This springs from different attitudes toward dis-
ease. Deschepper et al. (2002) found that Belgians worry more about disease and 
were more used to leaving the consultation room with a prescription. Belgians rated 
their upper respiratory tract diseases often as bronchitis, whereas the Dutch mostly 
rated similar symptoms as a cold or the flu and never as bronchitis. For the most 
part, Belgians more frequently consulted a doctor when ill and were prescribed anti-
biotics more often, whereas patients in the Netherlands took home remedies, some-
times in combination with OTC medicines.  
Traditionally, there is no direct incentive for patients to take cheaper pharmaceuti-
cals and moral hazard belongs to the problems with which the payers are faced. 
However, national policies try to increase patient interest and responsibility through 
measures such as co-payments and reference pricing (see Chapter 4).  
On the macro level, patient groups are generally not as well-organized as other ac-
tors. They lack financial means and their influence on pharmaceutical policy making 
is limited. Patient organizations are often fragmented along disease areas with pos-
sibly conflicting interests. This potentially makes patient organizations vulnerable to 
the marketing efforts of the pharmaceutical industry, through the funding of patient 
groups. This is a newer development in Europe but well-established in the United 
States. Although this may seem like a strange alliance, it is a logical partnership be-
tween two actors with a shared interest. Access to the newest treatments (which 
benefits patients) requires a positive reimbursement decisions (which benefits 
pharmaceutical industry). However, pharmaceutical industry and patient organiza-
tions are unequal partners in terms of funding and information and this can have 
serious consequences when grants and joint projects with pharmaceutical compa-
nies distort and misrepresent their own agendas (Herxheimer 2003).  
2.2.3 Payers 
Because the costs of pharmaceuticals can rise substantially, payers must facilitate 
access to drugs for the most vulnerable groups in the population. Payers in the Euro-
pean pharmaceutical market come in many forms (see Figure 5). A payer can be a 
sickness fund, an integrated part of a NHS or a private insurer and it may operate on 
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various levels (e.g. national, regional) or in a single payer or multiple payer system. It 
may also compete with other payers, have public or private features and it may re-
imburse the patient or the provider. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the payer/purchaser functioned mainly as a financial 
intermediary providing or reimbursing the necessary services for the population. In 
the 1980s, increased pressure on costs led countries to implement cost-containment 
policies that aimed at integrating a form of market mechanisms into their systems. 
During the 1990s, payer/purchasers received more planning and management au-
thority (Busse et al. 2007). In the UK, for example, which operates a tax-based NHS, 
there is a separation between the purchaser and provider (“the purchaser/provider 
split”) for the purpose of creating an internal market where providers compete for 
contracts with the payers. These various experiments with active purchasing and 
selective contracting, in which the payer seeks the best offer in terms of value for 
money and quality for its clients (patients), mainly focused on establishing competi-
tion between health service providers, rather than providers of pharmaceuticals.  
Thus far, payers have not played a major role in the containment of costs for phar-
maceuticals, largely because of the existing health care structure in which they may 
not have an incentive (e.g. in a strictly financial intermediary function) or simply due 
to a lack of instruments used to exert influence on pharmaceutical costs. In other 
words, payers are faced with agency problems. Payers cannot get relevant parties to 
do what efficiency requires. Consequently, people with more generous insurance 
spend more on medical care than people with less generous insurance (moral haz-
ard) and providers that pay on a fee-for-service basis may provide more care due to 
supplier-induced demand than they would if they were not paid per task (Cutler and 
Zeckhauser 2000). This can, depending on the health care system, directly apply to 
pharmaceutical provision. 
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Figure 5. Market structures for payer/purchaser organizations and European examples. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Kutzin (2001) and Busse et al. (2007). 
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prescribed drug for a generic drug if the patient’s sickness fund has such a discount 
contract. The legal requirement to substitute drugs has been criticized in some stud-
ies because it may compromise prescribing quality and patient safety (Pruszydlo et 
al. 2008; Quinzler et al 2008). 
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3 The European Union 
 
Pharmaceutical policy is a very complicated interplay of various actors, which in-
cludes national governments, industry, wholesalers, pharmacists, doctors, payers 
and patients (see Chapter 1). Often these stakeholders have conflicting interests that 
can vary from country to country. This makes it hard for national governments to 
achieve their respective policy goals. Although pharmaceutical policy is largely de-
termined at the national level, there is, nevertheless, a considerable amount of EU 
legislation that exerts influence on the policies of Member States, mainly through 
the use of regulations, directives and decisions.11  
As will become clear in this chapter, the role of the EU has been expanding in this 
area mainly resulting from the legal duty to advocate the principles of European law, 
including the free movements of goods and free competition. This is visible in the 
Community’s attempt to liberalize the market for pharmaceuticals. In recent years, 
the European Commission has modified its efforts to harmonize national policies into 
a more realistic co-ordination approach because countries were not and continue to 
be unwilling to give up their regulatory authority. They fear the outcomes for domes-
tic industry (e.g. jobs) and for their respective health care systems (e.g. higher prices 
for pharmaceuticals), depending on the Member State’s predominant policy objec-
tive.  
The European Union cannot be seen as a single actor with only one policy goal. Ra-
ther, it consists of various actors and various policies, including industrial, social and 
health policies, which each have a distinct influence on pharmaceutical policy and 
they are advocated by the various Directorate-Generals (DGs). Since these influences 
and their origins may seem opaque from outside, this chapter takes a closer look at 
the EU and aims to clarify the different influences of these policies and actors on 
past and present pharmaceutical provision. The first section discusses the EU policy-
making process and its main actors. Sections Two, Three and Four describe three 
                                            
11
 Regulations are binding in their entirety and are directly applicable in all Member States. Directives 
bind Member States as to the results to be achieved, but have to be transposed into the national legal 
framework and, thus, leave a margin for manoeuvre as to the form and means of implementation. 
Decisions are fully binding on those to whom they are addressed. 
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main areas of EU policy (i.e. industrial policy, EU social policy and EU health policy). 
Sections Five and Six examine two important EU actors: the European Medicines 
Agency (EMEA) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ).  
3.1 European Union policy process and actors 
The EU consists of three pillars: the European Community, which has its origins in the 
European Economic Community (EEC), the Common Foreign and Security Policy and 
Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters, which was created after the 
amendments introduced by the Amsterdam and Nice treaties. Hence, the latter two 
play a more intergovernmental role and, consequently, the Commission and the Eu-
ropean Parliament play less of a role. This thesis focuses on the first pillar because it 
is where most EU policies originate. The activities and responsibilities of the EU are 
outlined in various European treaties (e.g. the Treaty of Rome, the Single European 
Act, the Treaty of Maastricht).  
Governance and political leadership is provided by the European Council. It is the 
highest political body of the EU and it consists of the President of the European 
Commission and the heads of states/governments of Member States, who are as-
sisted by their foreign ministers. The Council has a rotating presidency, with the 
leader of each Member State serving for a period of six months. During the presi-
dency, the country’s representatives chair the meetings of the European Council and 
the Council of Ministers. The European Council usually has quarterly summits. 
The European Commission is the executive body of the EU and it is responsible for 
initiating legislation and the daily management of the EU. Whereas the Council main-
ly reflects national interests, the Commission is intended to solely represent com-
mon European interests. Its main functions are (1) to propose legislation to Par-
liament and the Council; (2) to manage and implement EU policies and the budget; 
(3) to enforce European law (with the Court of Justice); and (4) to represent the Eu-
ropean Union on the international stage, for example, by negotiating agreements 
between the EU and other countries. The Commission is currently composed of 27 
commissioners responsible for different areas of policy, one from each Member 
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State. The President and the commissioners are nominated by the Council and have 
to be confirmed by the European Parliament.  
The European Parliament (EP) reflects the interests of the European people and con-
sists of 785 members, who are elected every five years by EU citizens. The EP forms 
one half of the EU’s legislature. Its main functions are (1) passing European laws 
(jointly with the Council); (2) democratic supervision of EU institutions, including the 
Commission; (3) and budgetary authority over the e EU budget (shared with the 
Council). 
The Council of the European Union, formerly known as the Council of Ministers, con-
stitutes the second half of the EU legislature. The Council is a platform for national 
ministers to meet and represent the interests of their respective Member State and 
specific areas of policy. The Council meets in different formations (e.g. areas relevant 
to pharmaceutical policy are Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs, and Com-
petitiveness). The Council’s main responsibilities are (1) to pass European laws jointly 
with the European Parliament; (2) to co-ordinate the broad economic policies of the 
Member States; (3) to conclude international agreements with non-EU countries and 
organizations; (4) to approve the EU’s budget, jointly with the EP; (5) to develop the 
EU’s foreign and security policy; (6) and to co-ordinate co-operation between na-
tional courts and police forces in criminal matters.  
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Court of First Instance form the judicial 
branch of the EU. The former will be examined and analysed in more detail in Section 
3.5.  
3.2 European Union industrial policy 
The observation that the European Union leans toward industrial policy rather than 
health policy has its origins in the factual competences the European Economic 
Community (EEC), the predecessor of the EU, has had since its inception in 1957 
through the Treaty of Rome.  The main aim of the EEC was to bring about economic 
integration between the founding nations Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxem-
bourg and the Netherlands. The EEC sought to lay the foundations of “an ever closer 
union among the peoples of Europe” with “the constant improvement of the living 
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and working conditions of their peoples” and to “ensure the economic and social 
progress of their countries by common action to eliminate the barriers which divide 
Europe”. Its central aims included the need for steady expansion, balanced trade and 
fair competition through the establishment of a customs union with a common ex-
ternal tariff, common policies for agriculture, transport and trade (common com-
mercial policy) and the enlargement of the EEC to include the rest of Europe. Phar-
maceutical policy, as a result, leans towards an industrial policy perspective, which is 
also illustrated by the fact that most legislation regarding pharmaceuticals emanates 
from the long-established DG Enterprise-Pharmaceuticals Unit, not from DG SANCO. 
European pharmaceutical policy is, therefore, mainly aimed at the establishment of a 
common market for pharmaceuticals with common (rapid) authorization proce-
dures.     
3.2.1 European Union pharmaceutical policy: A history, 1960–2000 
European involvement in the pharmaceutical market dates back to the early 1960s, 
when the thalidomide disaster took place. Thalidomide, developed by the German 
firm Grünental, was sold as a sleeping aid and as a remedy for pregnant women to 
combat morning sickness. Prescription-free thalidomide, also known under various 
brand names including Contergan in Germany and Softenon in Belgium, Finland and 
Spain, was a bestseller in 1961–62 with 20 million tablets sold per month. It was not 
before long until some horrible side effects became apparent. Thalidomide caused 
birth defects and an estimated 8000 malformed children were born in Europe 
(Scherer 2000), from which an estimated 4000 cases in Germany alone. The thalido-
mide disaster, one of the biggest drug tragedies of recent history, raised awareness 
that in order to safeguard public health, no medicinal product must ever again be 
marketed without prior authorization. It highlighted the need for better standards 
and authorization procedures not only in European states, but also at the European 
Community level.  
In 1965, the first European Community pharmaceutical directive (Directive 
65/65/EEC) was adopted. Its purpose was to establish and maintain a high level of 
protection for public health through rules on the development and manufacturing of 
medicines, to establish guidelines for the post-marketing monitoring of drug safety 
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and to establish safety, efficacy and quality as the sole grounds for market approval. 
Thus, one can say that the first Community involvement in the European pharmaceu-
tical market had a strong public health policy perspective (protection) but, in the 
meantime, it also aimed to establish European standards necessary for the common 
market. 
Ten years later, two important directives (75/318/EEC and 75/319/EEC) introduced 
the mutual recognition of the respective national marketing authorization proce-
dures in Member States and provided the first step towards creating a Community-
wide single European market for pharmaceuticals. Directive 75/318/EEC created the 
mutual recognition procedure (MRP), which was intended to enable and speed up 
the free movement of medicinal products within the Community based on scientific 
criteria for quality, safety and efficacy. This new procedure was facilitated by Di-
rective 75/319/EEC, which set up a Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products 
(CPMP), a single authorization and administration body for the Community market, 
comprising representatives from each of the Member States.  
Mutual recognition, also known as the CPMP procedure, encouraged manufacturers 
with an existing authorization for at least one Member State to seek marketing au-
thorization for a drug simultaneously in five or more recipient Member States (out of 
the then nine Member States). This allowed companies to submit applications with-
out regulatory staff in every country, thus enhancing smaller national manufacturers 
to compete more globally. However, the mutual recognition procedure hardly im-
proved the situation. It caused delays as recipient Member States sought (non-
binding) arbitration from the CPMP on nearly every occasion. If arbitration had an 
undesired outcome for a recipient Member State, it could still refuse authorization 
under Article 36 of the 1957 Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), 
which gives members exception to the free movement rules where public health is at 
stake. Consequently, the procedure was not popular with industry. Only 41 applica-
tions were made in the eight years it was in place and the procedure was mostly 
used for – for industry less important – generics or “me-too” products. Of the 41 ap-
plications, 28 (70%) received a favourable opinion. The 41 applications led to 175 
authorizations and 65 final refusals (Cartwright and Matthews 1991).  
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Clearly, the CPMP procedure was not accepted by Member States and was unattrac-
tive to industry. In 1983, therefore, the EU created the multi-state procedure, in 
which the minimum number of recipient states was reduced from five to two (out of 
the then ten Member States). The procedure was introduced by Directive 
83/570/EEC, which soon proved to be troublesome. Although there was an increase 
in the number of applications submitted, Member States raised objections to all but 
one of three hundred applications (Abraham and Lewis 2003). It does not come as a 
surprise that the manufacturers remained sceptical about the advantages of the 
multi-state procedure. The vast majority of applications prior to the introduction of 
the decentralized procedure in 1995 were submitted via national approval routes 
(Abraham and Lewis 2000). 
The 1985 White Paper “Completing the Internal Market” provided the intentions of 
the European Commission regarding the completion of the single European market. 
These intentions were strengthened by the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986, which 
laid out plans to establish a single European market for the movement of all goods, 
services and capital by 1992. In another attempt to further rationalize the authoriza-
tion process, the 1987 Directive 87/22/EEC introduced the concertation procedure. 
The concertation procedure was compulsory for biotechnology and voluntary for 
high technology products and forced manufacturers to simultaneously submit their 
applications to the CPMP and one Member State, which acted as a rapporteur. The 
CPMP could then recommend an EU-wide license, after considering possible objec-
tions by other Member States. However, as with the multi-state procedure, CPMP 
arbitration was still non-binding and could be ignored by Member States. They both 
failed to fulfil expectations, although the concertation procedure was more suc-
cessful in terms of applications submitted and agreements over labelling (Jones and 
Jefferys 1994). 
Meanwhile, a European restrictive pricing policy was discussed and was successfully 
opposed and fought by the EFPIA. In 1989, however, the European Commission in-
troduced Directive 89/105/EEC, known as the Price Transparency Directive, in order 
to counter price differentials in medicinal products between Member States, which 
were, according to Chambers & Belcher (1994), up to five times on the prices of sin-
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gle products. The Price Transparency Directive required Member States to adopt 
verifiable and transparent criteria for setting pharmaceutical prices and their inclu-
sion in national health systems. The Directive is limited in its aim. It does not regulate 
European-wide price controls and profit caps, nor does it seek to harmonize the rules 
of the various national reimbursement schemes. However, it could be seen as the 
first Community involvement in terms of pricing and reimbursement. 
Further SEM-relevant legislation with regard to wholesale distribution (Directive 
92/25/EEC), the classification of pharmaceuticals (92/26/EEC), labelling and packag-
ing (Directive 92/27/EEC), advertising (Directive 92/28/EEC) and patent protection 
(Regulation 1786/92) followed. Despite this legislation, intra-EU price differentials 
were not reduced. In a 1994 Communication, the European Commission expressed 
concerns that part of the pharmaceutical industry in the European Union was losing 
global competitiveness, which would have serious economic and social conse-
quences for Europe (European Commission 1994).  
Some of the key actions identified in the 1994 Communication were put into action. 
A major change took place in January 1995. Member States became bound by CPMP 
opinions in both the multi- state procedure and the concertation procedure, as out-
lined in Directive 93/39/EEC. Member States can only question CPMP opinion if a 
potentially negative impact on public health can be proven. In accordance with ex-
pert advice from the CPMP, the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicines 
(EMEA12) was established under Regulation 2309/93 and began administering these 
new procedures in February 1995. To mark these changes, the multi-state procedure 
was renamed the decentralized procedure and the concertation procedure the cen-
tralized procedure. 
The response to this 1994 Communication by both the European Parliament (Resolu-
tion of 16 April 1996) and the Council (Resolution 96/C 136/04) was to stress the 
importance of working towards a European industrial policy for pharmaceuticals. In 
their view, this could be reached by completing the internal market, creating a stable 
and predictable environment for the protection of patient health, ensuring rapid 
                                            
12
 EMEA now stands for the European Medicines Agency and is referred to as such in the thesis 
  58 
access to the market and encouraging therapeutic innovation. However, no progress 
was made after the introduction of these documents. 
In 2000, the Commission ordered a detailed assessment of the EMEA’s procedures 
and operations, a commitment made in Article 71 of Regulation 2309/93, which was 
undertaken by external consultants Cameron McKenna and Arthur Andersen Con-
sulting (European Commission 2000). On the basis of this assessment, the Commis-
sion drafted a discussion document (European Commission 2001a), which eventually 
led to the adoption of a proposal for a comprehensive reform of the EU pharmaceu-
tical legislation in July 2001, often referred to as Review 2001 (European Commission 
2001b). The review contained the following objectives: to guarantee a high level of 
public health protection for Europeans, to complete the internal market in pharma-
ceutical products, to meet the challenges of EU enlargement and to rationalize and 
simplify the system as much as possible.  
The proposal for reform particularly concerns Regulation 2309/93, which provides 
the legislative framework for regulating medicinal products and resulted in Directive 
2001/83/EC on human medicines and Directive 2001/82/EC on veterinary medicines 
(European Commission 2001a, 2001b). Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community 
code relating to medicinal products for human use dated 6 November 2001 (later 
amended by the 2004 Directive 2004/27/EC) replaced and consolidated the first 
pharmaceutical, Directive 65/65/EEC, with all its relevant amendments, the two 
landmark directives 75/319/EEC and  75/318/EEC and their respective amendments 
and the 1992 Directives on wholesaling (92/25/EEC), classification (92/26/EEC), la-
belling and packaging (92/27/EEC) and advertising (92/28/EEC).  
3.2.2 European Union pharmaceutical policy, 2001–2005 
EU pharmaceutical policy thus far shows that progress has been made using secon-
dary legislation such as directives and regulations. This has led to the harmonisation 
of national practices and the establishment of a centralized licensing procedure un-
der the auspices of the EMEA. In the field of pricing and reimbursement, however, 
the 1989 Price Transparency Directive is the only accomplishment of Community 
policy in 40 years. The Transparency Directive was intended to be the first step to-
wards European regulation in national price and profit control. The Commission nev-
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er proposed any form of regulation for price controls and has viewed this as pri-
marily a national matter. This is not surprising for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the 
European Commission’s main goal is to liberalize the market and is decidedly leaning 
towards industrial policy. This aim is incompatible with installing some sort of price 
control or profit caps. Secondly, even if the Commission had wanted to introduce 
profit and price controls, there are huge practical problems. Setting the appropriate 
margin for retail price control is particularly difficult given the fact that pharmacy 
costs differ considerably from one Member State to another, as do the methods of 
retail price control (OECD 2002). Lastly, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty formally estab-
lished the principle of subsidiarity (also see Section 3.4) in EU law, effectively making 
it even more problematic for the Commission to interfere with national policy. 
In short, there remains no SEM for medicines. After some progress, it has reached a 
standstill, which mainly stems from the conflict between the principle of subsidiarity 
and the rules of SEM regulation, i.e. free movement rules. The former enables Mem-
ber States to retain the competence to determine national health care policy by de-
limiting policy competence to the lowest level at which it can be effectively under-
taken, while the latter demands the free movement of goods, including  pharmaceu-
ticals. What follows is a conflict between Member States, who defend the right to set 
their own prices and make their own reimbursement decisions and the European 
Commission, which has the legal duty to liberalize the market and demands that 
there be no obstacles in their circulation within the EU. In other words, competing 
policy objectives and competences exist between national (cost-containment) and 
supranational (market liberalisation and free movement rules) policymakers. 
In addition to this standstill, it became clear to the European Commission that the 
European pharmaceutical industry was losing out to its main competitors, mainly the 
US and, to a lesser extent, Japan. The 2000 report “Global Competitiveness in Phar-
maceuticals: a European Perspective” drafted for the Directorate-General for Enter-
prise and Industry pointed out that Europe is lagging behind in competitiveness 
when compared to the US (Gambardella et al. 2000). Indicators for this assessment 
include research and development (R&D), size of the European industry, size of Eu-
ropean pharmaceutical markets and growth rate. The pharmaceutical sector, a high 
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growth and innovation-intensive industry, is a main provider of employment and the 
main contributor to the European trade balance; through its products, it helps to 
achieve health goals and is thus of high strategic and economic importance. National 
price and profit regulation were said to have protectionist effects on the European 
pharmaceutical industry and reduce the incentive for innovation.  
The High Level Group on Innovation and Provision of Medicines (G10 Medicines 
Group) was established in March 2001 in response to the findings of the Pammolli 
Report. The G10 Medicines Group, set up by former Commissioner for Enterprise 
Erkki Liikanen and former Commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection David 
Byrne, explored possible directions for future EU policy, with achieving the seemingly 
dichotomous goal of innovation (competitiveness) and provision (accessibility) in the 
pharmaceutical sector. Although the G10 process integrated a stronger public health 
perspective through the involvement of DG Health and Consumer Protection, na-
tional health ministers and interest groups, it is discussed in this section as it is main-
ly driven by the Community’s internal market aspirations and, as a result, has a 
strong industrial policy perspective. The G10 group was created with the recognition 
that the Pharmaceutical Review on its own would not be sufficient to tackle the 
competitiveness problems currently facing the pharmaceutical industry and rather 
these problems required national action. Therefore, in May 2002, the G10 process 
resulted in a series of recommendations without direct legislative Community action.  
3.2.3 The G10 process 
Methodology 
The G10 Medicines Group, consisting of health and industry ministers, representa-
tives of the pharmaceutical industry and patient groups used the Lisbon Method in 
which the Commission served as a facilitator to help the members develop practical 
recommendations. Three working groups were created: provision, single market and 
innovation. These working groups produced a consultation paper containing key is-
sues and broad conclusions, which was issued for public consultation to reach a wid-
er group of stakeholders. Consultation often resulted in critical and conflicting re-
sponses. In addition to the consultation exercise, the G10 Medicines Group under-
took two other measures to increase transparency: the creation of a special web-
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site,13 containing all the documents used, a forum, the progress of the G10 Medi-
cines Group process and a programme of workshops to examine specific issues in 
more detail. The goal of this methodology was to reach a consensus within the G10 
Medicines Group on a recommendation package. This goal led to a final set of 14 
recommendations that were published and presented to President Prodi in May 
2002 (European Commission 2002). The recommendations concentrated on five ar-
eas: (1) benchmarking; (2) competition, regulation, access and availability in markets; 
(3) stimulating innovation and improving the EU science base; (4) patients; and (5) 
enlargement. 
Benchmarking: competitiveness and performance indicators 
1. The use of benchmarking 
The Commission should develop a comprehensive set of indicators in order for 
comparisons between the EU and its major competitors to be a basis for estab-
lishing the best practices. 
Competition, regulation, access and availability in markets 
2. Access to innovative medicines 
European institutions and Member States should secure better access to and 
availability of innovative medicines through improved licensing legislation, in or-
der to enhance market introduction and should improve the use of modern tele-
communication infrastructure (telematics) and techniques to facilitate the opera-
tion of the Community regulatory system. 
3. Improve timing of reimbursement and pricing negotiations 
Regarding national competence, Member States should try to improve time tak-
en between the actual marketing authorization and pricing and reimbursement 
decisions in order to have procedures that are both effective and ensure speed 
of access.  
4. Developing a competitive generic market 
                                            
13
 G10 website: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/phabiocom/p3.htm 
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The European institutions and Member States need to secure a competitive ge-
neric market through improvements in the licensing process. This should be 
achieved through finding an appropriate balance between providing intellectual 
property protection for innovative medicines and easy access to the generic mar-
ket through the introduction of a Bolar provision.14 However, Member States still 
determine the degree of generic penetration.  
5. Developing a competitive non-prescription market 
In order to develop a competitive non-prescription market, Member States 
should review where appropriate, amend mechanisms and concepts for moving 
medicines from prescription to non-prescription status and allow the same 
trademark to be used for the products moved to non-prescription status. 
6. Full competition for medicines neither purchased nor reimbursed by 
the state 
The Commission and Member States should secure the principle that a Member 
State’s authority to regulate prices in the EU should extend only to those medi-
cines purchased  or reimbursed by the state. Full competition should be allowed 
for medicines not reimbursed by state systems or medicines sold into private 
markets.  
7. Relative effectiveness 
Although mechanisms to establish relative cost and clinical effectiveness are pri-
marily a matter of national competence, the Commission should facilitate the ex-
change of national experience on health technologies (HTA) and new information 
technologies. 
 
 
                                            
14
 A Bolar provision enables commercial testing, using and making (not selling) of on-patent pharma-
ceuticals prior to patent expiry. Through this exemption of exclusive patent rights, manufacturers can 
obtain marketing approval before the patent has expired and secure more rapid market access. It is 
named after the US court case Roche Products Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical. Co. (Fed. Cir. 
04/23/1984). 
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Stimulating innovation and improving the EU science base 
8. Creation of virtual institutes of health 
The creation of the European virtual institutes of health should be stimulated, 
connecting all existing competence centres on fundamental and clinical research 
into a European network of excellence. 
9. Install incentives for research 
The Commission and Member States should support and co-ordinate the conduct 
of clinical trials on a European scale and establish a database of trials and clinical 
research results. They also should put in place an effective policy in terms of in-
centives, support areas of funding that are less attractive due to restricted size of 
the expected market (i.e. orphan and paediatric drugs) and support the devel-
opment of a biotechnology strategy in Europe, for which the completion of Di-
rective 98/44/EEC on the Legal Protection of Biological Inventions is important.   
Patients 
10. Enhanced information 
Restrictions on advertising prescription medicines to the general public should 
remain in place; however, there should be no restrictions on advertising non-
prescription and non-reimbursed medicines. There should be a practical and 
workable distinction between advertising and information through guidelines 
agreed on by both Member States and the European Commission. 
11. Review of patient information leaflets 
Legislation relating to patient information leaflets should be reviewed taking into 
account views of users and regulators of industry. 
12. Pharmacovigilance 
Systems of post-marketing surveillance should be optimized to ensure that co-
ordinated processes are in place to gather data on adverse events and patient 
safety. 
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13. Funding for patients groups 
The Commission should consider providing core funding for European patient 
groups to enable them to participate independently in debates and decision-
making on health matters in the EU. 
Enlargement 
14. Take full account of enlargement 
Although it is difficult to predict the impact of enlargement on the pharmaceuti-
cal market, in this recommendation, the G10 Medicines Group stresses that the 
Commission should take full account of enlargement consequences and issues. 
In July 2003, the European Commission (2003) welcomed the analysis and ap-
proaches proposed by the G10 group in Commission Communication COM (2003) 
383 “A Stronger European-based Pharmaceutical Industry for the Benefit of the Pa-
tient –A Call for Action”.  The Commission divided the G10 recommendation into five 
broad themes resembling the five themes used by the G10 group (see Table 8). In 
order for these recommendations to be realized, the Commission developed an ex-
tensive set of key actions, some linked to programmes already in place and ostensi-
bly put patients’ issues on the top of their list: 
 Benefits for patients: improving patient information on medicines, strengthening 
the role of patients in public health decision-making through the support of con-
sumer groups and strengthening European supervision of medicines (pharma-
covigilance). Also included in this section is the recommendation to review national 
approaches to cost and the clinical effectiveness of medicines.   
 Developing a competitive European-based industry: examining ways of improving 
access to innovative medicines, the need to speed up national negotiations on reim-
bursement and pricing, greater price competition for medicines that are not part of 
the state sector and measures to develop competitive generic and non-prescription 
markets. 
 Strengthening the EU science base: examining ways to develop incentives for re-
search, including the use of virtual institutes for health and biotechnology, as an ad-
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dition to the Sixth Framework Programme for Research and Technological Develop-
ments (FP6).15 
 Medicines in an enlarged European Union: examining ways to the challenge the en-
largement by providing a level playing field for intellectual property protection and 
providing support for accession countries to implement the new legislative frame-
work. 
 Member States learning from each other: introducing benchmarking through a set of 
agreed EU performance indicators (supply, demand & regulatory framework, indus-
try outputs and macroeconomic factors) as a basis for monitoring the implementa-
tion of recommendations and to exchange best practices. It was proposed that this 
could function under the Health Monitoring Programme (1998-2003) and activities 
planned by Eurostat as part of their development of a Systems of Health Accounts.  
Table 8. The Commission’s adoption of G10 Medicines recommendations. 
European Commission Com-
munication  
COM (2003) 383 
G10 Medicines rec-
ommendations 
number 
Corresponding with G10 Medicines  
theme16: 
Benefits to patients 7,10,11,12,13 Patients 
Developing a competitive Eu-
ropean-based industry 
2,3,4,5,6 Competition, regulation, access and 
availability in markets 
Strengthening the EU science 
base 
8,9 Stimulating innovation and improving 
the EU science base 
Medicines in an enlarged Eu-
ropean Union 
14 Enlargement 
Member States learning from 
each other 
1 Benchmarking: competitiveness and 
performance indicators 
Source: own compilation. 
The European Commission remained preoccupied with the competitiveness of the 
European pharmaceutical sector. A clear decline in applications for marketing au-
thorizations in 2002 and 2003 led the Commission to believe that there might be a 
worldwide crisis concerning innovation in the pharmaceutical sector. Against this 
                                            
15
 The Sixth Framework Programme (FP6) for Research and Technological Developments (2002-2006) 
was a collection of the actions at EU level to fund and promote research, leading to the creation of 
the European Research Area (ERA).  
16
 In the G10 report, recommendation seven concerning “relative effectiveness” is classified under 
“competition, regulation, access and availability in markets”. The Commission, however, categorises it 
under “benefits to patients”. This is the only major difference with the G10 and it seems to further 
underline the expressed emphasis of the Commission on patient benefits. 
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backdrop, DG Enterprise commissioned Charles Rivers Associates to conduct a study. 
This study aimed to investigate: (1) whether there is an innovation crisis in the 
pharmaceutical sector; (2) the reasons behind any crisis and (3) tools available to 
kick-start innovation.  
The outcome of the study was that the recent decline in applications does not reflect 
a crisis in innovation. Recent history of applications (and the close relationship be-
tween applications and authorizations) suggested that a recovery in authorizations 
was likely to occur in 2004/2005. However, the report came with a range of recom-
mendations broadly in line with the 2000 Pammolli report findings and recent policy 
proposals in the EU, concerning faster market access, streamlining the regulatory 
process and the level of market exclusivity. Furthermore, the report stressed the 
importance of clearing the (observed) bottleneck of Phase III development, by help-
ing companies to accelerate the entry of products in the market and the importance 
of improving Europe’s attractiveness as a locus of innovation on the medium term 
(European Commission 2004a).  
In 2004, Pammolli et al. published an update of their 2000 report called “European 
Competitiveness in Pharmaceuticals”, in which they concluded that their initial find-
ings still apply: “As a whole, Europe is still lagging behind in its ability to generate, 
organize and sustain innovation processes and productivity growth in pharmaceuti-
cals”. The report concluded that the failure of the continental European pharmaceu-
tical industry to achieve a substantial acceleration in productivity cannot fully be ex-
plained by factors which are sector specific, but should also be explained by rela-
tively low dynamism in Europe in terms of reforming some of its key capitalist insti-
tutions (e.g. labour and capital markets, education, welfare). Also, the uneven geo-
graphical distribution of research activities in pharmaceuticals, together with the 
observed differences in price levels for innovative drugs and reimbursement 
schemes between Europe and the US and across European countries seems to call 
for renewed transatlantic dialogue concerning the political economy of the pharma-
ceutical industry. 
In March 2004, the Directive 2004/27/EEC amended the Community code regarding 
medicinal products for human use, specifically new requirements for the use of 
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Braille on packaging and in leaflets. Furthermore, Regulation 726/2004 repealed the 
well-known Regulation 2309/93, which outlined the EU market authorization proce-
dures, although the general principles of 2309/93 remained in place. It mainly sought 
to improve the centralized and decentralized procedure by creating faster proce-
dures, expanding the mandatory list of pharmaceutical products (centralized proce-
dure) and harmonizing the data protection period further (decentralized procedure). 
Regulation 726/2004 applied from 20 November 2005. 
The Commission’s unrelenting preoccupation with the competitiveness of the phar-
maceutical industry is maybe best reflected in the installation of the DG Enterprise 
and Industry unit Competitiveness in the Pharmaceuticals industry and Biotechnol-
ogy. This unit’s overall goal is to promote innovation and competitiveness in bio-
technology and pharmaceutical industries, with particular attention to the comple-
tion of the Single Market and health and consumer protection. In June 2005, Vice 
President and Commissioner for Enterprise and Industry Verheugen and Commis-
sioner for Health and Consumer Protection Kyprianou established the Pharmaceuti-
cal Forum,17 which involved yearly meetings in the period 2006 up to 2008. The Phar-
maceutical Forum follows up on issues sill outstanding from the G10 Medicines pro-
cess. It thus formed three expert groups called Information to Patients, Relative Ef-
fectiveness and Pricing and Reimbursement.   
The process put forward in the aftermath of the G10 recommendations could be 
seen as a break from the traditional approach of harmonisation through European 
legislation (also see Table 9)  in favour of a more feasible approach of co-ordination 
of national results and, through this, respecting the subsidiarity principle and the 
national competence. Much will depend on Member States and their willingness to 
cooperate. Are they willing to accept coordination and, consequently, guidelines and 
benchmarks, not just for industrial matters but for health policy matters?  
 
                                            
17
 The Forum is jointly chaired by Vice-President Verheugen and Commissioner Kyprianou, Ministers 
from each invited Member State. In addition to Member States, three representatives from the Euro-
pean Parliament are members. The remaining membership is made up of senior representatives of all 
actors in the pharmaceutical market. 
  68 
Table 9. A non-exhaustive list of European Community action in the European pharmaceutical mar-
ket, 1965–2004. 
Year Important developments Concerning 
1965 Directive 65/65/EEC Establishment of rules for the development and 
manufacture of medicines and guidelines for the 
maintenance of a high level of protection for public 
health 
1975 Directive 75/318/EEC Establishment of the Committee for Proprietary 
Medicinal Products (CPMP) to facilitate mutual 
recognition 
Directive 75/319/EEC Introduction of mutual recognition of respective 
national marketing authorization procedures 
1983 Directive 83/570/EEC 
 
Creation of the multi-state procedure, in which the 
minimum number of recipient states was reduced 
from five to two 
1985 White paper “Completing the 
Internal Market” 
Laid down Commission proposals concerning the 
completion of the internal market. 
1986 Single European Act (SEA) Act outlining plans to establish a single European 
market for the movement of all goods, services 
and capital by 1992 
1989 Directive 89/105/EEC “Price Transparency Directive” created in order to 
counter price differentials for medicinal products 
between Member States 
1992 
 
Directive 92/25/EEC Wholesale distribution 
Directive 92/26/EEC Classification 
Directive 92/27/EEC Leaflets and labels 
Directive 92/28/EEC Advertising and sales promotion 
Regulation 1786/92 Patent protection 
1993 
 
93/39/EEC 
 
CPMP opinions in both the multi-state procedure 
as the concertation procedure became binding on 
Member States introduced as of 1995 
Regulation 2309/93 Establishment of the EMEA. Started operations in 
February 1995 and introduced centralized proce-
dure 
1996 Resolution 96/C 136/04 Call by the European Council for an industrial poli-
cy for the pharmaceutical sector in the European 
Union. 
2000 Report “Global Competitive-
ness in Pharmaceuticals: a 
European Perspective” (Pam-
molli-report) 
Report which indicated that the European pharma-
ceutical industry is losing to its main competitors, 
particularly the United States 
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Release of “Evaluation of the 
operation of Community pro-
cedures for the authorization 
of medicinal products” 
Cameron McKenna and Andersen Consulting re-
port on review of medicines licensing 
2001 Memo/01/267 Reform of European Union  pharmaceutical legisla-
tion 
Directive 2001/83/EC Community code concerning medicinal products 
for human use 
2002 G10 Medicines report Final report of the G10 process 
2003 COM(2003) 383 A stronger 
European-based pharmaceuti-
cal industry for the benefit of 
the patient – a call for action 
The Commission’s answer to the G10 recommen-
dations in which it adopted its views and drafted 
an extensive set of key actions for the future Euro-
pean pharmaceutical market  
2004 Release of report “Innovation 
in pharmaceutical sector” 
Report by Charles River Associates on a possible 
crisis in innovation in the pharmaceutical sector, 
including reasons and potential remedies 
Report on “European competi-
tiveness in pharmaceuticals”  
An update on the 2000 Pammolli report that shows 
that Europe’s pharmaceutical industry is still be-
hind its US counterparts 
Directive 2004/27/EC 
 
Amending Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community 
code concerning medicinal products for human 
use. Includes changes to the label and package 
leaflet requirements: Braille on the packaging and 
leaflet to be made available in formats for the 
blind and partially sighted 
Regulation 726/2004 Adjustments on Community procedures for the 
authorization and supervision of medicinal prod-
ucts for human and veterinary use and the estab-
lishment the European Medicines Agency 
Source: own compilation. 
3.3 European Union social policy 
The European Community’s social policies mainly aimed at workers working across 
borders and guaranteeing their social security benefits in an increasingly Europe-
wide labour market. The potential loss of social security benefits constituted barriers 
for those segments of the labour force that wanted to work abroad. Through the 
Treaty of Rome, the EEC was committed to “ensur*ing+ the economic and social pro-
gress of their countries by common action to eliminate the barriers which divide Eu-
rope”. The influence of EU social policy on the provision of statutory health services, 
which includes pharmaceuticals, has to be dealt with in the broader context of social 
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security, including statutory health services and the historical development of pa-
tient mobility. This field of EU policy is the domain of the powerful (when compared 
to DG Health and Consumer Protection) DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal 
Opportunities. Although reimbursement levels and decisions are the competence of 
the Member States, there is a relevant amount of EU legislation and, perhaps even 
more importantly, ECJ rulings to which Member States must adhere, in case a patient 
decides to seek reimbursement for the costs of health services incurred abroad.  
Previously, it was considered a solely private matter if anyone (e.g. a temporary visi-
tor, a long-term resident or a migrant worker) required treatment abroad. In other 
words, the costs were incurred individually with or without some form of travel in-
surance or arrangement through the employer. However, in the 1970s, the then Eu-
ropean Economic Community recognized that the principle of free movement of 
people was meaningless if only those in full health could take advantage of this free-
dom (Bertinato et al. 2005). 
Therefore, the Community set up a social security coordination system outlined in 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1408/71 and 574/7218 that established a series of mech-
anisms by which individuals can obtain health care abroad based on the principle of 
the free movement of persons. In 2004, Regulation (EC) No. 883/0419 was adopted, 
which in time will replace Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1408/71. This new regulation 
will eventually modernize the framework and incorporate important case law.20  
3.3.1 The European legal frameworks for cross-border health care 
In the area of health care, the primary aim of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1408/71 is 
to guarantee access to care in the state of residence for migrant workers and their 
families; however, Article 22 of Regulation 1408/71 also states the eligibility for re-
                                            
18
 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 1971 on the application of social 
security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community; consolidated 
version of 5 May 2005; Council Regulation (EEC) No. 574/72 of 21 March 1972 fixing the procedure for 
implementing Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 on the coordination of social security schemes for persons 
moving within the Community, consolidated version of 5 May 2005. 
19
 Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
coordination of social security systems, OJ L 166, 30.4.2004; however, this regulation has not been 
fully implemented and, therefore, Council Regulation (EEC) 1408/71 is referred to in this thesis. 
20
 For example, prior-authorization was addressed to align it with the jurisprudence of the ECJ on 
“undue delay” in the Watts Case (Case C-372/04). 
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imbursement for treatment in another Member State than the state of residence or 
affiliation. This eligibility for cross-border health services is subject to the following 
conditions: 
 Occasional care: when temporarily in another Member State, a person is entitled to 
(publicly contracted) care if it becomes medically necessary during their stay. To 
prove his/her entitlement in the home state and in order to receive care in the host 
state, the patient should carry a European Health Insurance Card (EHIC)21 and show 
it to a publicly contracted health care provider in the host state. 
 Planned care: patients moving to another Member State specifically to obtain care 
need to obtain prior authorization (certified by an E112 form) from their competent 
institution in their home state and submit it to the competent authority (depending 
on the Member State e.g. a sickness fund or provider) of the host state. This authori-
zation has to be given if the treatment is part of the benefit package at home but 
cannot be given within a medically justifiable time limit.22 
It is important to note that under Council Regulation (EC) No. 1408/71, the patient is 
treated in the host Member State as if he or she is a resident of that Member State. 
In other words, the reimbursement conditions and tariffs of the state of treatment 
apply, which will then have to be reimbursed by the payer of the home state.  
The situation for cross-border health care has changed dramatically since 1998. The 
European Court of Justice rulings in the Kohll/Decker and subsequent ECJ cases23 
made clear that national health systems and their available statutory health services 
do not operate in isolation from other Member States, but that they also must ad-
here to rules concerning the free movement of goods and services (see 3.5 for a 
more detailed discussion of these cases). These rulings created an alternative 
                                            
21
  The EHIC’s predecessor was form E111, which had to be submitted in the host state. The EHIC was 
introduced in 2004 to revise and simplify the coordination mechanism for occasional care by replacing 
all existing paper forms required for occasional care (E111, E110, E119 and E128).  
22
 Following the Watts case (Case C-372/04), the ECJ ruled that in order to refuse an E112 authoriza-
tion on the grounds of waiting times, the public health service must establish that the waiting time 
does not exceed a medically acceptable period with regard to a patient’s condition and clinical needs, 
i.e. no fixed time limit, but rather a waiting time that relates to an individual patient’s condition. 
23
 Case C-158/96, Kohll; Case C-120/95, Decker; Case C- 368/98, Vanbraekel; Case C-157/99, Geraets-
Smits/Peerbooms; Case C-385/99, Müller-Fauré/Van Riet; Case C-56/01, Inizan; Case C-08/02, Leicht-
le. 
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framework, interwoven with 1408/71 and described below, not based on free 
movement of persons, but on the free movement of goods and services:  
 Concerning non-hospital services received abroad, the ECJ ruled that pre-
authorization was not considered necessary, as the ECJ did not regard the need to 
maintain the financial balance or the quality of the health services as a justification 
for this barrier to the free movement rules. The court reasoned that it was unlikely 
that a substantial rise in cross border mobility to obtain non-hospital services abroad 
would occur and threaten the system, since coverage would be limited to the levels 
and conditions of the country of insurance affiliation.  
 In the case of hospital services, the ECJ did accept certain barriers to the free move-
ment of health services. Access to hospital services can indeed by subjected to a pre-
authorization (thus an E112 form), considering the importance for Member States to 
maintain balanced and accessible hospital services through a system of planning and 
contracting. However, authorization to receive treatment in another Member State 
may only be refused if the same or equally effective treatment can be obtained for 
the patient, without undue delay, from a contracted health provider at home. 
It is important to note that non-hospital treatment provided under this legal frame-
work, from now on to be referred to as the Kohll/Decker procedure, will be covered 
on the terms offered by the state of insurance, as opposed to the state of treatment 
under the EHIC and E112 schemes. Through its rulings, the ECJ has developed a fairly 
coherent body of jurisprudence regarding cross-border health services. It aimed to 
strike the right balance between the social nature of health services and the national 
competence on the one hand and internal market legislation and the European com-
petence on the other. It remains to be seen, however, whether the current balance 
will remain dominant over the next years as each ruling seems to open up more 
questions necessitating an interpretation in the form of a new ruling. For example, 
there is no European definition of hospital or non-hospital treatment and undue de-
lay, which may well lead to valid differences in interpretation, opening up the possi-
bility for patients (as seen before) to start legal proceedings in order to receive pre-
authorization for care that may not be covered or available and reimbursed at home. 
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3.3.2 Access to cross-border pharmaceuticals 
The parallel-existing frameworks described above provide four options, of which 
three can be used to obtain reimbursement for a prescription-only medicine (POM) 
abroad (see Figure 6).24  
1. The first option, using the EHIC card, only applies to occasional care on a temporary 
stay abroad (e.g. holidays). The patient is treated in the host Member State as if he 
or she is a resident of that Member State, which implicates that reimbursement 
conditions, benefit baskets and tariffs of the state of treatment apply. This option 
could motivate patients to go abroad on holidays or a daytrip, for example and feign 
the immediate need for a certain pharmaceutical treatment that is not provided or 
reimbursed in the home system. The potential to shop around for pharmaceuticals 
with an EHIC is considerable, although distances, travelling costs and information on 
availability constitute serious barriers. 
2. The second option, enabled through the ECJ rulings, is planned non-hospital care 
abroad without using an authorization. In this case, patients are restricted to the 
terms and benefits of the home state. This means that they cannot obtain reim-
bursement for pharmaceuticals abroad that are not included in the benefit basket at 
home (i.e. the positive list for pharmaceuticals). This also implies that possible higher 
tariffs in the state of purchase will not be covered by an additional reimbursement 
(as under EHIC and E112). This is of course a rather theoretical situation as it seems 
unlikely for a patient to go abroad for a pharmaceutical that can be obtained in the 
home state without extra costs. Although, under certain circumstances, for example, 
if a foreign pharmacy is much closer than the pharmacy in the home state, the pa-
tient may settle for a (small) out-of-pocket payment. If, however, this particular 
pharmaceutical is cheaper abroad, the patient would in theory be entitled to receive 
reimbursement up to the higher home state tariff and possibly make a profit25 or 
bypass a co-payment. Whether this option is used in practice and known to the pub-
lic is hard to say because no data or case studies are available. Another interesting 
development in this regard is the increasing number of internet pharmacies operat-
                                            
24
 Hospital treatment will often include pharmaceutical treatment, however, the focus of this thesis is 
the extramural provision of pharmaceuticals that citizens can obtain individually. Furthermore, one 
could interpret cross-border contracts, which are bilateral agreements mostly taking place between 
health insurers and health care providers as a fifth option to receive cross-border care. Both are, 
however, predominantly beyond the scope of this thesis.  
25
 This is the result of the Vanbraekel ruling  (Case C- 368/98) 
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ing internationally that make an (expensive) journey abroad unnecessary. However, 
the development of this practice is faced with many obstacles. Some pharmacies will 
not (or are not permitted) to recognize a foreign prescription, although this may 
change in the future when a new health services directive will likely also contain mu-
tual recognition of prescriptions. There still exist differences in labelling language, 
pharmaceuticals on the market and the way that Member States enable internet 
pharmacies, even though this may violate European case law.   
3. The third option requires the patient to seek authorization to get a reimbursed phar-
maceutical abroad. When granted, a patient should be eligible to receive reim-
bursement at the most favourable rate – the home state rate or the host state rate. 
This option could be used to obtain reimbursement for pharmaceuticals that are not 
covered at home, but the authorization may likely be refused. If a consumer seeks 
reimbursement for pharmaceuticals that are also provided at home, a positive au-
thorization decision seems very unlikely in case of a more expensive rate than at 
home.  
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Figure 6. Assumption of health care costs abroad, options listed 1 through 3 that may include indi-
vidually purchased pharmaceuticals.  
Source: Adapted from Assumption of Healthcare Abroad, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal 
Opportunities. 
The options described above, of which some more hypothetical or theoretical than 
others, are all not very well known to the public, providers and some payers mainly 
due to a lack of information. It seems though that there is potential for patients to 
obtain reimbursed medicines that are not included in the state of insurance, primar-
ily through the EHIC. In addition, there seems to be the possibility to make a profit if 
the (also in the home state provided and reimbursed) pharmaceutical is cheaper 
abroad, mainly through the Kohll/Decker procedure. In other words, there may be a 
financial incentive to seek out those pharmaceuticals that are reimbursed at home 
but are available and cheaper abroad. This practice may still be illegal depending on 
the national framework and it seems that there is still a need for further clarification, 
which may be given in the next years provided there are ECJ rulings dealing with 
cross-border pharmaceuticals.  
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3.4 European Union health policy 
The European Union’s involvement in health policy and health care services has al-
ways played a relatively minor role in the course of European integration. As stipu-
lated in Article 152 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC), Com-
munity action in the field of public health shall fully respect the responsibilities of the 
Member States for the organisation and delivery of health services and medical care. 
Furthermore, it is widely accepted that health care services are subject to the sub-
sidiarity principle. Nevertheless, there is a considerable amount of EU legislation, 
mainly emanating from the implementation of non-health EU policies, which also has 
repercussions for several topics relevant to governing, financing and delivering 
health services (e.g. medical devices, public procurement and the mobility of health 
professionals). In regard to health services and pharmaceuticals, the 1992 Maastricht 
Treaty (formally the Treaty of European Union), which reformed the existing treaties 
and the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) in particular, expanded 
the EU’s mandate on health policy (see Table 10) with two new provisions.  
First, Article 3(o) empowered the Community to “contribute to the attainment of a 
high level of health protection” for its citizens. Secondly, Article 129 also ensured a 
high level of health protection in the implementation of all Community policies and 
activities and outlined specific areas of competence for this objective, namely the 
prevention of diseases through promoting research on their causes, their transmis-
sion and their prevention and through encouraging cooperation between Member 
States. These two provisions were renewed and renumbered through the Treaty of 
Amsterdam into Article 3 par. 1 (p) and Article 152, respectively. 
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Table 10. EU mandate on health policy in the Treaty establishing the European Community. 
Article, new version 
(since the Treaty of 
Amsterdam26) 
Article, old version 
(the Treaty of Maas-
tricht) 
Content/significance for public health 
3 par. 1 (p) 3 (o) A contribution to the attainment of a high 
level of health protection 
30 36 Restriction of the free movement of goods 
on the grounds of health 
39 par. 3 48 Restriction of the free movement of workers 
on the grounds of public health 
46 par. 1 56 Restriction of the right of establishment on 
the grounds of public health 
95 par. 3 100 (a) Attainment of a high level of health protec-
tion in the approximation of laws 
95 par. 6 100 (a) Extension of the approximation period in 
the absence of danger to human health 
95 par. 8 100 (a) Obligation of Member States to notify spe-
cific public health problems in the field that 
have previously been the subject of harmo-
nisation matters 
137 118 Improvement to the working environment 
for the protection of worker health and 
safety 
140 118c Prevention of occupational accidents and 
diseases 
152 129 Public health competences 
153 129a Health protection as part of consumer pro-
tection 
174 par. 1 130 (r) Protecting human health as part of envi-
ronmental policies 
186 135 Including public health provisions to the 
provisions on the association of overseas 
countries and territories 
Source: Wismar et al. (2002). 
 
                                            
26
 The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) was not the last amendment. The TEC was last amended by the 
Treaty of Nice (2001), which entered into force 1 February 2003. The Treaty of Lisbon, signed on 13 
December 13 2007, amends the existing treaties of the European Union (EU) and is due to come into 
force in 2009 if it is successfully ratified by all European Union Member States. 
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The limitations of the Community sphere of competence are set out in the subsidiari-
ty principle (Article 5 of the TEC), which was established in EU law by the Treaty of 
Maastricht (1992) and entered into force on 1 November 1993. The subsidiarity prin-
ciple can be applied only to non-exclusive Community competences (i.e. where 
shared competence exists, such as public health) and to legislation introduced for 
the first time. The present formulation, last amended by the Treaty of Nice (2001), 
entered into force on 1 February 2003 and states:  
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the pro-
posed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by rea-
son of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. Any 
action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of 
this Treaty. 
It makes clear that the Community can only become active when their objectives 
cannot be achieved by the Member State (the sufficiency criterion) and when Com-
munity action brings added value over and above what could be achieved by the 
Member State (the benefit criterion). 
With regard to EU health competences, the subsidiarity principle is visible in Article 
152 of the TEC. It states (paragraph 4c):  
…excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States.  
and (paragraph 5): 
Community action in the field of public health shall fully respect the responsibilities of the 
Member States for the organisation and delivery of health services and medical care.  
Therefore, most Member States have assumed that health services fall within their 
spheres of competence, on the basis of Article 152 of the TEC. However, it became 
increasingly apparent that EU policies (e.g. competition law, advocating the Four 
Freedoms) do interfere with Article 152 because they may not necessarily respect 
the responsibilities of the Member States regarding their respective health systems. 
As far as a European level health policy is concerned, the competence is rather con-
fined to public health policy, advocated by the Directorate-General for Health and 
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Consumer Protection, which is also commonly referred to as DG SANCO.27 Examples 
include preventing human illnesses and diseases as well as food safety. Also, DG 
SANCO is leading the efforts to clarify (without specific legal action) the framework 
for cross-border care, as discussed in Section 3.3. However, its influence on pharma-
ceutical markets and provision is small when compared to DG Enterprise.  
3.5 The European Court of Justice (ECJ)  
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) was set up in 1952 in Luxembourg. It has the last 
word on matters of EU law in order to ensure its equal application across the Euro-
pean Union and Member States. Each Member State appoints one judge for a re-
newable term of six years. Through its interpretations of Community law, the ECJ 
wields considerable influence on the complicated interplay between the European 
Union, Member States and health services, as well as topics relevant to market lib-
eralisation, such as parallel importing, repackaging, intellectual copyrights and re-
branding. National differences in the degree and sort of pharmaceutical market 
regulation may prove vulnerable to litigation in the distribution of pharmaceuticals, 
for example. A discussion of all case law concerning the various topics affecting the 
pharmaceutical market is beyond the scope of the thesis. Instead, this section fo-
cuses on the court’s decisions on cross-border health care, which have significant 
effects on the cross-border provision of health (see Section 3.3) and provides illus-
trative examples of pharmaceutical market liberalisation. 
3.5.1 The ECJ and cross-border health services  
Three important ECJ judgements that greatly impacted the organisation of national 
health care are Kohll (C-158/96) and Decker (C-120/95), 1998, Geraets-
Smits/Peerbooms (C-157/99) and Vanbraekel (C-368/98), 2001 and Müller-Fauré and 
Van Riet (C-385/99), 2003.28  
Mr. Kohll and Mr. Decker both held Luxembourg citizenship but were refused reim-
bursement by their Luxembourg health insurance. Mr. Decker sought reimburse-
                                            
27
 From the French words santé (health) and consommateurs (consumers). 
28
 This list is non-exhaustive. More recent rulings dealing with border crossing health services which 
affirm and clarify the previous rulings include, for example, Case C-56/01 (Inizan), Case C-08/02 
(Leichtle), C-145/03 (Keller) and Case C-372/04 (Watts). 
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ment for a pair of eye glasses (goods) he had bought in Belgium using a prescription 
from a Luxembourg ophthalmologist, whereas Mr. Kohll demanded reimbursement 
for a dental treatment (services) his daughter had received in Germany. Neither had 
obtained pre-authorization from their home insurance institution as requested un-
der the E112 procedure. In the Decker case, the court affirmed that national security 
schemes should also respect Article 28 of the EC Treaty on the free movement of 
goods. In the Kohll case, the ECJ concluded that the requirement of prior authoriza-
tion constituted a violation of Articles 49 and 50 of the EC Treaty, which ensure the 
free movement of services. A refusal, the ECJ continued, could only be justified on 
the grounds of maintaining a balanced medical service accessible to all, guaranteeing 
the financial balance of the social security system, or overriding reasons in the gen-
eral interest (e.g. health protection). The ECJ found none of the above justifications 
for a refusal applicable, as reimbursement at the level of the home state would in no 
way threaten the financial balance or the quality of the health services in the home 
state.  
The Kohll and Decker cases sparked intense political and scientific debate on the 
meaning and implication of their rulings. Many questions remained, such as on the 
scope (whether it includes hospital care) and implications for national health sys-
tems. It was evident that there was a need for further clarification, which was soon 
provided by the ECJ rulings in the Geraets-Smits/Peerbooms and Vanbraekel cases, 
all of which concerned the reimbursement of hospital costs incurred in a Member 
State other than the home state. 
 Dutch citizens Mrs. Geraets-Smits and Mr. Peerbooms were both refused reim-
bursement by their Dutch sickness funds for the costs of their hospital treatment 
abroad for multi-disciplinary Parkinson treatment in Germany and experimental co-
ma patient treatment in Austria, respectively. Neither had obtained prior authoriza-
tion for these –in the Netherlands unavailable– treatments and they tried using the 
procedure based on the free movement of services established in the Kohll case to 
get a refund after returning home. The ECJ ruled identically in both cases, drawing on 
previous case law and reiterating that hospital treatment is a service according to the 
EC Treaty and through stating that the Netherlands had violated the free movement 
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rules by refusing authorization. However, the ECJ accepted that a Member State can 
justify certain restrictions for treatment through a pre-authorization if such a re-
striction is necessary in order to maintain a balanced medical and hospital service 
accessible to all and to guarantee the financial balance of the social insurance sys-
tem. The ECJ then continued to elaborate on what constitutes a fair and proportional 
pre-authorization procedure, stating:  
Authorization to receive treatment in another Member State may be refused only if treatment 
which is the same or equally effective for the patient can be obtained without undue delay 
from an establishment with which the insured person’s insurance has an agreement.  
Mr. Vanbraekel tried to obtain reimbursement for orthopaedic surgery that his late 
wife, Mrs. Descamps, a Belgian resident with Belgian health insurance, had received 
in a French hospital. However, upon her return to Belgium, the Belgian court con-
cluded that she was wrongfully denied authorization. The question that faced the 
Belgian court was whether she should be reimbursed at the Belgian tariff (as the 
Kohll ruling would imply for treatment without authorization), which was signifi-
cantly higher, or the lower French tariff, as Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1408/71 
implies. Eventually the ECJ was consulted and ruled that lower rates of reimburse-
ment for treatment delivered abroad can discourage people from applying for au-
thorization and medical treatment abroad and, because a violation of the free 
movement rules occurred, additional reimbursement covering this difference must 
be granted to the insured.    
This jurisprudence was reaffirmed in the Müller-Fauré/Van Riet judgment of 13 May 
2003, concerning the reimbursement of orthodontic treatment outside the Member 
State of affiliation without prior authorization. The court made clear that patients 
are generally entitled to reimbursement for non-hospital services (no need for prior 
authorization), whereas a pre-authorization for hospital services may be justified. In 
the judgement, the ECJ once more explicitly stated the conditions that Member 
States must fulfil in order to ensure that their health care systems are compatible 
with Community law.  
These rulings created a parallel framework to meet the costs of health services in-
curred in another Member State. The original framework (i.e. the procedures estab-
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lished under EC Regulation 1408/71, which includes procedure E112 for planned care 
and procedure E111, now the European Health Insurance Card, EHIC, for care that 
becomes medically necessary during an occasional stay) was initially set up to facili-
tate the free movement of migrant workers. Hence, the procedure was based on the 
free movement of persons. The new framework, which evolved in the aftermath of 
the Kohll/Decker case, is based on the free movement of services and goods.  
The cases exposed a contradiction in the treaties: free movement of goods and ser-
vices but a de facto exclusion of medical goods and services from these principles. 
Member States still organize their own social security systems with country specific 
conditions. The ECJ ruled that the free movement rules regarding services and goods 
also apply to the health services in the European Union and that this should be facili-
tated by Member States. However, the ECJ also made clear that public health and 
social security remain the preserve of Member States from both a legal and a politi-
cal perspective.29 The result is a rather complicated framework for the reimburse-
ment of cross-border services (see Section 3.3.1), especially from the perspective of 
European citizens. Nevertheless, these ECJ rulings increased the opportunities for 
European citizens to receive reimbursed health care goods (pharmaceuticals) and 
services (prescriptions, pharmacy services) across borders. 
3.5.2 The ECJ and pharmaceutical market liberalization 
The ECJ rulings have been encouraging parallel importing, which has resulted in the 
removal of divergent national intellectual property rights regarding copyrights, 
trademarks and patents. Furthermore, unnecessary national licensing regimes that 
prevent generic competition have been challenged by the free movement rules. In 
the absence of harmonization measures, the ECJ has been generally reluctant to act 
against national rules and regulations regarding price and profit regulation as well as 
reimbursement (selective lists). Ironically, the price differentials resulting from na-
tional divergence keeps parallel trade attractive. Also, Member States are free to 
                                            
29
 In the Smits and Peerbooms (C-157/99) judgement of 12 July 2001, the court stated that “according 
to case law, Community law does not detract from the power of the Member States to organize their 
social security systems. In the absence of harmonisation at Community level it is therefore for the 
legislation of each Member State to determine the conditions concerning the right or duty to be in-
sured with a social security scheme. Nevertheless, the Member States must comply with Community 
law when exercising that power” (paragraphs 44-46 of the judgement). 
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determine selling methods, provided that they do not discriminate against imported 
products (ECJ 1995). However, an ECJ ruling challenged the Commission’s ability to 
force the pharmaceutical industry to provide unlimited volumes of medicines to par-
allel importing wholesalers when it overturned a 1996 European Commission fine 
worth 3 million ECU on the Bayer Group for limiting the supply of Adalat. From 1989 
to 1993, the retail price of Adalat (a cardiovascular drug) was approximately 40% 
lower in France and Spain than in the UK. This motivated French and Spanish whole-
salers to export large quantities of the pharmaceutical to the UK, leading to losses up 
to €115 million for the British subsidiary. The Bayer Group countered this develop-
ment by reducing the supply of medicines to Spanish and French wholesalers. The 
ECJ ruled that the Commission had failed to prove a violation of European competi-
tion law as no evidence was found of an agreement between Bayer and its Spanish 
and French wholesalers to limit parallel exports of Adalat to the UK. 
However, a review undertaken by Hancher (2004) demonstrates that the ECJ has 
been generally unwilling to reverse its pro-internal market, pro-parallel import view, 
especially where it concerns unnecessary obstacles to free movement as a result of 
nationally divergent property rights. This may be at odds with the G10 process, 
which acknowledges the importance of property rights to industry and aims to find 
an appropriate balance between providing intellectual property protection for inno-
vative medicines and easy access to the generic markets. 
3.6 European Medicines Agency (EMEA)  
The EMEA is responsible for the coordination of the scientific resources that evaluate 
and supervise medicinal products for both human and veterinary use. To this date, 
there have been three procedures for the mutual recognition of marketing authori-
zation by Member States: the CPMP procedure (1976-1985), the multi-state proce-
dure (1985–1995) and the decentralized procedure (1995 to the present). The first 
two were very similar to each other and represent what is often characterized as the 
“weak” European regulatory state and they were not overly successful in terms of 
applications admitted. Major changes occurred in 1995 with the constitution of the 
decentralized procedure combined with the centralized procedure through the 
EMEA, which is often characterized as the “strong” European regulatory state (Abra-
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ham and Lewis 2000). These changes mark the beginning of a revolution in European 
pharmaceutical regulation and made market authorization increasingly the responsi-
bility of the London-based EMEA. In 2004, adjustments were made to the centralized 
and the decentralized procedure through EC Regulation 726/2004, which repealed 
the well-known EC Regulation 2309/93 and aims to provide, in the words of the 
EMEA, “a more robust, modern and effective regulatory framework for pharmaceu-
ticals in Europe” (EMEA 2005). 
Changes made to the centralized procedure include the following:  
 an expansion of the list of products for which the centralized procedure is mandato-
ry (in addition to new biotechnology and orphan drugs, all new products indicated 
for treatment of AIDS, cancer, diabetes and neurodegenerative diseases)  
 accelerated procedures through shortened deadlines in the different steps of the 
overall procedure  
 “fast track” procedures for products of major interest to public health and therapeu-
tic innovation  
 a strengthening of the role of the European Medicines Agency as a scientific advisor 
(e.g. it may request the European Commission impose financial penalties on authori-
zation holders)  
Some important changes to the mutual recognition decentralized procedure are:  
 harmonization of the data protection period with the period provided for the cen-
tralized authorized products (i.e. 10 years), with a possibility for a one year exten-
sion under certain conditions  
 improvement of the procedure (i.e. definitions, legal status and improvement on ar-
bitration mechanism applicable when Member States disagree over a certain au-
thorization) by ensuring that the objections related to the serious risk of public 
health are evaluated properly and that necessary follow up measures are taken.  
The centralized drug approval through the EMEA procedure has been reasonably 
successful and will include generic products in the future. Approval of a drug re-
quires acceptance in all other EU Member States. In the national decentralized pro-
cess, a company can apply for approval in one Member State. When it receives ap-
proval it can –with the expectation of quick authorization– apply to the market in 
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other Member States. In case of an objection by a Member State, the EMEA solves 
the dispute.  
Despite its relative success, there also has been criticism. Concerns have been raised 
about the review process, which supposedly approves drugs that may have little clin-
ical benefit despite their higher prices (Mossialos et al. 2004). Consequently, ap-
proved drugs are not likely to meet the expectations of patients who believe that 
these new drug signify substantial improvements in treatments (Garattini and Ber-
tele’ 2002). 
Furthermore, there are concerns about the operation of the EMEA (Garattini and 
Bertele’ 2004). First, the EMEA is regulated by DG Enterprise, not by DG Health and 
Consumer Protection whose objectives would perhaps be more aligned with the in-
terests of patients and less with the interests of industry. Secondly, while the EMEA 
and decentralized national licensing agencies are primarily financed through fees 
from industry for market authorization, it can provoke competition for funds. Ideally, 
the decentralized route would become obsolete and remove the competition. In 
addition, the European Commission recently suggested that the management board 
of the EMEA should include representatives from the pharmaceutical industry, 
providing a possible source for conflicts of interest. 
The EMEA does not have an internal staff capable of carrying out evaluations of 
submitted products, as, for example, its US counterpart, the Food and Drug Admin-
istration (FDA). Instead, it contracts national medicine agencies to perform evalua-
tions and report back their findings. Companies can nominate a national agency 
when applying through the centralized procedure, which may lead them to choose 
those more likely to give their product a favourable report (Garattini and Bertele’ 
2001). This practice could stimulate national agencies to compete with other agen-
cies on rapid authorization and favourable reports. 
All of these factors contribute to the fact that the EMEA has been accused of favour-
ing industry in its operations. An alleged swift approval, rather than strict assessment 
as a prime objective, has been criticized by various authors (e.g. Abraham and Lewis 
2000; Bertele’ and Li Bassi 2004; Garattini and Bertele’ 2001, 2004).    
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4 National pharmaceutical policies in the EU 
 
The national pharmaceutical market forms an important part of health care systems, 
not only in economic terms but also in terms of public health. The national regulato-
ry mechanisms in Europe were put in place in the aftermath of the thalidomide dis-
aster, showing an analogy with the European Community developments in the early 
1960s. In the early years, these regulatory systems mainly safeguarded the quality 
and accessibility of pharmaceutical provision, but, as early as the 1980s, the con-
tainment of pharmaceutical expenditures became more and more a policy objective 
in European states. The rising expenditures on drugs put pressure on the national 
health budgets, which posed a threat to the financing and accessibility of health 
care. Pharmaceutical expenditures, which frequently are growing faster than GDP 
and total health expenditure (see Table 11), have been the subject of many national 
cost-containment strategies.  
The degree to which cost-containment measures are adopted reflects how much 
focus is given to industrial policy (e.g. nourishing a science base, employment and 
strategic issues), public health policy (e.g. safe medicines, patient access, high quality 
preparations and innovative cures) and health care policy (e.g. cost-containment, 
generic promotion, cost effective medication). However, even Member States like 
Germany and the UK, who support strong industry and historically have been more 
willing to make a trade-off in favour of industrial policy, are cutting back on pharma-
ceutical expenditures.  
Before a medicine is dispensed, it has to be admitted to a national market through 
the responsible authorization agencies. This can be achieved through the EMEA (cen-
tralized procedure) or through a national medicine agency (decentralized procedure 
and exclusively national procedure). As soon as the product is licensed, various na-
tional regulations – often transposed European directives – apply to the medicine on 
issues ranging from packaging, advertising and distribution to pharmacovigilance. It 
is important to note that referring to “national policy” in this regard may be mislead-
ing, as the actual policy is the sum of transposed EU directives and national regula-
tion. This will be discussed in greater depth in the following sections.  
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Table 11. Pharmaceutical expenditures in several EU Member States, 1985–2005. 
 Total expenditure on pharmaceuti-
cals (% of total health expenditure) 
Total expenditure on pharmaceuti-
cals (% of GDP) 
Year 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Austria  9.0 9.2 11.9 12.0  0.8 0.9 1.2 1.2 
Belgium 15.7 15.5 16.7  17.1 1.1 1.1 1.4  1.8 
Czech Rep.  21.0 25.1 23.4 25.1  1.0 1.8 1.5 1.8 
Denmark 6.6 7.5 9.1 8.8  0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 2.0 
Finland 9.7 9.4 13.0 15.2 15.8 0.7 0.7 1.0 1.1 1.3 
France 16.2 16.9 15.0 16.5 16.7 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.9 
Germany 13.8 14.3 12.9 13.6 15.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.6 
Greece  14.3 15.7 17.8 18.5 1.0 0.9 1.4 1.4 1.7 
Hungary   25.0  30.5   1.8  2.6 
Italy  20.3 20.7 22.0 20.3  1.6 1.5 1.8 1.8 
Luxembourg 14.7 14.9 12.0 11.0 8.4 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.7 
Netherlands 9.3 9.6 11.0 11.7  0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9  
Poland     28.0     1.7 
Portugal 25.4 24.9 23.6 22.4 21.6 1.5 1.5 1.8 2.0 2.2 
Slovak Rep.    34.0 31.9    1.9 2.3 
Spain 20.3 17.8 19.2 21.3 22.4 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.9 
Sweden 7.0 8.0 12.3 13.8 13.7 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.1 1.3 
UK 14.1 13.5 15.3   0.8 0.8    
Source: OECD Health Data (2008). 
A decision has to be made on whether the pharmaceutical is covered under the 
health insurance scheme of the respective Member States. In principle, most Mem-
ber States have universal public coverage (i.e. coverage for the entire population, 
defined by legal residence or citizenship). In most EU27 Member States, this is ac-
complished through a contribution-based social health insurance (SHI) system or a 
tax-based National Health Service (NHS).30 The reimbursement decision is a crucial 
                                            
30
 SHI countries include Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Slovakia and Slovenia. NHS countries include UK, Sweden, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Poland, 
Portugal and Romania. More precisely speaking, however, each country has a unique mix of sources 
for health care revenues that consist of both general taxes and social contributions. Furthermore, 
some systems cannot be strictly described as systems of universal insurance. For certain population 
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decision for industry. If their products are not reimbursed, patients are not as likely 
to use it due to high costs, meaning that they will not be able to receive a return on 
their investment. After admission to the benefit basket, more regulations apply to 
the pharmaceutical under the respective health scheme (e.g. reference pricing and 
co-payment measures). Furthermore, other regulations seek to bring down pharma-
ceutical expenditures by influencing the prescriber (GP/physician) and pharmacist, 
which does not directly concern the pharmaceutical. 
International studies use various ways to categorize pharmaceutical policies: price 
measures versus volume measures, direct versus indirect measures, demand side 
versus supply side measures, or coercive versus non-coercive measures. However, 
these distinctions are often used to describe national cost-containment strategies 
Therefore, in order to get a more coherent impression of national pharmaceutical 
frameworks, the measures and regulatory approaches are discussed at the appropri-
ate level as depicted in Figure 7.  
The first section of this chapter deals with regulation that applies to the entire na-
tional pharmaceutical market. This includes, following the pharmaceutical down the 
value chain: marketing authorization (licensing), pharmacovigilance, classification, 
distribution and advertising. These issues are a shared competence between the 
European Union and Member States. The second and third sections discuss the vari-
ous national pharmaceutical regulations and measures under the respective SHI and 
NHS schemes in Member States, such as pricing and reimbursement. These will be 
divided into measures with a potential impact on the entire pharmaceutical market 
(Section Two) and measures that only have an influence within the system (Section 
Three). Making such a distinction is useful because it highlights the areas of shared 
competence where the Community can become active, albeit in accordance with the 
principle of subsidiarity. Within their respective health systems, the competence 
generally lies with the Member State, following Article 152.31 However, national reg-
                                                                                                                             
groups, the primary mode (or part) of cover for health care is substitutive voluntary health insurance 
(e.g. in Ireland and Germany). 
31
 The word “generally” was chosen because, as seen before, the organisation of the health systems 
of Member States must still respect the Four Freedoms. Therefore, the national systems are not com-
pletely exempt from Community influence. 
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ulation that impacts the entire national health market (see arrow in Figure 7) could 
also fall within the sphere of the EU competence (e.g. pricing regulation that affects 
non-reimbursed medicines). This implies a field of shared competence. It is specifi-
cally in these fields that the EU has used its competence and might possibly use it in 
the future. This chapter concludes with a section exclusively dedicated to pharma-
ceutical policy in new Member States. Its significantly different historical back-
grounds and recent Western-based reforms warrant a more thorough look into its 
development and reform processes. 
Figure 7. Competences in the national pharmaceutical market. 
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4.1 Regulation for the entire national pharmaceutical market 
 
The dissonance between the industrial policy-leaning European Commission and 
health policy-leaning Member States, forces Member States to use the principle of 
subsidiarity to block European regulation. Although Member States control a signifi-
cant portion of their respective pharmaceutical markets, the EU still plays a consid-
erable role. The EU regulatory framework, which aims to promote the single Europe-
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an market, has strong impact on issues such as manufacturing, authorization, label-
ling/packaging requirements, advertising rules, wholesale distribution and patent 
protection. This is achieved through Directive 2001/83/EC,32 the Community code 
relating to medicinal products for human use, hereafter to be referred to as the 
Community code, which integrates many of the previous pharmaceutical directives 
(see Section 3.2). The contents and scope of the Community code are outlined in 
Table 12. Member States have regulations in place on these issues, but their authori-
ty in these matters has been gradually overtaken due to these directives, which have 
to be transposed in their legal framework in order to further harmonize pharmaceu-
tical legislation. 
Table 12. Community code. 
Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal products for hu-
man use  
Title I Definitions 
Title II Scope 
Title III Placing on the market 
Title IV Manufacture and importation 
Title V Labelling and package leaflet 
Title VI Classification of medicinal products 
Title VII Wholesale distribution of medicinal products 
Title VIII Advertising 
Title IX Pharmacovigilance 
Title X Special provisions on medical products derived from human 
blood and plasma 
Title XI Supervision and sanctions 
Title XII Standing Committee 
Title XIII General provisions 
Title XIV Final provisions 
                                            
32
 Directive 2001/83/EC, later amended by Directive 2004/27/EC, replaces and consolidates the first 
pharmaceutical Directive 65/65/EEC, with all its relevant amendments, the two landmark directives 
75/319/EEC and 75/318/EEC and their respective amendments and the 1992 directives on wholesal-
ing (92/25/EEC), classification (92/26/EEC), labelling and packaging (92/27/EEC) and advertising 
(92/28/EEC). 
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4.1.1 Market authorization 
In 1995, the establishment of the European Medicines Agency (EMEA) and the cen-
tralized procedure altered the authorization process of medicines in the European 
Union (also see Chapter 3). It leaves pharmaceutical companies that seek market 
authorization in a Member State with three options: the centralized and the decen-
tralized procedures for EU-wide authorization and the old exclusively national pro-
cedure. 
 The centralized procedure is compulsory for new biotechnology products, orphan 
drugs and all new products for the treatment of AIDS, cancer, diabetes and neuro-
degenerative diseases. The application is submitted directly to the EMEA, which 
checks whether it fulfils all necessary requirements. If so, the EMEA validates the 
application and the Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP),33 part 
of the EMEA and selects two rapporteurs to assess the application. These appointed 
rapporteurs are individual members of the CPMP and take the preference of the ap-
plicant into account. The rapporteurs will act as the coordinators of the assessment 
report and the contact person for the applicant. At the conclusion of the scientific 
evaluation, undertaken within 210 days, the opinion of the full membership of the 
CHMP is transmitted to the European Commission to be transformed into a single 
market authorization for the whole EU, published in the Official Journal of the Euro-
pean Communities. After the product is licensed through the centralized procedure, 
the CHMP is responsible for pharmacovigilance until the product is available on the 
market. 
The decentralized procedure (or mutual recognition procedure) applies to the major-
ity of conventional medicinal products and is based on the principle of mutual 
recognition of national authorizations, granted by national marketing authorities.34 
Through this procedure, the market authorization for one European Member State 
can be extended to one or more Member States identified by the manufacturer. 
When problems concerning the recognition of authorizations occur between Mem-
                                            
33
 The Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP) was formerly known as the CPMP, 
Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products (see Chapter 3). 
34
 The concerned national medicines authorities responsible for licensing, classification and pharma-
covigilance can be found at www.hma.eu.  
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ber States, the EMEA (through the CHMP) gets involved and functions as an arbitra-
tor. In such a situation, the opinion of the CHMP is transmitted to the European 
Commission. If minor or no objections are raised by the Member States, the authori-
zation is published in the Official Journal of the European Communities. The mutual 
recognition is compulsory for any non-centralized product sold in more than one 
Member State. 
Market authorization exclusively for one country can still be obtained through the 
medicine agency of that particular Member State. These medicine agencies (also 
called licensing agencies) also have the national responsibilities of pharmacovigilance 
and the classification of all authorized products irrespective of procedure. However, 
as soon as the manufacturer seeks market admission in another Member State, the 
mutual recognition procedure becomes compulsory. The various European national 
medicine authorities keep in regular contact on issues of Community interest 
through the Heads of Medicines Agencies (HMA). 
The criteria for the authorization of pharmaceuticals in Europe are based on the EU-
wide good clinical practice standards and include proven safety and efficacy, as out-
lined in Directive 2001/20/EC (see below). Only a small beneficial effect needs to be 
demonstrated in order to fulfil the efficacy criteria and cost-effectiveness is not in-
cluded. This implies that a newly licensed pharmaceutical does not necessarily have 
higher therapeutic benefits. Cost-effectiveness does not become an issue in most 
countries until the reimbursement decisions on coverage under the SHI/NHS are 
made. The role of the authorization procedure is mainly to guarantee that the prod-
uct works, is safe and is of good pharmacological quality. Directive 2003/94/EC of 8 
October 2003 lists the principles and guidelines of good manufacturing practice con-
cerning pharmaceuticals. Title IV and V of the Community code cover further legal 
requirements for manufacturing, labelling and package leaflets. 
4.1.2 Pharmacovigilance 
After the pharmaceutical is approved, whether according to the centralized, decen-
tralized or national procedure, it undergoes post-marketing surveillance, or pharma-
covigilance. Pharmacovigilance is a continuation of the evaluation of the pharmaceu-
tical. Although pharmacovigilance used to be a solely national matter, after the tha-
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lidomide disaster, Directives 65/65/EEC and Directive 75/319/EEC, now part of the 
Community Code relating to medicinal products for human use, forced all actors to 
collect, collate and exchange adverse drug reactions (ADRs) within the European 
Economic Area. However, the directives are binding as to the results to be achieved 
and many of the regulatory requirements were already covered under existing na-
tional law. For example, the UK enacted the Medicines Act in 1968. Consequently, 
many different systems with different reporting patterns were put in place, if not 
already established. 
Furthermore, the new authorization procedures expose approved medicines to 
much larger populations, more so than under the pre-1995 European situation. The-
se developments raised concern about pharmacovigilance standards in Europe and 
highlighted the need for a better understanding of the various national systems be-
fore pharmacovigilance assessment could be applied to the EU as a whole. There-
fore, the EudraVigilance data processing network and management system was 
launched in December 2001. It has been developed according to internationally-held 
standards. As a result, the EMEA implemented the electronic data exchange of Indi-
vidual Case Safety Reports (ICSRs) for marketed medicinal products. The system ena-
bles the exchange of pharmacovigilance data between national medicine agencies, 
the EMEA and the pharmaceutical industry. 
Directive 2001/20/EC,35 the Clinical Trials Directive, has been fully implemented 
since 1 May 2004. The directive aims to simplify and harmonize the administrative 
provisions governing clinical trials by establishing a clear, transparent procedure and 
creating conditions conducive to the effective co-ordination of such clinical trials in 
the European Community by the medicine agencies involved. This means that from 
now on, sponsors of clinical trials need to obtain a EUDRACT number from the new 
EUDRACT database in order to collect all relevant information about suspected seri-
ous unexpected adverse reactions (SUSARs). This information is then reported to the 
appropriate authorities. EudraVigilance does not only cover the post-authorization 
phase, but also the pre-authorization phase. 
                                            
35
 Directive 2001/20/EC of the European Parliament and Council of 4 April 2001 on the approximation 
of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to the implemen-
tation of good clinical practice in the conduct of clinical trials on medicinal products for human use. 
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4.1.3 Distribution and classification of pharmaceuticals 
When a pharmaceutical enters a national market, pharmaceutical wholesalers are 
subject to national regulation, once again, stemming from the Community code re-
lating to medicinal products. The Code has a full title dedicated to wholesaling (Title 
VII) and integrates the 1992 directive (92/25/EEC) on wholesale distribution. The 
Code includes the requirement for the possession of an authorization before engag-
ing in wholesale activity, forces Member States to follow up with the authorization 
holder and suspend or revoke the authorization if authorization conditions are not 
met. Member States must ensure that their authorization holders maintain adequate 
premises, qualified staff, precise recordkeeping, emergency plans for market-
withdrawal of pharmaceuticals and information that may trace the distribution path 
of every medicinal product. Guidelines on good distribution (94/C 63/0336) are simi-
lar to the guidelines for good clinical and manufacturing practice and are also in ac-
cordance with the Community code.  
Pharmaceutical products can be dispensed by hospitals, community pharmacies and, 
depending on their classification and the Member State, drug stores and supermar-
kets. The European pharmacy sector is a heavily regulated, controlled field. In a 
study of regulation of professional services in the EU, conducted for the Directorate-
General for Competition, Paterson et al. (2003) found that pharmacists are faced 
with the most extensive, restrictive regulation of all researched professions, which 
included accountants, lawyers and engineers. Pharmacies must be licensed under 
national regulation in all EU Member States. Depending on the Member State, the 
responsible agencies are, for example, the French Départments and German Länder, 
the Health Care Inspectorate in the Netherlands, the National Agency for medicines 
in Finland, the health department (Belgium, Denmark and Portugal), the Royal Phar-
maceutical Society in the UK and the College of Pharmacists in Spain (Taylor et al., 
2004a). In Sweden, pharmaceutical products are sold through a state monopoly and 
only one state-owned company is carrying out the pharmacy services. Portugal, Aus-
tria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Spain, Greece and Luxembourg have 
quite extensive regulations, in which the number of pharmacies is restricted, for ex-
                                            
36
 Guidelines on Good Distribution Practice of Medicinal Products for Human Use (94/C 63/03) 
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ample through economic needs tests and maximum pharmacies relative to popula-
tion numbers. Ireland, Germany, the UK and the Netherlands do not have these 
kinds of restricting market entry regulations (Paterson et al. 2003). With the excep-
tion of Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK, only pharmacists can 
own pharmacies. In the Netherlands, for example, non-pharmacists have been al-
lowed to employ pharmacists since 1999. This paved the way for pharmacies owned 
by supermarkets, chemists, insurers and industry.  
Each Member State has its own medicines classification system, which is set up to 
ensure that the public benefits from the pharmaceutical while minimizing chances of 
inappropriate use and harm to the user. Classification is the responsibility of the 
Medicine Agency37 (licensing authority) of the concerned Member State. In most 
European countries (e.g. UK and France), medicines are classified into three catego-
ries: prescription-only medicine (POM, also known as Rx), pharmacy-supervised sale 
(P), or general sales list (GSL). Some Member States do not use the pharmacy-
supervised sale category.  
POMs can only be supplied when recommended/endorsed by a medical practitioner 
and dispensed through a community or hospital pharmacist. The over-the-counter 
(OTC) market, medicines for sale without prescription, consists of the P and GSL cat-
egories. There are major distinctions between the P and GSL categories in the vari-
ous Member States. In most countries, medicines in the P category can only be sold 
under the supervision of a pharmacist. On the other hand, both pharmacists and 
retail outlets (e.g. chemists or supermarkets) can sell pharmaceuticals from the GSL 
category. This is not necessarily the case in all countries. For example, in Italy and 
France the P and GSL categories are only available through a pharmacist, although 
GSL products may be displayed in areas where they can be selected by customers 
and advertised to the public (Bond et al. 2004). Deregulation was adopted in the 
Netherlands, which only had the POM and GSL categories until 2007. This split the 
OTC category in three (Staatsblad 2007). Apart from the P and GSL (all retail outlets) 
categories, there is a third intermediate category that can only be sold by pharma-
                                            
37
 National medicines authorities responsible for licensing, classification and pharmacovigilance can 
be found at http://heads.medagencies.org/index.html 
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cies and chemists and is, therefore, comparable to the Italian and French interpreta-
tion of GSL.  
The Classification Directive (92/26/EEC38), now under Community code Title VI, came 
into effect in 1992 and, on a European level, harmonizes the criteria that determine 
whether a product should be sold as an OTC or a POM. It is important to note, how-
ever, that these criteria are applied nationally and whether a pharmaceutical re-
ceives POM or OTC status varies considerably across Member States. A Europe-wide 
trend can be observed as the OTC market is expanding in terms of value, volume and 
range of products (Bond et al. 2004). 
4.1.4 Advertising 
Following Directive 92/28/EEC, now under Community code Title VIII, public advertis-
ing of POMs is prohibited, whereas public advertising of OTCs is allowed in most cas-
es.39 Most Member States already had a similar distinction and rules in place. As a 
consequence of the inconsistencies between countries in terms of classification, 
there are also differences in the ability to advertise pharmaceuticals. Member States 
have their own frameworks in place that regulate controls on OTC pharmaceuticals. 
The objectives of these constraints are related to public safety and competition is-
sues. A clear distinction has to be made between advertising and information to pa-
tients. In contrast to the European framework for pharmaceutical advertising, the 
issue of national information provisions did not lead to harmonization between 
Member States. Several Commission initiatives and repeated public debates focused 
on the need to address this lack of a Community framework on information to pa-
tients; however, no substantial changes to the legal situation have been made in the 
last 15 years (European Commission 2007). 
                                            
38
 Directive 92/26/EEC,of 31 March 1992 concerning classification of the supply of medicinal products 
for human use 
39
 Until recently, EU legislation prohibited advertising treatment for chronic insomnia, diabetes and 
other metabolic diseases, malignant diseases and serious infectious diseases, including HIV and tuber-
culosis and sexually transmitted diseases. The pharmaceutical review lifted these restrictions.  
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4.2 NHS/SHI regulation with a potential impact on entire national 
market 
There is a considerable amount of national cost-containment measures, which, de-
pending on how they are applied, can strongly influence the entire pharmaceutical 
market (outside the NHS/SHI, i.e. non-publicly covered medicines). As outlined in 
Section 4.2.1, direct price controls and prescribing and dispensing measures can af-
fect the entire pharmaceutical market. A myriad of cost-containment measures were 
taken in the 1990s, which were often copied from each other, even though reliable 
information about the successes and failures of measures adopted elsewhere was 
not gathered (Maynard and Bloor 2003; Guillén and Cabiedes 2003). There are stud-
ies that tried to link price level with the regulatory framework, often with significant 
discrepancies. Some suggest prices are kept lower through a strict regulatory frame-
work (Garattini et al. 1994; Johnsson 1994; Rovira and Darba 2001), while others 
suggest that in countries with less regulation, prices tend to be lower due to compe-
tition (Reekie 1998; Danzon and Chao 2000). This discrepancy reflects the different 
methodological approaches, including the range of products considered, particularly 
whether off-patent generics were included, the period covered by the data and the 
method of calculating the indices (Mrazek and Mossialaos 2004). Furthermore, the 
total of pharmaceutical spending (not just prices) suggests that the policies adopted 
in EU countries during the 1980s and 1990s have not been effective in controlling 
public pharmaceutical spending (Guillén and Cabiedes 2003).  
This illustrates the difficulties Member States experience controlling their pharma-
ceutical expenditures and developing successful pharmaceutical cost-containment 
policies. This section seeks to provide an overview of the wide variety of pharmaceu-
tical cost-containment regulation in place across Member States. The purpose of this 
thesis is to look at national policies and Member States in a general, rather conduct-
ing country-to-country analysis.    
4.2.1 Direct price controls and profit controls 
Price control measures aim to contain the rising public expenditures on pharmaceu-
ticals, in other words, the expenditures within the SHI/NHS system. However, these 
measures may have nationwide impacts and affect the entire national pharmaceuti-
  98 
cal market and/or all authorized medicines. This depends on the scope of the regula-
tion in force and when it only affects reimbursed medicines, the cost-containment 
effects are strictly limited to within the SHI/NHS. 
With direct price controls, the government simply sets maximum prices for pharma-
ceuticals. How these prices are set varies from country to country. They may apply to 
all medicines or to specific pharmaceutical groups, such as all reimbursed medicines, 
off-patent (generics) or on-patent pharmaceuticals. At what level these prices are 
fixed depends on several country-specific factors, including budget limits, prescribing 
behaviour, patterns of utilization and the importance of the pharmaceutical industry 
to the national economy (Mrazek and Mossialos 2004). Pharmaceutical prices are 
controlled in most European countries. The UK and Germany are the only EU15 
countries in which in-patent drugs can be freely priced at launch. In France, free pric-
ing for medicinal products defined as “innovative” was introduced in 2003. It does 
not come as a surprise that these three Member States have the largest pharmaceu-
tical industries in the EU. In the UK, however, prices are moderated indirectly by con-
trolling the profits earned by the pharmaceutical industry. The Pharmaceutical Price 
Regulation Scheme (PPRS) regulates profits to a band of 17% to 21% on historic capi-
tal, with 25% variation on either side. If companies set their prices in such a way that 
profits are higher than the band, the pharmaceutical company has to reimburse the 
NHS or reduce the profits. If profits are lower, the company can raise its prices. 
However, the scheme offers little incentive to be efficient, as such behaviour reduces 
cost and raises the profits, which then have to be reimbursed to the NHS (Maynard 
and Bloor 1997). 
Member States use different price setting schemes, which, of course, reflect their 
respective policy priorities. Prices are directly controlled through negotiations with 
industry (Austria, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and, more recently, the Netherlands) 
and fixed by national authorities through a list of factors, including discretionary cri-
teria that are subjective, open to bias and could result in a lack of transparency 
(Mrazek and Mossialos 2004). Examples of such factors are price comparisons be-
tween similar products within a country or comparisons with identical or comparable 
products in other countries. Examples include the use of international comparisons 
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of ex-manufacturers price (e.g. Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Italy, Portugal) or 
wholesale price (e.g. Finland, Ireland) (see table 13). The Netherlands, for example, 
uses the ex-manufacturer’s price in their neighbouring countries as a maximum, but 
regulates the prices of generics through yearly agreements (called ‘covenants’) with 
the generic industry, pharmacists and health insurers.  
Table 13. Examples of price comparison measures in Europe. 
Member 
State 
Price comparison 
Belgium Ex-manufacturer’s price in France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands  
Denmark Average European ex-manufacturer’s price excluding Greece, Portugal, 
Spain and Luxembourg, but including Liechtenstein 
Finland Average EU wholesale price 
Ireland Average wholesale price in Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands, UK 
Italy Weighted average of ex-manufacturer’s prices in the EU (excluding Luxem-
bourg and Denmark) 
Netherlands Average ex-manufacturer’s price in Belgium, France, Germany, UK 
Portugal Minimum ex-manufacturer’s price of identical products in France, Italy, 
Spain 
Source: Mrazek and Mossialos (2004). 
Whether price controls are effective in reducing pharmaceutical expenditures is 
heavily debated. The introduction of stricter price controls is often accompanied 
with increasing expenditures (Mrazek and Mossialos 2004).  Expenditures do not 
necessarily decrease when prices fall: the volume component or the shift to other 
medicines can still make up for the lower price. A frequently observed effect is that 
pricing measures seem to work in the short term, but their effectiveness decreases 
in the long term. Possible explanations are that industry is able to create “escape 
valves” by increasing the sales of already commercialized products and that higher 
prices can be set via product differentiation through new trademarks (Guillén and 
Cabiedes 2003). 
The 1989 European Transparency Directive forces Member States to adopt verifiable 
and transparent criteria when setting pharmaceutical prices and making reimburse-
ment decisions. It does not regulate European-wide price controls or profit caps, nor 
does it seek to harmonize the rules of the various national reimbursement schemes. 
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It does, however, set a 90-day limit for adopting a decision on the price. The Trans-
parency Directive is the only European directive concerning pricing that is in force. 
4.2.2 Measures regulating prescribing and dispensing 
Stimulating the use of generics 
Generics are off-patent drugs usually sold under their chemical name and are possi-
bly manufactured by more than one producers. Consequently, they are more price-
competitive. As visible in Table 14, there are various options that stimulate generic 
use, which are aimed at the demand side of the pharmaceutical market,40 either di-
rected towards the physician (responsible for the prescription) or towards the phar-
macist (responsible for dispensing the pharmaceutical). The number of Member 
States participating in the generics market has grown over the past few years and is 
expected to continue to grow in the near future.  
In countries that already had promoting policies for generics (Germany, Denmark, 
the Netherlands and the UK), the generic market (as a percentage of total prescrip-
tions) is notably bigger than in countries that did not have such policies in place (e.g. 
France, Spain) (Mrazek and Frank 2004). This is illustrated by Simoens and De Coster 
(2006), who had access to IMS Health and EGA data and distinguished two groups of 
countries in terms of share of generic medicines by volume in 2004. The first group is 
made up of countries with a mature generic market, in which the volume of generics 
exceed 40% of the market share, (e.g. Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Poland and 
the UK). The second group consists of countries with developing generic markets, in 
which generics make up less than 20% of the market share (e.g. Austria, Belgium, 
France, Italy, Portugal and Spain). The study demonstrates that there is no single 
approach to developing a generic medicines market, but countries that have pro-
moted generic medicines in the past 10 to 15 years consequently have more mature 
generic markets than countries that have only recently implemented such policies.   
For example, the greatest amount of drug substitution has occurred in the Nether-
lands (Guillén and Cabiedes 2003). The Dutch government, in alliance with pharma-
                                            
40
 There are also supply side policies that can stimulate the use of generics (e.g. reference pricing 
schemes).   
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cists and medical organizations, tries to stimulate a more rational prescribing behav-
iour through the use of electronic prescribing programs in which a computer pro-
vides suggestions for a generic substitute (EVS, Electronisch Voorschrijf Systeem).  
Table 14. Incentives to promote generics in the EU. 
Target Method Country 
Physician Generic name prescribing encour-
aged or required  
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain (in some regions), 
UK 
Prescribing budgets Germany, Italy, Ireland, UK 
Pay agreement linked to prescribing Spain (local schemes) 
Dissemination of information to 
promote generics 
Belgium, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, UK 
Prescribing guidelines France, Netherlands, Portugal, UK 
Monitoring prescribing Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Luxem-
bourg, Netherlands, UK 
Pharmacist Generic substitution  Denmark, Finland, France, Norway, 
Spain 
Multi-source product selection if 
prescription is written using the ge-
neric name 
Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, Por-
tugal, Netherlands, Sweden, UK 
Margins that encourage generic dis-
pensing 
France, Netherlands, Norway, 
Spain, UK 
Dispensing budgets Denmark 
Source: Mrazek and Mossialos (2004). 
Rationalization of prescribing  
The promotion of generics makes up a great part of the aim of most countries to 
rationalize their prescribing behaviour, but these attempts does not mean that they 
are constrained to generics. Some of the methods mentioned in Table 14 (e.g. guide-
lines, information campaigns and monitoring), can also be used to promote a more 
reluctant prescribing behaviour, to give advice on drugs and optimal length of treat-
ment for each condition and provide support for more cost-aware decisions, regard-
less of whether a computerized decision support system is used. All European coun-
tries apply prescribing guidelines to some extent and a trend is visible, but not all 
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countries apply them in a systematic and generalized way (Guillén and Cabiedes 
2003). 
The criteria that determine how the guidelines are designed differ from country to 
country. In general, they are not regarded as a substitute for a physician’s clinical 
judgement. In the UK, guidelines are the responsibility of the National Institute of 
Clinical Excellence (NICE). The NICE guidelines include cost-effectiveness insights and 
are targeted at both physicians and patients. France uses guidelines drafted by ex-
perts and professionals, which are framed as statements about what should not be 
prescribed (i.e. les réferences médicales opposables). In theory, failure to comply 
results in a fine related to the harm caused and the cost incurred and the extent of 
deviance; however, most practitioners are not even aware of these rules and their 
administration is so complex that they have been rarely used as control devices. In 
Germany, prescribing guidelines were introduced in 1995 and function closely with 
the negative list. However, these guidelines were not the subject of systematic anal-
ysis so the effects on quality and spending are unclear (Maynard and Bloor 2003).  
Remuneration of community pharmacies 
A percentage of prices is the most common method of remunerating community 
pharmacies in Europe (e.g. Austria, Belgium, Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain). This can make it attractive for community pharmacies in these countries to 
supply more expensive medicines, which is an undesired situation from a cost-
containment point of view. Key to controlling pharmacy reimbursement policies is 
attempting to eliminate the incentive to sell more and more expensive pharmaceuti-
cals. It has been shown that this can be achieved by removing the link between the 
remuneration of pharmacists and the price or quantity of drugs. Different schemes 
are in place. Some countries have margin-ceilings (Spain), use margins that diminish 
as prices rise (e.g. France and Germany until 2003) or have fixed amounts per dis-
pensation, regardless of drug price (UK, Sweden, Ireland and the Netherlands). The 
combination of a small price percentage and a dispensing fee is used in Germany. 
Since 2004, a pharmacy is remunerated 3% of the price of the pharmaceutical and a 
fixed dispensing fee of €8.10. In Denmark, the Ministry of Health offers a yearly 
amount to compensate community pharmacies that have low levels of dispensation 
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(Guillén and Cabiedes 2003). However, the question remains as to why there are still 
so many countries with a system that contains an incentive to sell more expensive 
medicines.  
4.3 NHS/SHI pharmaceutical regulation 
The regulation discussed in this section strictly lies within a Member State’s National 
Health Service (NHS) or Social Health Insurance (SHI) scheme and generally falls with-
in the sphere of competence of the Member State.  
4.3.1 Measures regulating the reimbursement of pharmaceuticals 
Positive and negative lists (selective listing) 
Most European countries appear to conduct a “positive list” or are moving towards 
introducing a positive list (McGuire et al. 2004). The criteria and schemes, through 
which pharmaceutical products are approved for reimbursement and put on a posi-
tive list, vary from country-to-country. The Transparency Directive 89/105/EEC, 
however, specifies a 90-day limit for making a reimbursement decision. In most 
countries, therapeutic benefit is the main criterion, but cost-effectiveness, compared 
to products already reimbursed, is growing in popularity. Germany is the main ex-
ception and still uses a negative list, which lists pharmaceuticals excluded from re-
imbursement. Newly authorized pharmaceuticals are automatically reimbursed, 
which makes the Transparency Directive’s 90-day limit superfluous. Long-existing 
plans to shift to a positive list have failed thus far. The UK uses a selective list, which 
formally still exists as a negative list. Since 1999, advice on cost-effectiveness criteria 
is given through the National Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE, see below). Since 
1999, pharmaceuticals in France are reimbursed according to their medical effec-
tiveness (Service Médical Rendu, SMR). A reform in 2003 followed the advice of the 
Commission de Transparence (part of the Haute Autorité de Santé) and reduced re-
imbursement rates for 617 drugs. Another 84 drugs were removed from the list in 
the summer of 2003 (Busse and Schlette 2004). 
Economic evaluation/post-licensing evaluation  
A manufacturer has to provide evidence of the quality, safety and efficacy of their 
product in order to have their product authorized. However, these three hurdles are 
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no longer sufficient to ensure a positive reimbursement decision. It is for this reason 
that throughout the EU and other industrialized nations, there is an increasing inter-
est for complementing pharmaceutical reimbursement procedures by adding a 
fourth hurdle, which would be demonstrable cost-effectiveness. There are a couple 
of relevant factors regarding the rise in cost-effectiveness studies for pharmaceutical 
prices or reimbursement. Apart from the more obvious reasons, such as rapidly 
growing pharmaceutical expenditures, the increasing number of prescribed items 
and growing awareness of failing national regulations, a propensity towards prescrib-
ing newly introduced drugs is commonly observed throughout Europe. New innova-
tive drugs tend to have higher prices on average than existing products (McGuire et 
al. 2004), making an examination of their relative cost-effectiveness even more ur-
gent. 
A number of EU states are developing or already using post-licensing evaluation sys-
tems that include the use of economic evidence in comparative drug evaluation 
when making reimbursement decisions.  The UK pioneered post-licensing evaluation 
in the EU. Since 1999, the National Institute of Clinical Effectiveness (NICE) has ad-
vized the NHS, not only on clinical effectiveness, but also on the cost-effectiveness of 
new products. The NICE requires companies to hand in evidence of the costs and 
effects of new products. Recommendations are generally for subgroups of patients 
and are guided by cost-effectiveness and cost-utility analysis. Whereas the NICE also 
provides guidelines to physicians and patients (see rationalization of prescribing), 
health economic evaluation is used as an additional requirement in the reimburse-
ment decision-making process in most European countries. These countries include 
Belgium, Finland, Norway, Portugal, Italy, the UK, Sweden, Spain and the Nether-
lands (McGuire et al. 2004; Taylor et al. 2004b). Other countries, such as France, Fin-
land, Norway and Denmark, include cost-effectiveness as supporting evidence for 
reimbursement or pricing (McGuire et al. 2004). In 2004, Germany established the 
Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care (IQWiG), which may have an evalu-
ative function in the future (Zentner et al. 2005). Hungary has become one of the 
first Eastern European countries to signal the introduction of economic evidence as a 
formal requirement (Taylor et al. 2004b).  
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Co-payments (cost-sharing) 
The majority of European countries use co-payments in which the consumer makes a 
contribution to the financing of pharmaceuticals (cost-sharing). During the 1980s and 
1990s, cost-sharing largely increased, which raised the level of private expenditure 
on drugs. It aims to increase efficiency by reducing excessive demand and containing 
overall health costs. In a study prepared for the European Commission DG Employ-
ment and Social Affairs, Thomson et al. (2003) distinguished three different forms of 
cost-sharing in Europe: co-insurance, the most common form, requires the patient to 
be liable for some percentage of the total cost of the pharmaceutical (Belgium, 
Denmark France, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain), flat-rate payments, in 
which the patient pays a fixed fee per item or prescription (Austria and the UK) and 
deductibles, which oblige the patient to bear the initial expense up to a specified 
amount (e.g. Denmark, Ireland and Sweden). Some countries may also use a combi-
nation of the three. Finland, for example, uses combinations of deductibles and co-
insurance. Some countries also opt for exemptions or reduced rates for vulnerable 
population groups. These exemptions and reductions are commonly based on clinical 
condition, level of income, age or type of drugs. Examples of such groups are low 
income groups (e.g. Austria, Belgium and Germany), the elderly (e.g. Belgium, Ireland 
and Spain), children (e.g. Germany and the UK), people with chronic illnesses (Portu-
gal) and people with life threatening illnesses (Belgium). Combinations also exist, 
such as the elderly with low income (Greece) (Thomson et al. 2003; 2004).  
However, its effectiveness as a policy tool is heavily debated in academic circles. In 
general, co-payments have had very limited success in controlling pharmaceutical 
expenditures in EU Member States. Also, their deterrent effect may apply to both 
unnecessary and highly effective treatments (Guillén and Cabiedes 2003). Conse-
quently, it is a sensitive social issue, evoking political debate and patient group and 
media attention about its feasibility and equity implications.  
Prescribing budgets 
In some Member States, doctors are allocated prescribing budgets or a practice 
budget, which includes prescription medicines. Examples of such Member States are 
the UK, Ireland, Germany, France and Denmark. Various studies on the effects of 
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budget holdings in the UK (GP fundholding) showed that drug spending is only af-
fected in the short term (e.g. Bradlow and Coulter 1993; Stewart-Brown et al. 1995; 
Walley et al. 2000). In the UK, primary care trusts (PCTs) were introduced in 1999, 
replacing the individual GP-fund-holding system. The PCT is responsible for purchas-
ing a wide range of services, including pharmaceuticals. The PCT can only purchase 
collectively and benefits through savings are also collective. The scheme uses peer 
pressure to develop corporate affinity among GPs in an effort to control overall pre-
scribing. However, both the reluctant and the generous GP may benefit from cost 
aware behaviour. This reduces the incentive and might reduce support for prescrib-
ing budgets (Walley and Mossialos 2004). In Germany, cash-limited prescribing 
budgets were collectively set up in 1993. In its nine year history (the scheme was 
abolished in 2001), the scheme underwent changes and always evoked discussions 
about cost-containment and the effects on prescribing quality.  
4.3.2 Reference pricing schemes 
A reference pricing scheme sets limits for pharmaceuticals assigned to the same 
group of therapeutic substitutes. If a consumer requests or is prescribed a more ex-
pensive drug, the consumer has to bear the difference in price. Some authors view 
reference pricing as a form of cost-sharing, albeit a more voluntary one as reference 
pricing schemes often provide co-payment-free alternatives. On the demand side, 
the scheme hopes to raise awareness of the prescribed drug’s price and to cause 
both the patient and doctor to opt for a drug listed at reference price or below. On 
the supply side, it hopes to cause manufacturers to lower their prices to reference 
prices. The scheme may be broadly or narrowly defined, including all generics and 
some patented drugs (e.g. the Netherlands) or just a small selection of generics (e.g. 
Spain). Furthermore, states use different systems to establish the reference price 
(Table 15). 
Table 15. Comparative definitions of reference price in selected EU schemes. 
Country Introduced Definition of reference price 
Germany 1989 Reference price should not surpass the highest price in 
the bottom third of the price range for drugs containing 
the same active substance and having comparable effica-
cy 
  107 
Netherlands 1991 Average price of drugs with similar (pharmaco-) therapeu-
tic effects  
Denmark 1996 Lowest priced generic equivalent available on the market 
Spain 2000 Arithmetic mean of the three lowest cost per treatment 
day grouped by formulation and calculated by DDD 
Belgium 2001 Equal to a price that is 26% lower than the price of the 
original brand for generic equivalent products 
Italy 2001 Lowest priced generic equivalent available on the market 
Portugal 2003 Lowest priced generic equivalent available on the market 
Sources: Mrazek and Mossialos (2004); Simoens and De Coster (2006). 
Although reference pricing seems to have a positive short term effect on pharma-
ceutical spending (Guillén and Cabiedes 2003), the effects do not result in important 
long term savings (Lopez-Casanovas and Puig-Jumoy 2000). One explanation is that 
an increase in the volume and price of drugs outside the reference price system typi-
cally nullifies any reductions in pharmaceutical spending from the scheme (Mrazek 
and Mossialos 2004). In the Netherlands, for example, many manufacturers raised 
their prices towards the price limit and price increases up to 500% (Snier 1995). Fur-
thermore, manufacturers and wholesalers have been paying bonuses and giving dis-
counts to community pharmacies where their respective products were dispensed, 
which undermines the system. Also, it is said to prevent payers from effectively ne-
gotiating medicine prices. However, France is implementing a reference pricing sys-
tem without the necessary accompanying controls indicated by the Dutch experience 
(McGuire et al. 2004). Also, Spain has altered its reference pricing system in an at-
tempt to curb pharmaceutical expenditures, which amounted to +11% in 2003 
(Busse and Schlette 2004).  
4.4 Pharmaceutical policy in the new Member States (EU12) 
Most of the new EU Member States (the EU12)41 cannot be easily compared to the 
EU15 countries. Pharmaceutical reform in the new Member States from Eastern Eu-
rope42 began when communist ideology gave way to democracy and market liberali-
                                            
41
 The EU12 are Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia 
and Slovenia, who joined in May 2004 and Bulgaria and Romania, who joined in January 2008. 
42
 Cyprus and Malta are exceptions, being Southern European democratic countries without a com-
munist history. 
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zation. Former communist countries went from a supply based, centralized system, 
often characterized by shortages and inadequate supplies, to a system with a liberal-
ized pharmaceutical sector, with a flood of new imported and affordable pharma-
ceuticals. Changes meant above all privatization of state industry and the distribu-
tion network.  
Reform of pharmaceutical regulation based on Western European standards has 
been driven by the desire for EU access and other measures, such as market authori-
zation, patent legislation, manufacturing standards, licensing requirements, drug 
pricing and reimbursement. These developments drove the EU12 countries to estab-
lish in 10 years what most EU15 countries have been working on the last 40 years. To 
facilitate this process, the Pan-European Regulatory Forum (PERF) was created for 
both regulators in the EU15 and the candidate countries (initially the 10 countries 
that joined 2004) to identify practical arrangements for implementing the EU regula-
tory framework for pharmaceuticals in anticipation of the “big bang” enlargement of 
2004. It went through three stages of development between 1999 and 2004, known 
as PERF I, PERF II and PERF III and sought to address topics such as quality, safety and 
efficacy in a European context. 
One important consequence of the massive shift to imported drugs was the escala-
tion of pharmaceutical expenditures. For example, in Slovenia the average cost of 
drugs increased by 70% between 1990 and 1999 (Albreht et al. 2002). Also because 
of the new imports, the list of available drugs skyrocketed in Hungary from 1300 
drugs in 1990 to 10 577 in 2002. 
The huge increases in pharmaceutical costs raised the need for cost-containment 
programs. The EU10 countries adopted approaches widely used in the EU15 (Mrazek 
et al. 2004), including selective listing with full, partial or no reimbursement (Czech 
Republic, Poland, Slovakia) and partial coverage according to disease severity (Hun-
gary, Latvia, Slovenia) or type of drug (Poland). 
Prices have been regulated by a number of mechanisms including price negotiation 
(Hungary, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania), international price comparisons (Czech Re-
public, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia), setting the ex-
manufacturer’s price (Slovakia, Lithuania), reference pricing (Czech Republic, Estonia, 
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Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia) and economic evaluation (Estonia, Latvia, Lith-
uania). As in Western Europe, there are multiple ever-changing and complex ap-
proaches (Mrazek et al. 2004). The countries have predominantly focused on reim-
bursement and pricing in favour of the measures affecting prescribing and dispens-
ing and, in this respect, they follow the patterns observed in Western Europe. 
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PART II: SCENARIOS 
5 Methodology 
 
This thesis aims to examine the possible future of the European pharmaceutical 
market and questions whether this future will result in greater European or national 
influence. In Part II, three scenarios for European pharmaceutical policy are devel-
oped and described. In Part III, these scenarios will be compared to the findings of 
the literature review detailed in Part I. This chapter describes the chosen methodol-
ogy for the framing of the scenarios. In order to make assumptions on the course of 
the issues and key variables and to be able to frame the scenarios, the Delphi tech-
nique was selected as a tool. Section One discusses the Delphi technique and rea-
sons for its selection. In the second section, the Delphi technique is applied to the 
particularities of the pharmaceutical market leading to the European pharmaceutical 
policy questionnaire. Section Three elaborates on the process of selecting experts 
and, finally, Section Four describes how the chosen Delphi design was conducted.    
5.1 The Delphi technique 
The Delphi technique is a means of obtaining a reliable consensus of opinion from a 
group of experts through a series of questionnaires that is interspersed with con-
trolled feedback (Garret 1999). In this process, the range of the answers will con-
verge towards the correct and final answer, which is provided by the median scores. 
The Delphi method was selected because it can generate the results of multiple ex-
perts, adding to its scientific value compared to scenarios stemming from one per-
son’s ideas, imagination or perception of the studied material. The main alternative 
is to hold expert meetings using the Nominal Group Technique (NGT), for example, a 
method similar to the Delphi with the exception of limited group discussion; howev-
er, final judgements are made in isolation (Van de Ven and Delbecq 1971). Contrib-
uting experts to this thesis come from all corners of the European Union and sched-
uling a meeting with all of them would not have been financially feasible, particularly 
considering the limited funding for this project. Even assuming that experts could 
(and were willing) to participate, group discussion leaves room for a possible bias. In 
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addition, traditional group meetings are an inefficient and ineffective method of 
making forecasts and decisions (Green et al. 2007). A systematic review undertaken 
by Rowe and Wright (1999) looked at several empirical studies that analyse the Del-
phi technique as a forecasting tool. They found that Delphi groups outperform statis-
tical groups (by 12 studies to two, with two ties) and standard interaction groups (by 
five studies to one, with two ties). Furthermore, the Delphi technique is an estab-
lished procedure that has been extensively reviewed in various studies (e.g. Linstone 
and Turoff 1975; Lock 1987; Stewart 1987; Rowe et al. 1991; Rowe and Wright 1999) 
and it adds scientific legitimacy to the scenarios. 
The Delphi technique was developed by Helmer, Dalkey and Gordon at the Rand 
Corporation at the beginning of the Cold War to forecast the impact of technology 
on warfare. Over the years, new applications have been developed such as the Policy 
Delphi (1970s), which seeks to generate the strongest opposing views on the resolu-
tion of a major policy issue and its main objective is not to reach a consensus (Turoff 
1970). The Argument Delphi focuses on ongoing discussion and finding relevant ar-
guments, rather than focusing on the output (Kuusi 1999). The Disaggregative Policy 
Delphi seeks to cluster quantitative expert or interest group responses into similar 
groups (Tapio 2002) and the Wideband Delphi involves more interaction and com-
munication between experts. According to Garret’s definition (1999), the key ele-
ments of the Delphi technique are the following:    
1. Structuring the flow of information: the contributions of the experts 
are collected in the form of answers to questionnaires and their comments to 
these answers when given. No discussion takes place among experts. The 
panel director then processes the information and filters out irrelevant con-
tent. This avoids face-to-face panel discussions on differences in opinion 
which may lead to biased outcomes.  
2. Providing feedback to the participants: the answers are sent back to 
the experts, who are then asked to review comments (answers). They then 
can reconsider and revise their original answer. The method prevents the 
participants from adhering to previously stated opinions and/or conforming 
to the positions of a group leader. They then complete another questionnaire 
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which is sent back to the coordinator. Several rounds may be required before 
a consensus is reached. It is also possible that no consensus is reached but 
that respondents divide themselves into two or more groups. This is the goal 
of some Delphi designs, including the Disaggregative Policy Delphi mentioned 
above. 
3. All participants remain anonymous43: identities are not revealed even 
after the completion of the final round and the report is released. This aims 
to prevent participants from dominating others using their authority or per-
sonality, to free them from their personal biases, to minimize undesired bias-
ing effects such as the “halo effect”,44 to allow them to freely express their 
opinions, to encourage open critique and to admit errors by revising earlier 
judgments without losing face. Moreover, the results can not be ascribed to 
the expert by name and no responsibility has to be assumed.  
For future studies, a Delphi design is often used to seek expert opinions on purpose, 
scope, key variables, actors, assumption sets, scenarios, strategies and tactics. The 
expert opinions are usually expressed through the assignment of weight (e.g. judging 
by probability, ranking by value) or the expression of choice from several possibilities 
rather than written answers to questions. The Delphi technique can, therefore, be 
used for both future research designs that are objective and exploratory and designs 
that are subjective and normative (Garret 1999).   
5.2 The European pharmaceutical policy questionnaire 
The aim of this Delphi questionnaire is to reach a consensus within a group of select-
ed experts on whether regulation in the European pharmaceuticals market will take 
a predominantly European or national course over the next twenty years. In the Eu-
ropean policy questionnaire, which was specifically designed for this thesis, experts 
were asked questions on key issues of pharmaceutical policy in Europe and were 
asked to estimate the current situation (the Delphi was conducted in 2006) and what 
they expect the situation to be in 2010, 2015 and 2025. Ten issues were selected 
                                            
43
 More novel Delphi applications may not guarantee full anonymity, such as the Wideband Delphi. 
44
 Halo effect: generalisation from the perception of one outstanding personality trait to an overly 
favourable evaluation of the whole personality (Merriam Webster Online). 
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from the review (Part I) and cover the whole range of regulation on all levels of the 
European pharmaceutical market: authorization, pharmacovigilance, classification, 
distribution, advertising, pricing, dispensing, prescribing, post-licensing evaluation 
and reimbursement. The key variable for these issues ranged from “fully national” to 
“fully European”. An extra category was added that asked the experts’ opinion on 
these issues. 
In order to achieve a high response rate, a very simple and short design with closed 
answer categories was constructed. Two rounds were expected to be enough to pro-
vide a picture of the overall trend expected by the respondents. A preliminary test 
survey (see Appendix A) was sent to the members of a European network the de-
partment of Health care Management at the Berlin University of Technology partici-
pates in to check whether the questionnaire, format (tables) and application were 
clear. Since the response rate was rather disappointing, the introduction was short-
ened and the expert questions section (see below) was moved to the end of the 
questionnaire, as to not immediately discourage the respondents.  
Some key features of the final first round design (see Appendix B) are: 
 The introduction emphasizes that filling out the questionnaire should not take more 
than a couple of minutes. It also provides a deadline and asks that the questionnaire 
be forwarded to other experts the recipient may know.  
 The questionnaire begins with “category of respondent”. The categories correspond 
with all actors of the pharmaceutical market indicated in the literature research of 
the thesis.  
 The questionnaire includes a category on how the expert values the current situa-
tion, also to see whether there was unacceptable divergence in their estimation. 
 The key variable ranges from “fully national” to “fully European”. This was combined 
with closed answer categories. On the question “Will the following issues predomi-
nantly be regulated and implemented at a European level or at a national level?”, re-
spondents were asked to use a five-category Likert scale: (1) fully national, (2) pre-
dominantly national, (3) even or 50/50, (4) predominantly European or (5) fully Eu-
ropean.    
 A list of expert questions was included in the questionnaire in order to possibly 
weigh the results and to check whether the right expertise was at hand. In addition, 
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three categories of answers (1=fully, 2=average, 3=not at all) were provided. They 
consist of two general questions, “Would you consider yourself an expert in the field 
of European pharmaceutical policy, both on the European and national level?” and 
“Are you familiar with the current state of the European pharmaceutical market, in-
cluding its actors and recent developments?” and two more specific questions, “Are 
you familiar with European law with regard to European health care, in particular 
the European Commission’s public health competences (e.g. Article 152)?” and “Are 
you familiar with European case law, especially Kohll/Decker, Smits-
Geraets/Peerbooms and Vanbraekel and its possible consequences?”. The latter two 
questions were included as European case law was indicated in the literature re-
search (Part I) as having a potential effect which could alter the future course of the 
European pharmaceutical market.  
 The questionnaire contains an optional comments section.   
5.3 Expert selection 
The experts for the Delphi questionnaire on European pharmaceutical policy were 
selected from different sources. The questionnaire demands a very broad expertise 
of national and European pharmaceutical policy and knowledge of all the issues, 
ranging from authorization to reimbursement. Acquiring the emails of suitable re-
spondents was done through the following methods: 
 All authors referred to in the literature research and authors referred to in some 
standard works on European pharmaceutical policy were searched on the internet 
and their e-mail addresses were noted down if found. 
 The membership directory of the International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and 
Outcomes Research (ISPOR) was consulted. The directory contains the e-mails of its 
members. 
 The websites of various organizations (e.g. NGOs, companies) and interest groups 
mentioned in the literature research were searched. Some only provided an e-mail 
address for general information, whereas others contained personal e-mail address-
es. 
 The previously mentioned methods do not yield a sufficient number of respondents 
from pharmaceutical industry. E-mail addresses of experts working for the pharma-
ceutical industry are difficult to acquire by searching the internet. Therefore, all 
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available business cards at the Department of Health Care Management, TU Berlin, 
were hand-searched. 
 After selecting the addressees, around 200 (alleged) experts working for various 
actors in the European pharmaceutical market were approached. However, academ-
ics make up the largest group of addressees and respondents.  
5.4 Conduct of the Delphi questionnaire 
The conduct of the questionnaire has the aim to achieve the highest possible re-
sponse rate. Therefore, the questionnaire has the following features: 
 The questionnaire was sent by e-mail. More people could be reached this way and it 
invited respondents to forward the questionnaire to colleagues. This was very suc-
cessful in some cases and the messages were forwarded to colleagues within and 
outside their institution of affiliation. As a result, the questionnaire even penetrated 
institutions that do not publish its e-mails on the internet. 
 E-mail is a fast, affordable means of communication for both the sender and the re-
ceiver. 
 The subject header of the email contained the words “(short!) Delphi questionnaire” 
and the date of the deadline (see Appendix B and C). 
 The questionnaire was sent by e-mail and opens in the message window, not in an 
attachment. The reader was directly presented with the questionnaire and saw that 
it is short, which aims to excite curiosity and a spontaneous reply. This is the reason 
why it was decided against only using attachments that could be filled out and sent 
back or using an interactive web-based design following a link, after which the re-
spondents would fill out their questionnaire online. Filling out the questionnaire 
online may be an elegant way to conduct a questionnaire and it has some ad-
vantages regarding the processing of the evoked data, but, in the end, the immedi-
ate visibility of the email questionnaire through the e-mail preponderated. Further-
more, widely used HTML supporting e-mail programs have no difficulties displaying 
figures or tables, which make attachments largely unnecessary.  
 After receiving and reading the e-mail, respondents were asked to reply to the e-
mail and fill out the questionnaire in the new reply e-mail. Although most e-mail 
programs support HTML-codes and respondents should have had no problems using 
this procedure, an attachment with the same contents as the e-mail was sent along 
as backup. It later turned out that some respondents preferred using the attach-
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ment, maybe also because some of them encountered problems with their non-
HTML -compatible e-mail programs. After ten days, shortly before the original dead-
line, a reminder message with an extended deadline of ten days was sent, containing 
the whole questionnaire and attachment so that the respondent did not have to 
look for the original e-mail. 
 As mentioned earlier, the expert questions were placed at the end of the question-
naire in order to prevent the respondents from being discouraged.  
 In round two, only the addressees whose results were received and used in Round 2 
were approached. Respondents did not have to answer the “category of respond-
ent” and “expert questions” sections again. The results of the first round of “catego-
ry of respondent” questions were incorporated in the questionnaire in round two.  
Anonymity 
To ensure the full anonymity of both the addressees and the results, the selected e-
mail addresses were inserted in the blind-copy field (Bcc) of the e-mail and then sent 
simultaneously. By blind-copying the addresses, respondents could not see the ad-
dresses of fellow respondents and 200 individual e-mails did not have to be sent. 
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6 Results 
 
The e-mail questionnaire received a steady flow of responses with small peaks di-
rectly after sending the message and after sending the reminder. The first round 
yielded 41 usable filled-out Delphi questionnaires. Some answers were not used due 
to illegibility and/or insufficient expertise. The processed results were then anony-
mously incorporated in a new questionnaire (see Appendix C) and sent again accord-
ing to almost the same protocol as described under “conduct of the questionnaire”. 
Of the 41 respondents in round one, 27 replied, a response rate of 66%.  
The respondents come from various backgrounds (see Table 16), the largest groups 
being academics, “other” (e.g. consultants, WHO) and the pharmaceutical industry. 
Two explanations for this unevenly spread result are that (1) the initial mailing list 
consisted mostly of academics and people from the pharmaceutical industry and (2) 
most actors lack broad knowledge about other layers of the European pharmaceuti-
cal market (e.g. a pharmacist might not know about current developments in author-
ization or European law) which could have prevented them from responding.      
Table 16. Category of respondents. 
 R1 R2  R1 R2 
Pharmaceutical industry (R&D) 7 5 National government/regulator 3 2 
Pharmaceutical industry (ge-
neric) 
  European Union 1  
Wholesaler 1 1 Academic 20 14 
Pharmacist   Consumer organization   
Insurer/payer (NHS, Sickness 
F.) 
1 1 Other  8 4 
R1=Round 1, R2=Round 2. 
In this chapter, the scenarios for future pharmaceutical policy will be filled in. First, 
the results of the Delphi questionnaire will be discussed (Section One). These results 
were used as building blocks to fill in a most likely Expert Scenario, which was then 
contrasted with a more optimistic (“pro-European”) and a more pessimistic (“anti-
European/national”) scenario. The scenarios are found in Section Two. 
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6.1 Discussion of the results of the Delphi questionnaire 
One could say that the median scores of the questionnaire show an extrapolation of 
current trends. Answers to the question “Will the following issues predominantly be 
regulated and implemented at a European level or at a national level?” (see Table 
17) can be divided into two main groups.  
In the first group, the experts foresaw further Europeanization of the European 
pharmaceutical market, where the European Union and national governments share 
the competence. Europe has the most competence and European law has the largest 
potential influence. Authorization, pharmacovigilance, classification, distribution and 
advertising show a steady and gradual trend towards European regulation. 
The second group covers those sectors of the European pharmaceutical market that 
overlap with the national health systems of Member States. Hence, those parts 
where the competence of the Member State prevails. Therefore, pricing, dispensing, 
prescribing and reimbursement remain predominantly a national competence and 
just a slight increase in European influence is expected.  
However, post-licensing is one major exception. Post-licensing evaluation is the use 
of comparative benefit and cost-effectiveness studies when making reimbursement 
decisions. It takes place within the national health systems as a competence of the 
Member States and is not expected to remain a solely national matter. Rather, it is 
expected to develop into a field with evenly spread responsibility.  
The following results attract particular attention. Although the respondents’ answers 
show convergence in the second round and a trend is visible, not all issues arrived at 
a consensus. In the second round, 66% of respondents from the first round respond-
ents filled out the questionnaire. It is worth questioning whether the 66% showed 
convergence compared to their first round. However, the answers of the 34% that 
did not respond in the second round were visible and influenced the 66% that re-
sponded and, consequently, they have to be included. In addition, some very differ-
ent views exist as to how the “today” (2006) situation should be interpreted. Adver-
tising in particular and classification to a lesser extent, shows widely diverging views. 
Although 41% in the first round seem to think that advertising is a fully national field, 
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the remainder think it is predominantly national (19%), evenly spread (14%), pre-
dominantly European (22%) and even fully European (3%, i.e. 1 respondent, a clear 
outlier). This is a remarkable score bearing in mind the fact that an advertising di-
rective has existed since 1992 (now integrated in the Community code), which pro-
hibits direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription drugs. An explanation for this 
spread could be the fact that European countries had similar policies in place even 
before the 1992 EC involvement regarding advertising and classification. This may 
affect the visibility and people’s awareness of European involvement. The second 
round still shows disagreement and even more people now view advertising (54%) 
and classification (58%) as fully national fields. These scores are less convincing than 
other issues, where a consensus of 90% to even 100% appeared.  
Table 17. Delphi questionnaire results.  
  EXPECTATION  
Issue 2006 2010        2015        2025            Opinion     
Rnd1 
(%) 
Rnd2(
%) 
Rnd1 
(%) 
Rnd2(
%) 
Rnd1 
(%) 
Rnd2(
%) 
Rnd1 
(%) 
Rnd2(
%) 
Rnd1 
(%) 
Rnd2(
%) 
1. Market authoriza-
tion (licensing) 
1: 08  1:  1:  1:  1:  
2: 23 31 2: 10  2:  2:  2:  
3: 45 58 3: 45 73 3: 20 12 3: 05 04 3: 09 04 
4: 25 12 4: 38 20 4: 50 73 4: 45 30 4: 25 48 
5:   5: 08 08 5: 30 15 5: 50 67 5: 66 48 
n=40 n=26 n=40 n=26 n=40 n=26 n=40 n=27 n=32 n=25 
2. Pharmaco-
vigilance (post-
marketing surveil-
lance) 
1: 18 08 1: 08  1: 05  1: 05  1:  
2: 49 65 2: 15 23 2: 05 08 2: 03 04 2: 06  
3: 28 27 3: 51 58 3: 33 35 3: 23 11 3: 22 12 
4: 05  4: 23 15 4: 44 50 4: 44 59 4: 25 40 
5:  5: 03 04 5: 13 08 5: 26 26 5: 47 48 
n=39 n=26 n=39 n=26 n=39 n=26 n=39 n=27 n=32 n=25 
3. Classification: Rx 
(prescription only), 
OTC  
1: 38 58 1: 18 20 1: 08 08 1: 03 04 1: 10 08 
2: 38 27 2: 38 58 2: 21 31 2: 21 22 2: 13 17 
3: 15 12 3: 23 15 3: 31 46 3: 23 37 3: 10 13 
4: 05 04 4: 15 04 4: 26 12 4: 28 22 4: 32 38 
5: 03  5: 05 04 5: 15 04 5: 26 15 5: 34 25 
n=39 n=26 n=39 n=26 n=39 n=26 n=39 n=27 n=31 n=24 
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4. Distribution 
(wholesaling) 
1: 41 31 1: 15 12 1: 03 04 1: 03  1: 03  
2: 46 62 2: 38 58 2: 36 31 2: 26 22 2: 19 17 
3: 08 08 3: 33 23 3: 33 50 3: 31 29 3: 35 33 
4: 05  4: 13 04 4: 26 12 4: 26 41 4: 23 38 
5:   5:  04 5: 03 04 5: 15 07 5: 19 13 
n=39 n=26 n=39 n=26 n=39 n=26 n=39 n=27 n=31 n=24 
5. Advertising (e.g. 
direct-to-consumer 
advertising) 
1: 41 54 1: 16 20 1: 05 08 1: 03 08 1: 13 13 
2: 19 15 2: 34 36 2: 18 32 2: 16 15 2: 17 30 
3: 14 12 3: 18 12 3: 29 28 3: 24 31 3: 23 09 
4: 22 15 4: 26 28 4: 26 20 4: 29 27 4: 13 17 
5: 03 04 5: 05 04 5: 21 12 5: 29 19 5: 33 30 
n=37 n=26 n=38 n=25 n=38 n=25 n=38 n=26 n=30 n=23 
6. Pricing (e.g. pricing 
and profit controls, 
reference pricing) 
1: 80 88 1: 59 62 1: 34 35 1: 20 26 1: 26 32 
2: 15 12 2: 24 23 2: 37 38 2: 35 37 2: 16 20 
3: 05  3: 07 15 3: 12 20 3: 18 19 3: 23 20 
4:   4: 07  4: 12 08 4: 15 15 4: 13 12 
5:   5: 02  5: 05  5: 13 04 5: 23 16 
n=40 n=26 n=41 n=26 n=41 n=26 n=40 n=27 n=31 n=25 
7. Dispensing (phar-
macy level): e.g. ge-
neric substitution, 
remuneration 
1: 85 92 1: 66 73 1: 44 42 1: 38 26 1: 42 29 
2: 10 08 2: 27 28 2: 34 46 2: 30 52 2: 26 42 
3: 05  3: 05  3: 17 12 3: 20 19 3: 13 08 
4:   4: 02  4: 02  4: 10 04 4: 10 08 
5:   5:  5: 02  5: 03  5: 10 13 
n=40 n=26 n=41 n=26 n=41 n=26 n=40 n=27 n=31 n=24 
8. Prescribing: e.g. 
prescribing guide-
lines, budgets 
1: 90 100 1: 61 85 1: 41 31 1: 26 19 1: 29 17 
2: 10  2: 32 15 2: 34 62 2: 35 56 2: 23 29 
3:   3: 07  3: 20 08 3: 20 19 3: 23 29 
4:   4:   4: 05  4: 15 07 4: 16 13 
5:   5:   5:   5: 03  5: 10 13 
n=40 n=26 n=41 n=26 n=41 n=26 n=40 n=27 n=31 n=24 
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Will the following issues predominantly be regulated and implemented at a European level 
or at a national level? Grey: highest score 1=fully national, 2=predominantly national, 
3=even or 50/50, 4=predominantly European, 5=fully European. 
These largely confirm the findings of the literature review in terms of actual compe-
tences. Furthermore, they seem to continue the “Europeanization” trend as ob-
served in the review of 40 years of pharmaceutical policy. When merging the results 
of Table 17 with Figure 7 (see Chapter 4), this becomes even more clear (see Figure 
8). In those fields where a shared competence between the EU and Member States 
exists, the experts expect a shift towards European regulation of at least two points 
on the Likert scale between 2006 and 2025. In fields where the Member States have 
more competence, only a one point shift in European influence is expected and the 
overall results suggest that these issues remain predominantly regulated at the na-
tional level. One exception is the issue of post-licensing (part of the reimbursement 
decision) which shows a higher jump of two points towards a field of shared compe-
tence. This could be explained by the expectation that European collaboration pro-
jects will be initiated by Member States, instead of on a European level. Section Two 
of this chapter expands on this issue.    
9. Post-licensing 
evaluation (compara-
tive benefit/ cost-
effectiveness) 
1: 73 88 1: 34 35 1: 17 08 1: 10 04 1: 16 08 
2: 23 12 2: 41 65 2: 29 42 2: 25 30 2: 13 13 
3: 05  3: 22  3: 39 50 3: 33 37 3: 13 21 
4:   4: 02  4: 07  4: 25 26 4: 35 42 
5:   5:   5: 07  5: 08 04 5: 23 17 
n=40 n=26 n=41 n=26 n=41 n=26 n=40 n=27 n=31 n=24 
10. Reimbursement: 
by public payers, i.e. 
scope of benefit cata-
logue (including posi-
tive/negative list) 
1: 90 96 1: 70 81 1: 43 50 1: 28 26 1: 32 25 
2: 10 04 2: 20 15 2: 38 38 2: 45 44 2: 28 42 
3:   3: 10  3: 15 08 3: 13 19 3: 22 17 
4:   4: 04 4: 05 04 4: 15 11 4: 10 13 
5:   5:   5:   5:   5: 06 04 
n=40 n=26 n=40 n=26 n=40 n=26 n=40 n=27 n=31 n=24 
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Figure 8. Competences in the national pharmaceutical market combined with an expected shift 
between 2006 and 2025 (rated 1–5), based on expert opinions. 
EU 
Competence
National    
Competence
Authorisation 3→5
Pharmacovigilance 2→4 
Classification 1→3 
Wholesaling 2→4 
Advertising1→3-4
Pricing 1→2 
Prescribing 
1→2 
Dispensing 
1→2
Reimbursement           
1→2                   
Post licensing 1→3
Shared 
Competence
Potential 
impact
NHS/SHI part
 
Rating: 1=fully national, 2=predominantly national, 3=even or 50/50, 4=predominantly Eu-
ropean, 5=fully European. 
The expert opinion 
When asked for their opinion, a significant amount refrained, especially in the first 
round. This may indicate that it was a difficult question to answer. One possible ex-
planation was provided by a respondent who stated under his or her comments sec-
tion, “my opinion depends on the content of the policy, not where it is promulgated 
and so that is why I have not expressed any opinion in that column.” Although it pro-
vides an interpretation of the question, one can still state, irrespective of the con-
tents of the policy, whether it is better to regulate and implement certain issues on a 
national or European level. 
Furthermore, the expectations of the experts seem to resemble the experts’ opin-
ions on the desired situation. This could mean two things: (1) the experts approve of 
the development of the European pharmaceutical market and agree on its course or 
(2) they filled out the questionnaire to serve their interest. Or, as one respondent 
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stated in the comments section, “I have the strong feeling that the ‘consensus’ will 
depend on the interests of the responders and the mix of responders.” Of course the 
respondent could have been biased; however, the likelihood of the respondent using 
the questionnaire to impact the future of the European pharmaceutical market is 
slim, considering the questionnaire was anonymous and this thesis serves no official 
policy-making purpose. 
6.2 Filling in the scenarios 
The results of the Delphi questionnaire can now be used to construct three scenari-
os. The outcomes of the experts’ views will be used as the “middle” and “most likely” 
scenario, called the “Expert Scenario”. This Expert Scenario will be contrasted with a 
more pessimistic scenario and a more optimistic scenario. 
In the pessimistic’ scenario, which will be referred to as the “European Crisis Scenar-
io”, the European process suffers major setbacks, mainly caused by a stalled expan-
sion process, a pervasive image problem and the public’s lack of trust in European 
integration, all of which are worsened by an enduring European constitutional crisis. 
These developments eventually lead to a return to national regulation and a freeze 
on the European process. 
The optimistic scenario, called the “European Scenario”, assumes that after the suc-
cessful passing of the European Constitution, spurring newly found trust in the Euro-
pean project on behalf of Europeans, Member States will increasingly be burdened 
border-crossing patients. This threatens the financial balance of their respective 
health care systems and counter-action is necessary. Member States must gather 
and try to work out a deal on a European benefit catalogue. This would lead to an 
Europeanization of the various national health systems. Ironically, this has been in-
stigated by Member States, not the European Commission. The following chapters 
elaborate on these scenarios. 
6.2.1 The Expert Scenario 
The Expert Scenario is an extrapolation of current trends (see Table 18). After initial 
progress using secondary legislation, such as directives and regulations, a standstill in 
the harmonization process is reached, mainly because of the dissonance between 
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subsidiarity and a SEM. Instead, the European Commission now favours the coordi-
nation of national results along the lines of the G10 recommendations, in which the 
European Commission acts more as a facilitator. The projects, actions and collabora-
tions resulting from the G10 process, partially already in place or linked to existing 
programmes, unfold over the next five years. Larger harmonization efforts in certain 
areas could be possible, even using secondary legislation, in part due to greater con-
vergence of national agendas.  
Table 18. The Expert Scenario in numbers. 
Issue Today 2010 2015 2025 
Authorization 3 3 4 5 
Pharmacovigilance 2 3 4 4 
Classification 1 2 3 3 
Distribution 2 2 3 4 
Advertising 1 2 2 3-4 
Pricing 1 1 2 2 
Dispensing 1 1 2 2 
Prescribing 1 1 2 2 
Post-licensing evaluation  1 2 3 3 
Reimbursement 1 1 1 2 
Will the following issues predominantly be regulated and implemented at a European level 
or at a national level? 1=fully national, 2=predominantly national, 3=even or 50/50, 
4=predominantly European, 5=fully European. 
In this scenario, the sectors where European law has the largest influence (roughly 
the whole European pharmaceutical market minus the diverse national health sys-
tems) will slowly move towards a predominantly European level-regulated and im-
plemented system. Those sectors of the health care system that fall mainly under 
the national competence remain a national competence and hardly shift towards 
Europe. 
Authorization 
Authorization will gradually shift from a field of equally shared competence to a sole-
ly European matter. The several national licensing agencies will only work for the 
EMEA, which is based in London and it will no longer be possible to authorize a 
pharmaceutical for just one national market. The first step will be the removal of the 
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exclusively national authorization procedure by 2015. The various national licensing 
agencies will then only serve as solely subcontractors for the EMEA. Secondly, the 
decentralized authorization procedure will be phased out completely by 2025 after a 
gradual process of shifting certain therapeutic groups towards the centralized proce-
dure, as done before with biotechnology products and orphan drugs. 
Pharmacovigilance 
The main European instrument for pharmacovigilance is the Eudravigilance data pro-
cessing network that came into effect in 2001 and was modernized in November 
2005 as a result of the pharmaceutical review (European Commission 2001a). This 
network, in combination with the Clinical Trials Directive, seeks to harmonize and 
streamline the exchange of data between national licensing agencies, the EMEA and 
pharmaceutical companies. However, many different responsible authorities are 
involved and there are different procedures and responsibilities for products under 
the centralized and the decentralized authorization procedures (ISI 2006). Therefore, 
the harmonizing practice has so far been more successful for medicinal products 
licensed through the centralized procedure (CAPs) than for products licensed 
through the decentralized procedure. In the next years, the European legal frame-
work will seek to further harmonize regulation, pharmacovigilance practice, product 
information, communication and cooperation between Member States.  
The first result will be an equally shared competence between Member States and 
Europe by 2010. In the following 15 years, the network will be enhanced and ex-
panded. The abolishment of national authorization and the decentralized procedure 
will also facilitate harmonization and simplify the system. All national pharmacovigi-
lance systems will start working according to the same protocol and systems by 
2015, under the auspices of the EMEA, but national institutions will be left largely 
intact. 
Classification 
Title VI of the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use out-
lines the criteria set to determine whether a pharmaceutical should be classified as a 
prescription-only medicine (POM) or an over-the-counter (OTC), non-prescription 
drug. However, these criteria have so far been applied nationally. National variations 
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also exist as some countries split the OTC category into a pharmacy supervised list 
(P) and a general sales list (GSL). Thus, one could say Member States have the upper 
hand in terms of regulation. 
Nevertheless, the European Commission regards a more flexible classification pro-
cess, in particular where it concerns moving medicinal products from POM to OTC 
status, as essential for a competitive non-prescription market. Therefore, the Euro-
pean Commission will use all its influence to implement the actions as proposed in 
the G10 recommendations in the next five years. These recommendations include 
allowing the use of the same trademark for pharmaceuticals moved to non-
prescription status and encouraging Member States to review these switching mech-
anisms.  
Classification will develop into a field of shared competence beginning around the 
year 2010. An amended classification directive introduced between 2010 and 2015 
will then establish the categories POM, P and GSL. In other words, the directive fol-
lows the European trend by splitting up the OTC category. It is, of course, hoped that 
this would establish a more flexible and faster switching process, through which 
more pharmaceuticals receive the non-prescription status (either P or GSL), making 
more drugs directly accessible to the public at lower level outlets, such as supermar-
kets. It also includes mechanisms for industry to apply for reclassification. This di-
rective will further harmonize and thus Europeanize the European pharmaceutical 
market. However, even in this scenario, the classification decision is still applied na-
tionally, but it can be expected that national differences in sale items will become 
less distinct.    
Wholesaling 
The wholesaling sector will see a further European harmonization and liberalization 
trend. Still very much nationally dominated, it will develop into a Euro-dominated 
field. As of yet, there is only one European directive setting criteria that have to be 
met by wholesalers, such as adequate premises, qualified staff and emergency plans 
for market withdrawal. These criteria, however, are enforced on a national level by 
very different national authorities, varying from federal states (Germany) to a na-
tional medicine agency (Finland) to a health inspectorate (the Netherlands). The first 
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step will be more liberalization Europe-wide through competition law. By enacting a 
regulation, the supervision of wholesaling a European matter will become the re-
sponsibility of the EMEA. The national competent authorities will then operate under 
the supervision of the EMEA. 
Advertising  
Although there is a directive that prohibits public advertising of prescription-only 
medicines (POMs), the differences stemming from nationally applied classification 
decisions makes it a predominantly national field. Also, Member States individually 
decide on the methods they use for controlling pharmaceutical advertising and the 
level of the penalties for breaching their national rules. Advertising will change into 
an evenly shared competence sector as a consequence of an overall trend towards a 
more liberal European pharmaceutical market favoured by the industrial policy-
leaning European Commission. More therapeutic groups will be open for direct con-
sumer advertising around the year 2015, mainly due to the classification system. The 
methods for controlling pharmaceutical advertising and level of penalty will be more 
harmonized. There will be more convergence in advertising between countries by 
2025 as a result.  
Dispensing, pricing, prescribing and reimbursement 
Regulation concerning dispensing pharmaceuticals to the public, pricing, prescribing 
and reimbursement mainly takes place within the national health system, where the 
competence largely lies at the national level. Member States decide how this is to be 
regulated (e.g. on a national level or devolving it to the regions).  Therefore, the con-
sulted experts expect little European influence over the next years and the regulato-
ry frameworks will, for the most part, remain a national competence. As Member 
States take generally more health policy-leaning perspectives, it can be expected 
that the emphasis remains on cost-containment, that more cost-containment 
measures will be adopted and that these cost-containment strategies used through-
out the EU show more convergence. This would mean more stringent pricing re-
gimes, increased use of generic substitution especially in immature generic markets, 
conservative prescribing through the use of guidelines and increased requirements 
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regarding the use and execution of economic evaluations (e.g. post-licensing evalua-
tions) when making reimbursement decisions.  
However, some Europeanization is expected but that does not have to mean much 
more than increased cooperation between countries, maybe even supported or facil-
itated by the European Commission where it serves its public health goals or suits its 
market liberalization agenda. Increasing the amount of generics in the market, for 
example, could curb national expenditures, but could also provide opportunities for 
the European Commission to promote and facilitate a competitive European generic 
market.  
The European Commission’s limited competence in national systems does not mean 
that the Member States have full control over national pricing and reimbursement 
schemes. Some of the pricing and reimbursement schemes presently in force in 
Member States can have a strong influence on the entire pharmaceutical market (i.e. 
outside the various national health systems). The European Commission respects the 
authority of Member States in their national health systems and respects their pro-
tection of their respective health care budgets; however, the Community pursues full 
competition for medicines neither purchased nor reimbursed by the state (i.e. cate-
gories of medicines that are not reimbursed, often non-prescription drugs and those 
pharmaceuticals provided outside the state sector, which includes in private hospi-
tals). This should result in a competitive EU-wide single market for non-reimbursed 
medicines with pan-European prices and less interference from the regulations of 
Member States. 
The definition of what belongs to the national system (i.e. where does the national 
competence end and where does the European competence begin), will be rede-
fined over the next twenty years. Member States keep full competence in the mar-
ket where regulation concerns controlling their health care budgets through dispens-
ing and prescribing regulation, for example. This means restrictive pricing and re-
strictive policies for dispensing and prescribing can only apply to reimbursed phar-
maceuticals.  
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Post-licensing evaluation 
One of the more surprising outcomes of the Delphi is the expectation of experts in 
the field of post-licensing evaluation. The increasing use and importance of clinical 
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness studies as a fourth hurdle in gaining access to a 
Member State’s list of reimbursed pharmaceuticals is already a Europe-wide trend. 
In this policy scenario, all Member States will actively use the fourth hurdle and ex-
perts expect a larger European role. However, apart from a facilitating role, this 
seems unlikely to be instigated by the European Commission. The more industrial-
policy leaning European Commission is more interested in opening up the markets 
and creating more liberalization than more restrictive controls, let alone putting re-
strictions in place that could eventually block off certain pharmaceutical products 
from being reimbursed in a certain Member State. Furthermore, the Commission 
recognizes it is primarily a matter of national competence.  
Maybe the outcomes are not as contradictory as they may appear at first sight. Not 
all European regulation and influence has to come from the European Commission. It 
is very well possible that the experts had more European-level cooperation between 
national governments and institutions in mind (i.e. initiated at the national level). Or, 
as one respondent rightly commented in the first round of the Delphi questionnaire, 
“where you say ‘European’ it does not necessarily mean European Commission, but 
it can be collaboration between the EU Member States.” One can think of Europe-
wide economic evaluations initiated by the National Competent Authorities (NCAs 
such as the NICE in the UK and the IQWiG in Germany) and even structural coopera-
tion between the NCAs. This cooperation will be increasingly possible as the national 
cost-containment regulations and practices in this area show more and more con-
vergence.   
In their adoption of the G10 recommendations, the European Commission pleads for 
more exchange of national experience on health technologies (HTA) and is in this 
way hoping for more speed and transparency in national relative effectiveness as-
sessment systems. The EC supports this view through providing funding for EU-
netHTA, the European Network for Health Technology Assessment, which coordi-
nates the efforts of 29 European countries, including 25 EU Member States, in evalu-
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ating health technology in Europe. Their reasoning is that a patchwork of different 
national systems places a huge burden on industry and can delay access to the mar-
ket. Hence, the European Commission will try to exert influence where it can, keep-
ing in mind its limited competence, but with a different policy perspective than the 
Member States. The Commission favours faster and easier market access and reim-
bursement, whereas Member States prefer cost-containment through rational use of 
efficient pharmaceuticals. 
6.2.2 The European Crisis Scenario 
In the European Crisis Scenario, we assume that a set of interrelated determinants 
come together in the upcoming five to 10 years, creating a very difficult environment 
for the EU pharmaceutical policy to progress. An ongoing constitutional crisis un-
dermines the whole European process. After the failure of the ratification of the Eu-
ropean Constitution through referenda in France and the Netherlands in May and 
June 2005 respectively, as well as the failed ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon (a 
revision of the European Constitution) through an Irish referendum in June 2008, the 
prospect of another failed attempt and its possibly severe consequences cripple the 
successive EU presidencies. Although the successive Member States exercising the 
EU presidency prioritize an agreement on the European Constitution at the semi-
annual European summits, Member States remain divided as to how to solve the 
ongoing standstill. Instead, Member States keep bickering over the European budg-
et, rebates, the agricultural policy, democratic accountability, enlargement issues 
(Turkey in particular) and future visions for the EU. The presidency seems unable to 
find the right moment or correct political and economic opportunity to come up with 
a feasible plan to start the ratification process anew.  
Adding to the problem are low economic growth rates in the European Union and 
the cumbersome expansion of the new Member States. The Lisbon objective to be-
come “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-driven economy by 2010” 
seems further away than ever. The goals of the Treaty of Lisbon were already toned 
down, partially put on ice and branded “unrealistic” and “too ambitious” and now 
few European citizens believe in the beneficial effects of a single European market. 
The new Member States (the EU12), especially Bulgaria and Romania, do not provide 
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the Union with the energy as was maybe hoped by the founding Member States. On 
the contrary, they slow down harmonization and have difficulty effectively transpos-
ing the acquis communautaire, the total body of EU law accumulated thus far, into 
their respective legislative frameworks.  
To make matters worse, a Vioxx-like scandal of a medicinal product authorized 
through the European centralized procedure legitimizes present criticism of the 
EMEA and the European procedures. It is evident that the combination of these de-
velopments cannot remain without consequences for the European Union in regard 
to its power to carry out policies and its public image. The European Crisis Scenario 
unfolds against this difficult background (see Table 19). 
Table 19. The European Crisis Scenario in numbers. 
Issue Today 2010 2015 2025 
Authorization 3 3 2 2 
Pharmacovigilance 2 2 2 2 
Classification 1 1 1 1 
Distribution 2 2 1 1 
Advertising 1 1 1 1 
Pricing 1 1 1 1 
Dispensing 1 1 1 1 
Prescribing 1 1 1 1 
Post-licensing evaluation  1 1 1 1 
Reimbursement 1 1 1 1 
1=fully national, 2=predominantly national, 3=even or 50/50, 4=predominantly European, 
5=fully European (not based on expert opinions). 
Authorization and pharmacovigilance 
In 2009, a statin drug called Cardax is authorized through the centralized procedure 
and sold and prescribed as a preventive cure for cardiac illnesses, but turns out to 
have some terrible side effects. Cardax, which was introduced by “company X”, was 
authorized through the centralized procedure in which the company favoured 
“Member State Y” as a rapporteur state, expecting a more rapid and favourable au-
thorization procedure than with the medicine agencies of other Member States.  
Data and market studies led “company X” to believe that “Member State Y” provided 
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the best chances of getting their product approved. The new pharmaceutical was 
instantly extremely popular, with market shares up to 45% in Europe. After roughly 
two years since its introduction, it becomes clear that the widely-used product has 
life threatening side effects when used in combination with an ACE-inhibitor. A sig-
nificant increase in cases of cardiac arrythmias causing sudden cardiac death is 
shown in patients, mostly men over 55, after using Cardax.  
All European Member States are affected resulting in huge public outcry. Questions 
and motions are put forward in all national parliaments and in the European parlia-
ment. Already present criticism of the alleged industry-favouring EMEA aggravates 
soon after. European public opinion and the majority in national parliaments hold 
the EMEA and the European Commission responsible and accuse the European 
Commission of neglecting its public health goals and favouring industry goals. In an 
attempt to appease the outraged and shocked public, Germany and France, two of 
the Member States most affected in terms of casualties, announce that they will 
solely authorize new pharmaceutical products through their national authorization 
procedures for an undetermined period of time. Furthermore, they announce a reas-
sessment of all pharmaceuticals authorized through European procedures and a re-
assessment for all pending authorization requests.  
The German and French action is a major setback for the pharmaceutical policy 
agenda of the European Commission and for the EMEA and its procedures in particu-
lar. It precipitates a status quo for many years to come, with no actual change to-
wards Europe. On the contrary, where possible, Member States will place more em-
phasis on their national competences and practices. Europe and all its connotations, 
has become a heavily burdened term that the governments and political parties of 
Member States would rather avoid when courting the Euro-sceptic electorate. 
Moreover, solid economic growth in the European Area between 2015 and 2020 is 
seen as proof by national governments and civilians alike that there is no necessity to 
revitalize the European process.   
 Pharmacovigilance, in accordance with developments in the field of authorization, 
will become more regulated at the national level. The plans of the European Com-
mission to further harmonize regulation, pharmacovigilance practice, product infor-
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mation and communication and cooperation between Member States will be put on 
hold. 
Classification, distribution, advertising, dispensing, pricing, prescribing and reim-
bursement 
The status quo seems to have the gravest effects for those fields that had the most 
potential to see a move towards Europe and to become Euro-dominated. Apart from 
authorization and pharmacovigilance, classification, distribution and advertising 
could be mentioned in this regard. Regulation regarding pricing, dispensing, prescrib-
ing and reimbursement will develop along the lines of the Expert Scenario, in which 
these issues remain within the national competence. As a result, the national health 
policy perspective will dominate the policies of Member States. This implies more 
stringent cost-containment regimes, with restrictive pricing and reimbursement 
frameworks and a prominent role for clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness. 
One can also think of increased use of generic substitution, rational prescribing and 
cost-sharing. 
The European Commission’s limited competence in the health systems of Member 
States will not be acted upon as described in the Expert Scenario. This is mainly due 
to the general Europe-wide, Euro-sceptic environment. This means that the Europe-
an Commission will not take action in those fields that could be seen as a potentially 
European field, specifically regulation that applies (or has potential influence) out-
side the boundaries of the national health system. This could, for example, be the 
case for pricing schemes or dispensing regulation applying to medicines neither pur-
chased nor reimbursed by the state. In the European Crisis Scenario, there will there-
fore be no developments towards a competitive European, non-prescription market 
with less interference from Member State regulation and there will be no develop-
ments towards an EU-wide single market for non-reimbursed medicines with pan-
European prices. Discussion of the division of national and European competences as 
described in the Expert Scenario is eagerly avoided. 
6.2.3 The European Scenario 
In the European Scenario (see Table 20), we assume that an unexpectedly far-
reaching agreement on an actual European Constitution combined with the highest 
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economic growth rates in the European Union since the 1990s and a steady drop in 
unemployment rates from about 8% in 2006 to around 6% in 2011, gradually change 
the public’s overall Euro-sceptic perception of the EU. Furthermore, the new consti-
tution would make it easier to pass legislation as qualified majority voting is aban-
doned in favour of simple majority voting. Eurostat data show that expansion east-
ward is, in fact, an important factor in this relative progress, as it proves to be more 
successful and much less cumbersome than expected. The economic data show high 
domestic demand in the booming accession countries, providing the EU15 Member 
States with new, attractive markets for exports and investment. A new European 
Commission plan drafted in 2010, continuing where the Lisbon objectives and the 
Partnership for Growth and Jobs left off, will seek to capitalize on this momentum. 
The new and highly ambitious plan foresees more European harmonization also with 
the use of secondary legislation.  
Table 20. The European Scenario in numbers. 
Issue Today 2010 2015 2025 
Authorization 3 3 4 5 
Pharmacovigilance 2 3 4 5 
Classification 1 2 3 4 
Distribution 2 3 4 5 
Advertising 1 2 3 4 
Pricing 1 2 3 4 
Dispensing 1 2 3 4 
Prescribing 1 2 3 4 
Post-licensing evaluation  1 2 3 4 
Reimbursement 1 2 3 4 
1=fully national, 2=predominantly national, 3=even or 50/50, 4=predominantly European, 
5=fully European (not based on expert opinions). 
Moreover, two developments in the European health care sector will have far-
reaching consequences. First, better organized empowered patient groups, led by an 
increasingly aggressive Health Consumer Powerhouse, will reap the benefits of the 
latest EU case law and spur a rise in European cross-border patients, who (inde-
pendently, not as part of a cross-border contract) will seek reimbursement for health 
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services abroad for what is often on the fringes of what is funded in the home state. 
Second, the growing importance of internet pharmacies, which are enabled by fa-
vourable EU case law and increasingly less hampered by restrictive national regula-
tion, will have a catalysing effect on cross-border pharmacy services.   
In this scenario, more patients will challenge refusals for reimbursement and exploit 
legal uncertainties surrounding cross-border care. Successive rulings until 2015 will 
be in favour of patients, lowering unjustified barrier for providing and receiving care 
abroad. In these rulings, the ECJ specifically addresses pharmaceuticals as both a 
service (prescription) and a good. Patients challenge long waiting times, which, in the 
view of the ECJ, are no longer justified as a tool used for efficient planning, even 
when the targets of national waiting lists are met.45 Patients challenge private pro-
viders for refusing reimbursement,46 which eliminates much of the (legal) uncertain-
ty when visiting a foreign provider. Patients challenge refusals for treatment abroad 
that is not provided in the home state, while arguing that treatment offered at home 
is verifiably less effective than what is offered abroad.47 The FP6 HealthBASKET pro-
ject found this behaviour highly probable and showed that huge differences may 
exist in the way patients with identical conditions are treated across Member States, 
which can result in large differences in the choice of technologies, procedures, staff-
ing mix and usage intensity (Velasco-Garrido 2006). This could then motivate Euro-
pean patients to use their legal options to seek statutorily-paid, cross-border health 
care with the expectation of reimbursement for treatment, for example, with newer 
technologies or a more broadly-defined treatment that includes services not includ-
ed at home (Busse and Van Ginneken 2007). In this scenario, it becomes increasingly 
difficult for Member States to justify an authorization refusal, even for treatments 
and services, including pharmaceuticals, which are not covered in the national bene-
fit basket.  
                                            
45
 As was seen in the 2006 Watts judgement, case C-372/04 
46
 This development was already apparent in the 2007 Stamatelaki judgement, Case C-444/05. 
47
 According to the ECJ in the Smits/Peerbooms decision, authorization refusals on the grounds of 
effectiveness should be based on what is “sufficiently tried and tested by international medicine” 
(evidence based medicine) when refusing an authorization. In the Smits/Peerbooms case, the effec-
tiveness of the sought treatments was deemed insufficient to justify reimbursement. A lawsuit would 
stand a good chance when a treatment is verifiably better according to best medical evidence.    
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Patients also increasingly use the Kohll/Decker procedure (see Section 3.3.) to obtain 
pharmaceuticals that are listed in their home state but were dispensed by foreign 
pharmacies. Using this procedure, patients even have a financial incentive to pur-
chase less-expensive pharmaceuticals abroad, which are then reimbursed with the 
higher home state tariff. Not only does this enable a profit, it may also imply, for 
certain Member States, bypassing co-payment. Favourable case rulings, initiated by 
patients demanding to be reimbursed at the higher home state rate, make this op-
portunity known to the general public.   
A combination of these developments strengthens and increases opportunities for 
patients to receive non-hospital care and pharmaceuticals in a host state regardless 
of the state’s reimbursement conditions. This undermines the attempts of the Euro-
pean Commission and Member States to secure national competence in the national 
health systems through a directive that states that non-hospital care in another 
(host) Member State should be reimbursed according to the same conditions as the 
home Member State.  
The different patient groups in Europe observe this opportunity and draft lists of 
reimbursed services, pharmaceuticals and specific case law in all Member States to 
exploit the loopholes and uncertainties in cross-border care. In order to do this more 
effectively, the national patient groups organise themselves in pan-European patient 
organizations. A spike in cross-border health care will result, mostly based on case 
law than on Regulation 1408/71. Patient groups serve as information supplier for 
patients, using websites with examples and advice on situations in which it is benefi-
cial or disadvantageous to go abroad. Pharmaceuticals play a pioneering role in this 
development because through the increasing number of internet pharmacies and 
internet-doctors, a patient does not physically have to go to another Member State 
(which comes with extra costs that cannot be reimbursed), but can place his/her 
order from his/her home using a personal computer, regardless of whether an inter-
net-doctor is used from another country.   
Member States continue to argue that cross-border patients pose a threat to the 
financial balance and solidarity of their health systems by maintaining medical and 
hospital services that are balanced and accessible to all citizens of the EU through 
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planning and contracting. Although this is a legally legitimate argument,48 it will be-
come too difficult and too late to reverse the resulting situation. Countries with ex-
tensive benefit baskets and/or countries with inexpensive health services and phar-
maceuticals see an influx of foreign money coming from foreign health insurance 
systems (e.g. health insurers and the NHS) and countries with more restrictive bene-
fit baskets and/or more expensive pharmaceuticals will see the money leaking from 
their health system. In the end, the only rational answer is for Member States to sit 
together and come up with a deal on a basic European benefit package with similar 
conditions for co-payments in an effort to remove the incentive to go abroad. This 
would still leave room for additional benefit catalogues that reflect differences be-
tween Member States concerning the cultural and economic environments. The 
basic European benefit basket should limit people from seeking reimbursement for 
non-reimbursed services and costs in another country. 
Member States will also open up their procurement and contracting mechanisms to 
foreign providers. The European health market, including the pharmaceutical mar-
ket, will become increasingly European in nature, in which providers, purchasers and 
patients increasingly interact on a European level. 
Authorization and pharmacovigilance 
Under the European Scenario, authorization and pharmacovigilance will develop 
along similar lines as would occur in the Expert Scenario. Hence, authorization will 
gradually turn from a field of equally-shared competence to a solely European mat-
ter. The several national licensing agencies will only work for the EMEA based in 
London and it will no longer be possible to authorise a pharmaceutical for just one 
national market. The first step will be the removal of the exclusively national author-
ization procedure by 2015. The various national licensing agencies will solely serve as 
subcontractors for the EMEA. As a second step, the decentralised authorization pro-
cedure will be phased out completely by 2025, after a gradual process of shifting 
certain therapeutic groups towards the centralised procedure. 
                                            
48
 As was made clear in 2001 with the ECJ rulings in the Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms cases, C-
157/99. 
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As for pharmacovigilance, the EudraVigilance data processing network that came 
into effect in 2001 combined with the Clinical Trials Directive seek to harmonise and 
streamline the exchange of data between national licensing agencies, the EMEA and 
pharmaceutical companies. However, the many different responsible authorities 
involved and the different procedures and responsibilities for products under the 
centralised and the decentralised authorization procedure (ISI 2006) are complicat-
ing factors. This is why the harmonizing practice has thus far been more successful 
for medicinal products licensed through the centralised procedure (CAPs) than for 
products licensed through the decentralised procedure. This will change mainly as a 
consequence of the developments in the authorization procedures. The abolishment 
of national authorization and eventually the decentralized procedure will provide 
greater harmonization and simplify the system in favour of Europe. This means that 
all national pharmacovigilance systems will start working according to the same pro-
tocol and system by 2015, under the auspices of the EMEA, but will leave the nation-
al institutions intact. Around 2020, an amendment of the existing regulation will ex-
pand the competences of the EMEA and make it the sole body in Europe responsible 
for pharmacovigilance, which distinguishes the European Scenario from the Expert 
Scenario. 
Classification, distribution and advertising 
Under Title VI of the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use, 
criteria are set which determine whether a pharmaceutical should be classified as a 
prescription-only (POM) or a OTC drug. However, these criteria have so far been ap-
plied nationally. In the next 20 years, classification will develop into a fully European 
field. An amended classification directive introduced between 2010 and 2015 will 
establishes the categories POM, P and GSL across Europe. It mainly seeks to enable a 
single European market for pharmaceuticals and raise the number of non-
prescription products, making more drugs accessible to the public through a flexible 
deregulation of pharmaceutical products. The classification decision will be the re-
sponsibility of the EMEA, for which national competent authorities are then con-
tracted to give advice. The pharmaceutical industry will be encouraged to seek re-
classification for their products through a new European reclassification mechanism. 
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These directives will attribute to an almost complete harmonization and, thus, a Eu-
ropeanization of the European pharmaceutical market and the national differences 
in sale prices will gradually disappear.    
In addition, the nationally-dominated wholesaling sector will undergo further Euro-
pean harmonization and liberalization, as is expected in the Expert Scenario, but 
even slightly more far-reaching. Wholesaling will develop into a fully Euro-dominated 
field. As of yet, there is only one European directive that sets the criteria for whole-
salers, such as adequate premises, qualified staff and emergency plans for market 
withdrawal. These criteria, however, are enforced at the national level by very dif-
ferent national authorities. A first step will be more harmonization between national 
practices. A regulation will make the supervision of wholesaling a European matter 
and the responsibility of the EMEA. The competent national authorities will be under 
direct supervision of the EMEA, similar to the relationship between national medi-
cine agencies and EMEA in terms of authorization and pharmacovigilance.  
Although there is a directive that prohibits public advertising of POMs, the differ-
ences stemming from nationally applied classification decisions make it a predomi-
nantly national field. As a consequence of the shift to a single European market for 
pharmaceuticals, advertising will change into a Euro-dominated field in order to facil-
itate the SEM and new regulation will make the monitoring of advertizements and its 
associated penalties a European responsibility. As a result, the methods of monitor-
ing advertisement for medicinal products are harmonized and penalties for in-
fringements will become standardized for all Member States.  
Pricing, dispensing, prescribing, reimbursement and post-licensing evaluation  
As seen above, those fields that have traditionally been the full competence of the 
Member States have to be adapted to the new European reality. This will force 
Member States to coordinate their decisions on pricing and reimbursement (includ-
ing post-licensing evaluation) at the European level through a collaboration of com-
petent national authorities. This is the only way of facilitating a European health 
market with free flowing services and people without directly giving up all national 
competences. The harmonizing effect also leads to more coordination of regulation 
that concerns prescribing and dispensing of pharmaceuticals. It is a gradual process 
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that first involves the emergence of a European health market between 2015 and 
2020, with Europe-wide free pricing for non-reimbursed medicines and generics and 
a basic European reimbursement package, which eliminates the possible financial 
incentives to go abroad. On the other hand, it simplifies the procedure of receiving 
treatment and pharmaceuticals abroad. This will be accomplished through collabora-
tion instigated by Member States. In the subsequent years, more people will favour 
greater European Commission involvement based on the principle of subsidiarity. 
The national collaboration process will have provided a high level of harmonization 
in national practices and will basically pave the way for more European involvement. 
A logical step in the development of the single European market will be to organize 
and arrange medicines at a European level, which is now in accordance with the suf-
ficiency criterion (the level best suited to achieve its objectives) and the benefit cri-
terion (value is added). Furthermore, it will build on the positive climate around the 
European Union in general and it has many organizational advantages. A Euro-
dominated pharmaceutical market with a European reimbursement decision will be 
just one of the results.  
The question remains whether restrictive pricing regulation or free pricing for all 
pharmaceuticals will be the dominant policy perspective of the European Commis-
sion. As of now, the European Union has a mainly industrial policy perspective, but 
this is largely the result of the factual competences of the EU, which mainly stem 
from the free trade principles (see Chapter 3). When the EU is handed new compe-
tences relating to health care policy and public health policy, the policy outcome is 
expected to change accordingly and provide a better, more balanced representation 
of the overall perspectives of Member States. Moreover, Member States are not 
expected to give up competence in their national health care systems if it would be a 
radical change from their former policies. Hence, this would create a more balanced 
policy with a stronger health policy perspective and more innovative policies for re-
strictive pricing, reimbursing and prescribing regulation. In the end, one should not 
forget that Member States form the European Union.    
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PART III: ANALYSIS 
7 Analysis 
 
This chapter provides a systematic examination of the impact of the three pharma-
ceutical policy scenarios (i.e. the Expert Scenario, the European Crisis Scenario and 
the European Scenario) on the actors in the European pharmaceutical market. There-
fore, each policy scenario for the future (Part II, Chapter 6) will be compared to the 
trends and characteristics for each actor as described in the literature review (Part I), 
as visualized in Figure 1. The observed trends in the literature review are likely to be 
affected by different policy scenarios, which would especially affect the pace at 
which these trends evolve. The discussion in the next and final chapter of Part III ad-
dresses what these scenarios imply for the provision of pharmaceuticals within the 
European Union and the competitiveness of European industry (i.e. the goals of the 
European Commission in this sector). 
7.1 Impact of the Expert Scenario 
In the Expert Scenario, the supply side of the European pharmaceutical market will 
generally see a consolidation and harmonization trend that trickles down the phar-
maceutical value chain. As a result, international consolidation concerning wholesal-
ers and, at a later stage, pharmacies is a logical consequence of companies trying to 
keep up with the pharmaceutical industry and wholesalers in order to be on a level 
playing field with their respective suppliers, particularly in an increasingly liberalized 
market. Various developments in European and national pharmaceutical policy rein-
force these developments. One can think of the increasingly Euro-dominated author-
ization procedures and classification decisions but also of the levelling effect of par-
allel trade, which is less hampered by national regulation and national differences. 
Although the demand side of the market largely overlaps with the health systems of 
Member States (the competence stays with the Member States in the Expert Scenar-
io), it is not immune to the European trend and is, to a certain degree, forced to 
adapt to the changing realities of the supply side. The next paragraphs analyse the 
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impact of the Expert Scenario on the various actors of the European pharmaceutical 
market.  
7.1.1 The European pharmaceutical industry  
In the Expert Scenario, the European policies that mainly affect the pharmaceutical 
industry are authorization, classification, advertising, pricing, prescribing, reim-
bursement and post-licensing evaluation. These policies will be briefly discussed to 
provide an overview of the impact of the Expert Scenario on the pharmaceutical in-
dustry, which includes the innovative industry, generic manufacturers and NBFs. 
Authorization 
After the abolishment of the strictly national procedure, authorization will be carried 
out through European procedures only by 2015. This implies that national differ-
ences in, for example, availability, administration and packaging will gradually fade 
out. Pharmaceuticals will no longer be tailored to the needs of specific populations 
(national or regional) and there will be no pan-European differences in sale prices. 
This means that generic manufacturers, who are still strongly regionally-embedded 
and mainly operate along national boundaries (Gambardella et al. 2000; Pammolli 
2004), will have to look out for European partners to produce, market and distribute 
their generics since they will face increased competition from other European gener-
ic manufacturers. Hence, it can be expected that a consolidation trend as part of a 
general consolidation of the pharmaceutical industry (see Chapter 2) can be ex-
pected to persist, maybe even accelerate due to increased competition. NBFs are 
already bound to the centralized procedure, so there will be no impact on the way 
they seek authorizations for their products.   
Classification 
The EU legislation concerning classification mainly seeks to facilitate a competitive 
non-prescription market. The European OTC (P and GSL) market is already expanding 
in terms of value, volume and range of products, despite differences in the exact 
products available and the regulations governing their distribution, supply and use 
(Bond et al. 2004). This is an interesting development for all manufacturers of non-
prescription medicines, especially since the P and GSL categories will presumably be 
applied across Europe between 2010 and 2015. Producers will have a large stake in 
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getting their products switched from the P to the GSL category, which is more acces-
sible to the public. They will have the necessary mechanisms at their disposal to ap-
ply for a reclassification of their product, against European-wide criteria, albeit na-
tionally applied. One can expect the industry to adjust to this development, which is 
actually a lucrative opportunity, by developing new strategies and, for example, di-
versifying the range of their products and package sizes, all aimed at receiving the 
GSL status. It is also in line with the ongoing trend towards self-medication, in part 
due to the increased expectation of Member States that citizens bear more of their 
health care costs themselves (Bradley et al. 2004) and the European Commission’s 
efforts to support a competitive non-prescription market as first articulated in its 
response (European Commission 2002) to the G10 report (European Commission 
2001).  
Advertising 
In the Expert Scenario, more therapeutic groups will be open for direct consumer 
advertising. In addition to this, a growing non-prescription market through deregula-
tion also implies more pharmaceuticals that allows direct consumer advertising, 
which could lead to an even further increase in advertising expenditures on top of 
the already very high marketing expenditures that sometimes exceed the R&D budg-
et (OECD 2008). On the other hand, the abolishment of the strictly national authori-
zation procedure, but also a more harmonized classification decision, will gradually 
remove national differences in the categories in which pharmaceutical products are 
sold in certain Member States. This increasing convergence will make it easier to 
instigate larger pan-European marketing campaigns, which can be expected to bring 
about synergy effects. Another advantage for the pharmaceutical industry in this 
regard will be the increased harmonization in the methods for controlling pharma-
ceutical advertising and the establishment of a harmonized penalty system instead 
of the old system that was fragmented along national boundaries. 
Pricing, reimbursement post-licensing evaluation and prescribing 
Since the Member States will retain full control over their national health system 
where it concerns the state (publicly covered) sector, there will be more emphasis on 
cost control and curbing health care budgets, which is in line with the current trend 
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(see Sections 4.2 and 4.3). Furthermore, the increasing convergence with regard to 
the methods used for cost control (Maynard and Bloor 2003; Guillén and Cabiedes 
2003), the pharmaceutical products that are available and the use of economic eval-
uation and post-licensing evaluation (through European collaboration of National 
Competent Authorities) are likely to result in reimbursement decisions increasingly 
being made along the same lines and, thus, having similar outcomes. Member States 
that had relatively free pricing (e.g. Germany and the UK) will also increasingly regu-
late prices for innovative drugs. Member States will then use the full repertoire of 
volume and price measures in order to circumscribe the number and price of phar-
maceuticals that are reimbursed through the system. This implies that it will become 
more difficult, mainly for the innovative industry, to win back their increasingly cost-
ly investments in R&D (through new technologies), especially in those cases where 
the new pharmaceutical has no proven extra clinical or administering benefit. Fur-
thermore, this has considerable consequences for the sequence in which manufac-
turers launch their products in the European market (i.e. countries with relatively 
free pricing in the first place) as this influences the prices in other countries and price 
comparisons. In the literature review, it became clear that the pharmaceutical indus-
try is quick at adapting to new situations so it can be expected to come up with vari-
ous strategies to deal with this new reality. Apart from the already visible consolida-
tion trend, one can think of even more emphasis on drugs with blockbuster potential 
(e.g. lifestyle drugs and drugs for diabetes and cardiac illnesses), a further switch to 
the US and new cheaper emerging markets (e.g. new EU Member States and Asia) as 
centres of research and operating activities in search of increased efficiency and 
productivity, larger marketing expenditures and increased financing of well-disposed 
clinical trials. Research has shown that pharmaceutical companies tend to go where 
there is a strong market (Pammolli et al. 2004; OECD 2008). It is interesting to note 
that some new Member States (e.g. Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slove-
nia) already show an increased specialization in pharmaceutical manufacturing 
(Pammolli et al. 2004). 
On the other hand, new opportunities will arise through the sheer size of the Euro-
pean market as a whole, in which all national markets are gradually opened up 
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through EU law. What arises is a formidable market of 487 million people with large 
growth potential, especially in the EU12 Member States. In this market, a liberalized 
OTC market with free price setting throughout the EU, later followed by an increas-
ingly European generic market, will emerge in which manufacturers compete on 
price. This development will make these markets particularly more competitive. For 
the generic industry, chances lie in favourable national policies that increase the 
amount of generics that enter the market and favourable EU policies that promote 
the wide use of Bolar provisions to ensure faster market access after patent expira-
tion (European Commission 2002). This tougher competition should spur the com-
petitiveness of the European generic industry and not ‘nurture’ inefficiency (Gam-
bardella et al. 2000). Tougher competition can also be expected in the marketing of 
generic products. The innovative industry will try to retain market share even more 
by using their brand and trying to give it a strong position in the market prior to pa-
tent expiration.  
7.1.2 Wholesalers 
In the field of wholesaling, the current consolidation and integration trends (Clement 
et al. 2005) will be reinforced by increased harmonization in national pharmaceutical 
policies and liberalization of pharmaceutical markets. On the one hand, the areas in 
which European wholesalers can cooperate increase with every development that 
harmonizes the national regulation concerning the distribution, use and supply of 
pharmaceuticals. Since the pharmaceutical products that are on sale in the various 
EU countries are expected to become increasingly similar, it is likely that wholesalers 
collaborate in the purchasing and distribution of pharmaceuticals. On the other 
hand, the merger and acquisition trend is, of course, not a voluntary one but is also 
precipitated by fiercer competitive pressures. 
A minority of countries do not allow for short-line wholesalers because it is thought 
to contradict the public interest when wholesalers only specialize in certain thera-
peutic groups or pharmaceuticals in their assortment (Taylor et al. 2004a). However, 
EU law will gradually open up these markets and limit national interference. This will 
add to the trend observed in some Member States of highly specialized wholesalers 
carrying a limited range of products at very competitive prices (Taylor et al. 2004a), 
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which are especially active in those markets that are expected to gradually turn pre-
dominantly European over the next two decades (e.g. the non-prescription and ge-
neric markets).  
Member States show differences in their legal frameworks with regard to the distri-
bution chain and integration. It can be expected that these differences will slowly 
dissolve through the workings of EU law. This will eventually make vertically-
integrated combinations in the pharmaceutical value chain (i.e. combinations be-
tween pharmaceutical industry, wholesalers and pharmacies) a widespread Europe-
an practice. Furthermore, the observed merger and acquisition trend (Clement et al. 
2005) will continue and have a levelling effect on the huge differences between 
wholesalers per capita in the various Member States. This will result in oligopolistic 
market structures, as already observed in the more developed EU Member States 
and in most Member States by 2015. The consolidation trend increases the purchas-
ing power of the wholesalers, through which they will be able to negotiate more ef-
fectively with their suppliers.    
Parallel trading is expected to become more well-established, not only through fa-
vourable case law, harmonized markets, effective national incentives and smaller 
price differentials, but also because larger wholesaler combinations can face the in-
dustry at eye level. Before, wholesalers were reluctant to engage in parallel trading 
fearing profit loss and a bad relationship with the pharmaceutical industry, of which 
they were highly dependent. Needless to say, the pharmaceutical industry is a 
known adversary of parallel trading because they fear profit loss in high-priced coun-
tries (see also Section 3.5.2 for the discussion of case law). This development con-
tributes to more competitive pressure and a levelling effect on price differentials, 
together with other aforementioned trends with harmonizing effects.  
Although these large wholesaler combinations purchase pharmaceuticals on a Euro-
pean level, the supplier relationship with pharmacies will at first remain conducted 
at basically a national level through locally-based subsidiaries. However, more bor-
der-crossing services are also likely to develop when European markets for certain 
pharmaceutical groups develop (OTCs and generics pioneering this development).  
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7.1.3 Pharmacies 
As seen in the literature review, the future of European pharmacies is strongly in-
terwoven with the future of wholesalers and they will basically follow the same 
trends. Pharmacies have a special role in the value chain, being on the dividing-line 
of the private free market that supplies them and the public, heavily regulated mar-
ket they serve. Since it is such a regulated environment (Paterson et al. 2003), there 
is tremendous opportunity for market liberalization and the EU will push through its 
agenda wherever it can. Ongoing market liberalization will make market-entry regu-
lation easier, which enables other forms of ownership and new combinations in the 
pharmaceutical value chain. The market will be opened up, for example, through 
enabling non-pharmacists to open pharmacies, by gradually abolishing state monop-
olies where present or allowing the takeover of pharmacies across national borders. 
The EU perspective will not conflict with the national agendas since cheaper phar-
maceuticals, through lower profit margins for pharmacists, are perfectly in line with 
national health care policy.     
At present there are huge national differences in the number of pharmacies per mil-
lion inhabitants, with differences of up to seven times within the EU15 (Paterson et 
al. 2003; Taylor et al. 2004a) but a strong consolidation trend aiming to reap the 
merits of economies of scale will counter these differences to a certain degree and 
larger chains are the result. Chaining will give pharmacies a better position in their 
negotiations with suppliers, but will also avail them in an increasingly cost-conscious 
environment in which they are confronted with progressively stringent national cost-
containment policies. One can think of Member States promoting generic substitu-
tion but also of direct negotiations between governments and pharmacy organiza-
tions, as seen in the Netherlands for example. At first, chaining takes places within 
national boundaries, yet it is also very likely that the international takeover trend 
visible in the pharmaceutical industry and followed by the wholesalers, will eventual-
ly trickle down to the pharmacies as well. It seems likely that the DocMorris case 
described in this thesis will become an example of increased importance.  
Another significant development with catalysing potential for the occurrence of Eu-
ropean pharmacy chains with European prices is the rise of internet pharmacies. 
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However, this mainly applies to the OTC pharmaceuticals and non-reimbursed pre-
scription pharmaceuticals (i.e. those medicines for which the patient carries the fi-
nancial responsibility). If an internet pharmacy in Member State A offers certain 
POM pharmaceuticals at a lower price than Member State B, a patient in Member 
State B does not have an incentive to order the product in Member State B because 
his/her payer will reimburse anyway. It is important to mention that the European 
Commission supports a mutual recognition of pharmaceuticals in a proposed 2008 
directive for cross-border health services. It could, therefore, be a different case 
when Member State payers start to develop (or are given the instruments and free-
dom to develop) policies that will give patients some participation in the discounts 
they receive. This would correspond with similar regulations for pharmacists that are 
allowed to keep some of the discounts they receive when they manage to purchase 
medicines at a discount.  
However, this seems unlikely in this scenario since it could also threaten the domes-
tic pharmacy sector (i.e. the national provision of medicines) and this is not in the 
interest of the Member States. For OTCs and costly non-reimbursed pharmaceuticals 
(e.g. anti-malaria prophylaxis, which is not reimbursed in the insurance policies of 
most countries), it can become very profitable to look around. This is possible if we 
assume mutually recognized prescriptions. Additionally, in this particular field (i.e. 
outside the national, publicly-covered system) Member States cannot do much to 
control or regulate this practice. Patient and consumer groups could function as facil-
itators in making this possibility visible to the public. The competitive pressure inter-
net pharmacies impose on traditional pharmacies can result in lower national prices 
and internet pharmacies can have a levelling effect on European price differentials in 
the longer term.    
7.1.4 Demand side (medical care triad) 
The demand side of the European pharmaceutical market will be faced with more 
policies focused on cost-awareness, which aim to keep health care affordable and 
accessible over the next twenty years and further in the future. This can be achieved 
if Member States adopt similar strategies concerning pricing, prescribing and dis-
pensing, as discussed in Chapter 4; however, new initiatives will also emerge, often 
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part of larger health care reforms that aim to generally restructure the funding of 
health care and introduce more market competition. This could be some form of 
managed competition with limited government interference. In this development, 
the payers/purchasers of health care (e.g. health insurer, sickness fund, Primary Care 
Trust) will have larger stakes in controlling health care costs and are likely to bear 
more direct financial responsibility herein. It is, therefore, very well possible that 
payers will play a larger role in controlling pharmaceutical expenditures in the future 
than they do at present.  
It is also on this side of the pharmaceutical market where the most divergence be-
tween Member States continues to exist. Whereas the supply side is less fragmented 
and increasingly organized on a European level, the demand side represents 27 dif-
ferent Member States and thus 27 health systems. Furthermore, it represents a myr-
iad of cultural and personal attitudes towards prescribing practices and pharmaceu-
tical consumption. These differences exist not only nationally but also on a regional, 
cultural and individual level. This applies to both prescribers (doctors, GPs and physi-
cians) and patients.  
Prescribers 
In general, taking into account the differences in consumption and prescribing across 
national and cultural boundaries, doctors will be under increasing pressure to pre-
scribe rationally and, by doing so, have a larger responsibility in controlling health 
care cost. It can be expected that their ability to prescribe what they deem appropri-
ate will be increasingly challenged through guidelines, electronic formularies and the 
use of prescribing data. In this practice, huge national differences exist between 
Member States (see Section 4.2.2), so there will be frontrunners and stragglers, but 
the trends are already visible. Also, more Member States with high levels of prescrip-
tion per capita will realize that there is huge potential for savings. The frontrunners 
in general are the western and mainly northern Member States, whose prescribing 
policies show more innovative and restrictive policies in this regard compared to 
southern, traditionally high-consumption countries. These policies will be adopted by 
the EU12 countries when their health care systems develop towards the EU15 aver-
age in terms of quality. Twenty years from now, the differences per Member State 
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will be levelled for the most part. Another development will be the increasing loss of 
trust in the doctor-patient relationship, also due to more power and information in 
the hands of patients with regard to accessing and using medicines (Bradley et al. 
2004). This development, in combination with restrictive cost-containment policies, 
will negatively impact the reputation of the medical profession. It will be in their in-
terest to construct these formularies and policies. It could also lead to greater inter-
national collaboration and more European collaboration, in particular of professional 
medical organizations that will look to safeguard their autonomy in prescribing as 
they see fit.     
Patient/consumer  
In an IAPO (International Alliance of Patients’ Organizations) survey, including input 
from patients from ten EU Member States, patients rated timely access to the best 
treatment and information, the right to participate in decision at the individual pa-
tient level and patient involvement in policy-making among their top priorities (IAPO 
2006). This is reflected in this scenario for the future of the European pharmaceutical 
sector. As described in Section 2.2.2, the doctor-patient relationship is changing, 
which can be ascribed to developments in the environments of patients. Patients 
become more involved in their choice of treatment and have various ways to access 
a sheer limitless amount of medical information, mainly through the internet. Fur-
thermore, the doctor–patient relationship is characterized by strong information 
asymmetry, but this unequal relationship will be countered to a certain degree 
through patient empowerment.  
The myriad of European patient groups will also organize themselves better, on both 
a national and European level, to keep up with the Europeanization trends on the 
supply side of the European pharmaceutical market in order to enable them to par-
ticipate independently in the decision-making process on health matters in the Euro-
pean Union. It will be of key importance in this age of rapidly growing, freely-
accessible medical information that patient organization groups, in dialogue with the 
relevant European and national institutions, play a pioneering role in the establish-
ment of a standardized European certifying system for good quality health infor-
mation web sites, with, for example, quality labels and a multilingual web portal. 
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Already there are regional and national networks in place and others are developing 
but, in this scenario, the expectation is that around 2010, these networks should 
work toward some kind of standardized European system. This can all take place 
within the frameworks of the G10 Medicines Group plan concerning information to 
patients, the EU’s e-Health action plan (European Commission 2004b) and the 2006 
MedIEQ (Quality Labelling of Medical Web Content Using Multilingual Information 
Extraction) project, co-funded by the European Commission under the public health 
programme. However, patient organizations have to play a pioneering and pro-active 
role in this process.   
In an increasingly cost aware environment, patients will also be expected to have an 
increased responsibility for paying for their medicines and may be encouraged to 
care for minor ailments with OTC remedies, paid for out-of-pocket (Mossialos et al. 
2004). Apart from good information, this further illustrates the need for powerful 
patient organizations that monitor developments that could have negative effects on 
the equity of access. Another development will be the expectation that patients will 
increasingly be subjected to marketing efforts from the pharmaceutical industry. Not 
just through direct-to-consumer advertising, a result of increased competition and a 
larger OTC market and more therapeutic groups open to advertising, but also 
through new methods, such as funding for patient groups (Herxheimer 2003).  
Patient organizations are relatively poor and have little independent funding, which 
can make them easily seduced by the rich pharmaceutical sector. When these rela-
tionships exist, they must be fully acknowledged and open. All patient groups should 
have readily available guidelines, maybe standardized on a European level, on how 
to interact with the pharmaceutical industry. In this light, it would be a good idea to 
apply the recommendations from the G10 Medicines Group to the funding of patient 
organizations. However, there are important issues at stake, such as equity of access, 
appropriate use and detection of adverse events (Bond et al. 2004). 
Payers 
Under this scenario, little convergence in national practices with regard to insurance 
form is expected and national health insurance systems will develop in ways decided 
at a national level. In other words, this is the result of a general health care policy, 
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rather than the impact of the European pharmaceutical policy. It is up to the individ-
ual Member States whether this is some sort of managed competition under public 
or private law or a NHS. However, it can be expected that innovative policies will be 
developed in most Member States to counter agency problems and, by doing so, it 
will give them more responsibility in the containment of costs.  
7.2 Impact of the European Crisis Scenario 
The European Crisis Scenario foresees a gradual return to national competence 
where possible. The process of an increased Europeanization and consolidation of 
the distribution chain will be halted by the shift towards national competence and 
less foreign competitive pressures, as occurs in the other scenarios. This will inevita-
bly have grave effects for all the actors of the European pharmaceutical market, from 
which the supply side actors will be particularly affected. Changes and stagnation 
are, therefore, most visible in those fields that undergo a Europeanization trend in 
the other scenarios (i.e. those fields that have shared competences between the EU 
and Member States). This includes authorization, pharmacovigilance, classification 
and distribution. The fields where the national competence is predominant will see a 
development that is similar to the Expert Scenario, but in a national, rather than a 
European context. In comparison to the Expert Scenario, there will be more diver-
gence between countries, resulting in frontrunners and stragglers that are further 
apart in the way they implement policies than in the Expert Scenario, where the Eu-
ropean process has a strong harmonization effect. In the following paragraphs, the 
impact of the European Crisis Scenario will be examined in detail.   
7.2.1 European pharmaceutical industry 
Authorization, pharmacovigilance, classification and distribution 
Under the European Crisis Scenario, authorization, pharmacovigilance, classification 
and distribution will gradually return to being national competences. The failure of 
the European authorization procedures becomes clearly visible between 2015 and 
2020 when the EMEA and its procedures will be dismantled. What remains are 27 
strictly national authorization procedures with different protocols, different data 
exclusivity periods, a myriad of pharmacovigilance systems and a nationally-applied 
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classification decision based on domestically determined criteria. The diverging ef-
fect of these developments will have huge consequences for the pharmaceutical 
industry and the way products are brought to the national markets.  
The larger, traditional, innovative multinational companies historically already pos-
sess subsidiaries in most countries, often the result of mergers and acquisitions. The-
se national subsidiaries and agencies will now have to concentrate on maintaining, 
or maybe even expanding, the capacity to file for authorization procedures and 
meeting the requirements of the national regulatory frameworks. Hence, for the 
innovative pharmaceutical industry, this scenario implies higher administration costs 
and even more pressure on their R&D budgets compared to a scenario in which ad-
ministration and industry friendly European procedures emerge as the European 
standard.  
On the other hand, one could think that it could also provide opportunities to exploit 
pharmaceuticals in higher priced states, such as states in which the pharmaceutical 
industry is an important provider of jobs. In any case, this will be difficult in the more 
developed EU15 countries considering the assumption that developed European 
states will all be forced to adopt stringent cost-containment policies in order to curb 
health care expenditures and relieve national budgets. An interesting development 
would be further specialization into pharmaceutical manufacturing (Pammolli et al. 
2004), which has already started in Central and Eastern European countries. This 
may result in a relocation of the manufacturing sector of the pharmaceutical indus-
try, which would not only serve as a production facility with low labour costs, but 
also as a growth market where national governments are willing to develop a fa-
vourable industry-friendly climate, including lenient pricing regimes, to attract and 
retain big pharmaceutical companies, tailored to the purchasing power in these 
countries.  
Manufacturers of generic pharmaceuticals, which are still very much nationally orga-
nized, will have the smallest burden to bear. The several national generic markets 
will not develop into a dynamic, Europe-wide generics market with a standardized 
regulatory framework. The lack of convergence and standardization means that po-
tential competition from other countries will face a serious barrier and disadvantage 
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that varies from country to country when accessing a national market. Through this, 
the generic industry can hold on to its dominant national positions for a longer peri-
od of time than under the other scenarios. However, the concentration trend will 
still be inevitable, mainly as a result of pressure from national pricing regimes, but it 
could be severely slowed down due to less foreign competition.   
Smaller pharmaceutical companies that do not a have an agency or subsidiary in the 
various European states and companies, for whom the central European procedure 
was obliged (often small non-European NBFs), will have to initiate authorization pro-
cedures in all the different European States, which is a clear competitive disad-
vantage in their quest to get their products on the market. In this process, pharma-
ceutical outsourcing companies such as Parexel will play a key role and show incredi-
ble growth potential when their expertise and infrastructure is consulted, but in-
creasing use of partnerships with multinationals (e.g. biopartnering) also seems like-
ly.   
This increased administrative effort to cope with the various regulatory frameworks 
implies extra costs and it is possible that not in every European country an authoriza-
tion application is made. Poorer and smaller European countries may be deprived of 
some new products. It is not unthinkable, however, that smaller countries follow the 
example of Luxembourg and will adopt the authorization decisions of other Europe-
an countries. Also, smaller scale cooperation on authorization between certain Euro-
pean states could prove necessary in order to safeguard access to expensive innova-
tive pharmaceuticals.    
It is important to note that the lines between innovative, generic and NBF companies 
will become even more blurred over the next twenty years, making combinations of 
the developments described above possible. 
Advertising 
In the European Crisis Scenario, the national differences as to which pharmaceutical 
products are sold in which category in certain Member States are expected to di-
verge as a result of national variations in market authorizations and classification 
decisions. The increased divergence will make tailor-made national advertising cam-
  155 
paigns a necessity, much like the present situation and two groups of countries will 
become visible.  
The first group, consisting of the more developed EU15 countries, will place more 
emphasis on self-medication as a means to cut costs and will, therefore, favour flexi-
ble deregulation of pharmaceuticals. Citizens of these countries already have years 
of experience and have long been encouraged to employ self medication. Therefore, 
the number of non-prescription pharmaceuticals open to advertising is likely to in-
crease. The ban on advertising POMs will be prolonged since it is assumed to stimu-
late the demand for expensive POMs.  
The second group will mainly consist of Eastern and Central European countries with 
less developed health care systems. Their populations are not as used to a culture of 
self medication, may not be aware of its dangers and will therefore be protected by 
conservative classification decisions (i.e. pharmaceuticals are more likely to be kept 
on POM or P status). However, as previously assumed, the Eastern and Central Euro-
pean countries are interested in attracting pharmaceutical industry as a locus of 
manufacturing and innovation. It could mean that the research-intensive pharma-
ceutical industry is enticed by lenient advertising regulation. Concretely, this could 
mean that certain POMs may be advertised. In this case the governments make a 
health/industry policy trade-off in favour of the pharmaceutical industry. This is 
comprehensible keeping in mind that these countries have strong growth economies 
combined with not fully developed health care systems where the health budget 
does not pressure the national budget to the same degree as in Western European 
countries. There are opportunities in both groups depending on the state and thera-
peutic class and overall spending on advertising will likely increase.  
Pricing, reimbursement, post-licensing evaluation and prescribing 
As far as regulation within a state’s health care system is concerned, the European 
Crisis Scenario will develop along the same lines as the Expert Scenario. However, 
there are two major differences. First, we assume in the Expert Scenario that the 
pharmaceutical markets show convergence through the harmonizing effects of in-
creasingly Europe-dominated regulation over authorization, pharmacovigilance, clas-
sification and distribution. This is not the case in the European Crisis Scenario where 
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these markets are expected to develop in ways that increase the differences be-
tween them, which also restricts the opportunities to collaborate. Secondly, in the 
European Crisis Scenario the influence of EU legislation is no longer an important 
factor, as opposed to the European Expert Scenario. This means that there is no Eu-
ropean liberalization of the markets outside the state sector, hence no development 
towards a competitive, European non-prescription market and no movement to-
wards some sort of competitive European generic market. As a result, the European 
states will have strong influence over the entire national pharmaceutical market, as 
described in Sections 4.2 and 4.3.  
It is expected that developed European health care systems will take a stronger 
health policy perspective in which containment of costs is key and that the newer, 
less developed European States, mostly Eastern and Central European countries, are 
more likely to make a trade-off in favour of industrial policy. This is an assumption 
that requires strong economic growth in these countries and initial investments in 
the access to health care before switching to a stronger industrial perspective since 
many Eastern European countries have systems where patients are often struggling 
with comparably high co-payments as of 2008 (e.g. Poland, Slovenia, Estonia).  
In the former, we see the trend as described in the Expert Scenario, which means 
that the trend of copying methods used for cost control will set the standard 
(Maynard and Bloor 2003; Guillén and Cabiedes 2003), of which economic evalua-
tion, generic penetration and restrictive pricing will be expected to become integral 
parts. This implies that it will mainly become more difficult for the innovative indus-
try to win back their investments in R&D, which are already accelerating in terms of 
costs. In general, the aforementioned factors will not create a favourable long-term 
environment for the innovative pharmaceutical industry (including NBFs) in the EU15 
countries and further relocation of operations seems to be the solution.  
In the latter, new opportunities for the pharmaceutical industry will arise in the 
booming new European countries where favourable reimbursement and pricing poli-
cies only add to the already attractive emerging economies with low labour costs, 
growing markets and an abundance of well-educated scientists and engineers. In this 
scenario, the relocation from the EU15 to the US, Eastern and Central European 
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countries and other comparable emerging economies (e.g. in Asia) may take place 
with an accelerated pace.   
For the more nationally-organized generic industry, chances lie in favourable nation-
al policies that would increase the level of generic penetration. They could be one of 
the winners in this scenario, with less foreign competitive pressure as markets are 
diverging and a shared interest with national government (generic penetration).  
7.2.2 Wholesalers 
For wholesalers, the European Crisis Scenario will not have grave consequences on 
the short term. However, consolidation trends among European wholesalers towards 
pan-European wholesalers will be hindered when compared to the Expert Scenario, 
in which the current consolidation trends and integration (Clement et al. 2005) will 
be accelerated through increased harmonization in national pharmaceutical policies 
and the opening up of national pharmaceutical markets through EU law.  
The differences that Member States show in their legal frameworks with regard to 
integration, mainly where the wholesaler-pharmacist relationship is concerned, will 
not gradually dissolve but will develop according to the policy objective in the re-
spective country. In other words, some countries will implement –if not already in 
place– market liberalization policies similar to those emanating from European law, 
resulting in large vertically-integrated combinations in the supply chain, whereas 
other countries will keep or increase the restrictions in their legal framework.  
The observed horizontal integration trend will have a levelling effect on the huge 
differences between wholesalers per capita in the various Member States. However, 
the huge national differences will not disappear at the same rate as under the Expert 
Scenario. The strictly nationally-regulated health systems will make it easier for 
wholesalers to retain their leading national positions for a longer period of time. Go-
ing abroad is not yet a competitive necessity and does not have the same financial 
advantages as the other scenarios, where collaboration in more fields is possible 
(e.g. purchasing, storing, marketing and distribution).  
Nevertheless, depending on the state of the development of the national pharma-
ceutical market, the national wholesaling market will show an increasingly oligopolis-
  158 
tic structure. In this process there are frontrunners that, as of today, have already 
reached this stage (mainly northern countries from the EU15), a midfield (southern 
Europe) and trailers (new accession countries). Pan-European collaboration between 
the developed nations with similar frameworks remains attractive on a smaller scale 
and scope.  
The operating environment for parallel trading will become more difficult and com-
plex. Since market authorizations are granted on the national level, the differences 
concerning what is on sale (e.g. packaging sizes, administering form) vary between 
countries, which will increase the impediments to import pharmaceuticals that are 
on sale in another country. Furthermore, the national frameworks of each individual 
country determine whether parallel trading is allowed. In this scenario, the whole-
sale combinations that do engage in these activities, where legally permitted, mainly 
operate in a national setting and, as a result, have less negotiating power vis-à-vis 
the multinational pharmaceutical industry. Therefore, they can be expected to en-
counter difficulties with the pharmaceutical industry when they pursue parallel im-
porting. The pharmaceutical industry would want to avoid a situation in which their 
products are purchased at a foreign subsidiary with lower prices. Even though the 
wholesalers are expected to hold on to their leading role on the national scale, they 
do face the difficulty of coping with a much larger, internationally-oriented industry 
with a stronger negotiation position.  
7.2.3 Pharmacies  
There are huge national differences in the European Member States in the number 
of pharmacies per capita and the regulatory environment in which they must oper-
ate (Paterson et al. 2003; Taylor et al 2004a). It is expected that under the European 
Crisis Scenario, depending on the policy perspectives of the individual Member 
States, more (national) market liberalization will enable new combinations in the 
pharmaceutical value chain with the hope that it increases efficiency and drives 
down profit margins (i.e. a stronger health care perspective). One can think of the 
chaining of pharmacies but also of non-pharmacists being permitted to open and/or 
own pharmacies. On the other hand, some Member States can be expected to take a 
stronger public health perspective and keep more restrictive regulations in place 
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with regard to market entry, such as pharmacy ownership (e.g. state monopoly or 
solely pharmacists), the number of pharmacies (e.g. through economic needs tests 
and pharmacies per capita).  
However, also under the European Crisis Scenario, larger chains are developing, 
which is hoped to give pharmacies a better negotiation position in their dealings with 
suppliers, but also to help them cope with increasingly stringent national cost-
containment policies. One can imagine Member States promoting generic substitu-
tion, but also direct negotiations occurring between governments and pharmacy 
organizations. 
Another significant development with far reaching potential is the emergence of 
internet pharmacies. However, this development will mainly take place domestically 
since pharmaceutical markets and their regulations take a national course, which 
makes cross-border internet pharmacies virtually impossible. 
7.2.4 Demand side (medical care triad) 
The demand side of the European pharmaceutical market will be characterized by 
diverse national policies adapted to different national settings and priorities that 
represent a myriad of cultural, national, regional and personal attitudes towards pre-
scribing practices and pharmaceutical consumption. The countries may also be divid-
ed into two general groups along the same lines as described above. 
One group, mostly consisting of the EU15 Member States, will roughly follow the 
developments as described under the Expert Scenario, i.e. they follow the ongoing 
trend and will expand their cost-containment policies aiming at affordable and ac-
cessible health care through cost and volume measures. The strategies, new and pre-
existing, will often be copied from other countries and applied to their own domestic 
situation. 
The other group, mainly the new accession countries, will lead to a policy trade-off in 
favour of industrial policy. Reforming regulation based on Western European stand-
ards has been driven by the desire of EU access (Mrazek et al. 2004) and mainly in-
cluded measures such as market authorization, patent legislation, manufacturing 
standards, licensing requirements as well as drug pricing and reimbursement. The 
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implemented cost-containment measures have predominantly focused on reim-
bursement and pricing rather than measures affecting (rational) prescribing and dis-
pensing (Mrazek et al. 2004).  
Prescribers 
In the first group, doctors will generally face increasing pressure to prescribe ration-
ally and thus will have a role in controlling health care costs, following the expecta-
tions of the Expert Scenario. Member States with high levels of prescription per capi-
ta will realize that there is huge potential for savings. It is likely that the doctor’s abil-
ity to prescribe what they see fit will be constrained through guidelines, electronic 
formularies and the use of prescribing data. In this process, huge national differences 
exist between Member States, so there will be frontrunners and stragglers. Add to 
this development the observed loss of trust patients have in their doctors (Bradley et 
al. 2004) and one can see that the medical profession will be under increased strain. 
It will be in their interest to cooperate to construct these formularies and policies. 
International collaboration is foreseen at this point in the Expert Scenario, but it 
cannot be expected to be at the same degree as in the European Crisis Scenario with 
its diverging national health systems. 
In the second group, these volume measures will not be implemented to a large de-
gree until the full range of pricing and reimbursement measures are exhausted and 
the health care systems are on a EU15 level. In the meantime this practice nicely fits 
the governments’ policies to provide an attractive manufacturing, operating and 
research base for the pharmaceutical industry. This is expected to take at least the 
next twenty years. The doctors will therefore enjoy more freedom in their prescrib-
ing habits and will not be subjected to extensive restrictive prescribing measures. 
However, the increasing loss of trust in the doctor-patient relationship is a trend 
here, although not to the same degree as the consumers of more developed EU 
Member States. This can be explained through (although gradually dissolving) differ-
ences in education levels, cultural attitude towards pharmaceuticals and access to 
information.  
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Patient/consumer 
In the first group of Member States, the patients will roughly see the same develop-
ments as in to the Expert Scenario, although not in a European context, i.e. circum-
scribed to the national setting. Hence, the doctor-patient relationship will become a 
situation in which patients become more involved in choice of treatment and have 
various ways to access an abundance of medical information, mainly through the 
internet. This will decrease the existing information asymmetry in the doctor–patient 
relationship to a certain degree. Therefore, patient groups will also better organize 
themselves, mainly domestically, in order to allow them to participate independently 
in the decision-making process on national health decisions. Furthermore, the devel-
opment towards mainly nationally standardized certifying systems for health infor-
mation web sites of good quality will be of key importance. The patient groups will 
have to play a pioneering, active role in that development. Already there are regional 
and national networks in place and others are developing. This will result in fully-
operational national systems by 2015. The development towards a European stand-
ardized system as described under the Expert Scenario will largely be put on ice.  
Furthermore, in an increasingly cost aware environment, patients will be expected to 
have an increased responsibility in paying for their medicines and will be encouraged 
to care for minor ailments with OTC remedies paid for out-of-pocket (Mossialos et al. 
2004). This also further illustrates the need for powerful patient organizations with 
access to the decision-making process that monitor developments that could nega-
tively affect equity of access to pharmaceuticals. 
In the second group, the development towards full-fledged patient organizations still 
has a long way to go. The patients and their organizations will have to go through the 
same emancipation process as in the first group of Member States. This is expected 
to take longer due to cultural, political and economical factors.  
Both groups, however, will be faced with increased marketing efforts from the 
pharmaceutical industry. Not just through direct-to-consumer advertising, which can 
be expected to be more common in second group of countries as a result of more 
therapeutic groups open to advertising, but also through new strategies, such as 
funding for patient groups.  
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Payers 
As under the Expert Scenario, not much convergence in national practices with re-
gard to the organization of payers is foreseen. National health insurance systems will 
autonomously develop in ways decided upon at a national level as a result of discus-
sions and decisions on their respective health systems that reflect country specific 
characteristics (e.g. concerning the economical, political and cultural environment). 
Whether this is some sort of managed competition, under public or private law, or 
an NHS is up to the Member State and is not a result of the European Crisis Scenario. 
7.3 Impact of the European Scenario 
In the European Scenario, both the supply side and demand side of the European 
pharmaceutical market undergo a strong Europeanization trend. On the supply side, 
this takes place at a faster pace and with further reaching consequences than under 
the Expert Scenario because pharmacovigilance matters and classification decisions 
are decided on a supranational level. At first Member States will retain full control 
over their national health systems where it concerns the public sector. This implies 
more emphasis on cost control and curbing health care budgets and thus an extrapo-
lation of current trends (see Sections 4.2 and 4.3). When you add the increasing con-
vergence in methods used for cost control (Maynard and Bloor 2003; Guillén and 
Cabiedes 2003), the range of available pharmaceutical products and the use of eco-
nomic evaluation (through European collaboration of the national competent au-
thorities) to this development, reimbursement decisions will increasingly be taken 
along the same lines. Furthermore, the market in general, the non-prescription and 
generic markets in particular and national benefit catalogues will become more Eu-
ropean in nature, also forced through cross-border health care. The first step will be 
a European benefit catalogue that takes out the incentive for patients to go abroad 
for (reimbursed and/or in their home-state unavailable) pharmaceuticals. As a result, 
it will become a logical consequence to arrange pricing, reimbursement, post-
licensing and prescribing on a European level between 2020 and 2025. What will 
result is an emerging SEM for medicines with the free movement of all pharmaceuti-
cals, including innovative POMs, generic medicines and non-prescription drugs all at 
pan-European prices (before taxes such as V.A.T).  
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On the demand side, a development towards a European health market with Euro-
pean health insurers emerges. For this, litigating consumers and border-crossing 
pharmaceuticals play a pioneering and catalysing role. In the next paragraphs, the 
impact of the European Scenario on the various actors of the European pharmaceu-
tical market will be described in more detail.  
7.3.1 European pharmaceutical industry  
In the European Scenario, the European policies mainly affecting the pharmaceutical 
industry are authorization, classification, advertising, pricing, prescribing and reim-
bursement and post-licensing evaluation. These fields for the most part overlap with 
the developments of the Expert Scenario. This will be discussed briefly in the follow-
ing pages with greater emphasis on the differences between scenarios.  
Authorization  
As under the Expert Scenario, authorization will be carried out through European 
procedures only by 2015 and a gradual phasing out of the decentralized procedure 
will take place between 2015 and 2020, using the centralized procedure by 2025. 
This implies that national differences with regard to what is on sale, how it is admin-
istered, how it is packaged and the contents of leaflets, among other concerns, will 
gradually disappear as newer products enter the market and substitute older prod-
ucts over time. Pharmaceuticals will gradually no longer be tailored to the needs of a 
particular Member State and the availability of pharmaceuticals will be largely con-
sistent across Europe. This practice will have a profound influence on the innovative 
industry because it is now dealing with one large market and only one market au-
thorization has to be filed.  
As a result, generic manufacturers, who are still strongly regionally and domestically 
embedded and mainly operate along national boundaries, will have to look out for 
European partners to produce, market and distribute their generics because they will 
have to compete with all other European generic manufacturers looking for a share 
of the European market, despite the fact the market is still growing. Hence, the con-
solidation trend towards a competitive European generic industry can be expected 
to persist and maybe even accelerate. There will be no direct impact on NBFs as the 
centralized procedure has already been compulsory for their products.    
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Classification 
The EU legislation relating to classification mainly seeks to facilitate a competitive 
non-prescription market, which has been expanding in terms of value, volume and 
range of products. An amendment of the classification directive will first implement 
the P and GSL categories across European Member States between 2010 and 2015. 
Where the Expert Scenario differs from the European Scenario is that a new regula-
tion will make the EMEA the institution responsible for making a centralized and 
binding European classification decision around 2020. In interplay with the solely 
European central authorization, this has a stronger harmonizing effect on the phar-
maceutical market than under the Expert Scenario. Producers will have a large stake 
in getting their products deregulated from P to the easier, accessible GSL category 
and will have the mechanisms at their disposal to apply for a reclassification of their 
product, at first through nationally applied Europe-wide criteria and later through 
the European centralized classification decision around 2020. As under the Expert 
Scenario, one can expect the industry to adjust to this development by developing 
new strategies and, for example, differentiating the range of their products aimed at 
receiving the GSL and P status. It is also in line with the ongoing self-medication 
trend and the increased expectation of Member States that citizens inevitably will 
have to bear a larger part of their health care costs.  
Advertising 
The harmonizing effect of the centralized European market authorization and classi-
fication decision will turn advertising into a Euro-dominated field, with a European 
monitoring and penalty system under the auspices of the EMEA. Moreover, more 
therapeutic groups will be open for direct consumer advertising, also as a result of an 
expanding non-prescription market and the deregulation of pharmaceuticals to P 
and GSL categories. Hence, more pharmaceuticals will exist for which direct consum-
er advertising is allowed and will possibly result in higher advertising expenditures. 
However, the convergence trend that is even more rapid than under the Expert Sce-
nario across Member States will make it easier to instigate larger pan-European mar-
keting campaigns which should enable efficiency gains for the marketing of pharma-
ceuticals that sometimes exceed the R&D budget (OECD 2008).  
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Pricing, reimbursement, post-licensing evaluation and prescribing 
The European Scenario foresees increasingly converging national markets with a lim-
ited number of reimbursed pharmaceuticals that go through a Europe-wide post-
licensing evaluation. This national practice results in emerging and eventually fully 
European markets for non-reimbursed, generic and innovative medicines. This im-
plies that it will mainly get more difficult for the innovative industry to win back their 
increasingly expensive investments in R&D, especially when a new pharmaceutical 
has no proven extra clinical or administering benefit. It may become more lucrative 
to focus on OTCs with blockbuster potential or specific groups of lifestyle drugs. It 
will force the pharmaceutical industry to abolish their market launching strategies 
(e.g. which Member State first?) as these strategies will effectively become useless in 
a SEM with centralized reimbursement decisions where there are few possibilities 
left to manipulate and influence the prices. A further relocation in search of produc-
tivity and efficiency gains to emerging economies (e.g. new accession countries, Asia) 
or more lucrative markets (e.g. USA) as a locus of research and operating activities, 
becomes an attractive alternative. Also, larger marketing expenditures and increased 
financing of (well-disposed) clinical trials will seek to influence government and pub-
lic opinion. 
The European generic industry will face threats and opportunities in the emerging 
generic market. On the one hand, through favourable national policies, the degree of 
generic penetration is expected to rise and the market they serve will be extended to 
all Member States. On the other hand, fiercely competitive foreign manufactures will 
also attempt to attain a slice of the huge European market and prices will be driven 
down. The increasing competitive pressure will result in winners and losers (i.e. mer-
gers and acquisitions) and an accelerated consolidation trend will become visible.   
7.3.2 Wholesalers  
For European wholesalers, the current trends of consolidation and integration will be 
reinforced by increased harmonization in national pharmaceutical policies, liberaliza-
tion of pharmaceutical markets, increased competitive pressure and eventually the 
emergence of a SEM for medicines. These results are similar to the results of the 
Expert Scenario. The areas in which European wholesalers can cooperate increase 
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with every development that harmonizes the national situations. For example, 
wholesalers can be expected to collaborate in the purchasing (stronger negotiating 
position) and distribution of pharmaceuticals. This leads to a strategic relocation 
from the national market to the European market.   
Furthermore, EU law will gradually open up the wholesaling markets and limit gov-
ernment barriers concerning market-entry. This will add to the development of spe-
cialized wholesalers that carry a limited range of products at very competitive prices 
(Taylor et al. 2004a), which as of yet are not legally permitted in every Member 
State. The specialized wholesalers will be initially active in the markets that gradually 
turn European, first the OTC and generic markets and later the entire pharmaceutical 
market including POMs. This will have a levelling effect on pan-European drug prices. 
Parallel trading is expected to become a widespread practice, playing a catalysing 
role in the harmonization of pharmaceutical price levels through competitive pres-
sure, as observed in some studies (West and Mahon 2003; Enemark et al. 2006). This 
development contributes to the removal of European price differentials.  
Furthermore, more market liberalization will make vertically integrated combina-
tions in the pharmaceutical value chain (i.e. combinations between pharmaceutical 
industry, wholesalers and pharmacies) a widespread European phenomenon. The 
strong consolidation trend has a levelling effect on the huge differences between 
wholesalers per capita in the various Member States. This will result in oligopolistic 
market structures in most Member States by 2015.  
7.3.3 Pharmacies 
As previously observed under the Expert Scenario, the future of the European phar-
macies is strongly related to future developments in the European wholesaling sec-
tor. Pharmacies basically undergo the same trends. The EU will push through its 
market liberalization agenda, helped by litigating (foreign) pharmacy chains in search 
of market share. This eventually deregulates market-entry regulation, enables other 
forms of ownership and makes new combinations in the pharmaceutical value chain 
possible. What emerges is a more harmonized European pharmacy environment 
characterized by gradually abolished state monopolies (where present), international 
consolidation, market entry and ownership by foreign pharmacy chains. There is no 
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conflict between EU-initiated market liberalization with national agendas since 
cheaper pharmaceuticals achieved through lower profit margins for pharmacists is 
perfectly in line with national health (care) policy. This harmonizing effect also com-
bats the huge national differences in pharmacies per capita as it leads to a strong 
consolidation trend mainly through chaining. Chaining will give pharmacies a better 
negotiation position in their dealings with suppliers. Chaining first takes places within 
national boundaries and European chains will be established. Convergence will occur 
faster than under the Expert Scenario when national situations converge.  
As described under the Expert Scenario, internet pharmacies have the catalysing 
potential to affect the occurrence of European pharmacies and overall European 
prices. Pharmacies have to compete with foreign pharmacies for market share, 
which is possible as a result of a harmonized market. However, in the beginning this 
mainly applies to the non-reimbursed prescription pharmaceuticals (i.e. pharmaceu-
ticals for which patients are financial responsible), such as OTCs and costly non-
reimbursed pharmaceuticals like anti-malaria prophylaxis. Patient and consumer 
groups may make this opportunity visible to the public. The competitive pressure 
internet pharmacies impose on traditional pharmacies can result in lower national 
prices and internet pharmacies from cheaper countries can create a levelling effect 
on European price differentials in the long term. 
However, when the harmonization of the pharmaceutical market advances and 
when payers have more influence on their products and the development of phar-
maceutical policies, payers will encourage or obligate patients to get their POMs at 
selected, possibly foreign or self-owned internet pharmacies. Taking over or opening 
up (internet-) pharmacies seems a logical step in building up the necessary expertise.  
When pharmaceuticals become regulated at the European level by 2025, regulation 
will be put in place stemming from former national policies that regulate the nation-
al provision of medicines. This will include a regulation that safeguards the public 
function of pharmacies (i.e. ensuring a minimum per million inhabitants or area).  
Lastly, these developments have huge consequences for the responsibilities of 
pharmacists. Through the deregulation of medicines and the emergence of internet 
pharmacies, personal advice on pharmaceuticals, one of the traditional roles of the 
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pharmacist, will be increasingly taken away and put in the hands of the patients. Fur-
thermore, many future pharmacists will be employed instead of owning their own 
pharmacies. On the other hand, they will increasingly obtain the legal instruments 
and responsibility to correct inaccurate prescriptions and substitute cheaper generic 
equivalents. 
7.3.4 Demand side (medical care triad) 
The demand side of the European pharmaceutical market will undergo markedly 
different developments compared to the Expert Scenario. Empowered patient 
groups reap the benefits of favourable case law, which eventually results in a Euro-
pean health care market and a true SEM for pharmaceuticals. This precipitates the 
emergence of a European basic health care catalogue and later a European health 
insurance market for patients, in which combinations of consolidated European 
health insurer offer insurance policies to all European citizens. 
Prescribers 
As in the Expert Scenario, the freedom of doctors to issue prescriptions will be re-
stricted and a loss of trust is observed. This results in a difficult work environment for 
medical professionals. The Expert Scenario also discussed the various ways Member 
States design their policies. Those cost-containment policies aimed at the prescribing 
habits of doctors will be increasingly adopted by less developed Member States 
when their rapidly developing health care systems reach the EU15 level in terms of 
quality, quantity and funding of services.  
This may jeopardize the autonomy and reputation of the medical profession. It will 
be in their interest to construct cost-containment policies and alter the outcomes of 
these policies to the best of their ability. Therefore, since the European health care 
market will gradually become European, doctors will have to organize themselves 
better, which shall lead to more European collaboration of European professional 
medical organizations looking to safeguard their autonomy in prescribing what they 
deem suitable for the patients.     
Patient/consumer  
Empowered patients and better organized patient organization play a pioneering 
and crucial role in the development and realization of the European Scenario and the 
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emergence of a European health care market, which is described in more detail un-
der the European Scenario in Chapter 6. European patients and their organizations 
are an integral part of the European Scenario as it is they who interfere with the ef-
forts of Member States to maintain the competence in their respective health care 
systems, show a spike in pan-European patient mobility and challenge refusals for 
reimbursement at home for services incurred abroad using favourable case law and 
harmonized European pharmaceutical markets to their advantage. Furthermore, it is 
the patients that speed up the establishment of a European health system when 
they progressively use (possibly foreign) internet pharmacies to purchase pharma-
ceuticals, initially non-prescription medicines and gradually more POMs.  
Funding will be of key importance in establishing a European partner that can partic-
ipate independently and on eye-level in the decision-making process on health mat-
ters in the European Union. In the European Scenario, this funding mainly stems 
from the EU and national governments, which aspire to cut the increasingly observed 
partnership between patients and the pharmaceutical industry. This will allow pa-
tient groups in taking up a pro-active role in the establishment of a standardized Eu-
ropean certifying system for health information web sites of good quality, which 
takes place within the frameworks of the G10 Medicines Group plan concerning in-
formation to patients, the EU’s e-Health action plan (2004) and the 2006 MedIEQ 
(Quality Labelling of Medical Web Content Using Multilingual Information Extraction) 
project. 
The need for thorough and accurate information on the product and its appropriate 
use is strongly related to another challenge the European patient groups will face, 
namely the increased responsibility patients will receive in paying for their own med-
icines, also facilitated by the flexible classification of medicines. This development 
can have negative effects on the equity of access and will thus deserve the full atten-
tion of European patient groups. 
The emergence of a SEM for medicines influences price levels throughout the EU. 
Countries with low pharmaceutical prices that were formerly basically subsidized by 
countries with higher pharmaceutical prices (where industry made the larger share 
of its profits) are likely to see higher prices as new harmonized prices come into 
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force. This could have consequences for the equity and access to medicines provided 
that economic and purchasing power differentials are still present throughout Mem-
ber States. 
Payers 
The payer has many faces in the European pharmaceutical market. It can be a sick-
ness fund, private insurer or an integrated part of a NHS; it can have public or private 
features and it can reimburse the patient or the provider. In the next twenty years, 
convergence will not occur to the same extent as other actors in the pharmaceutical 
market because of the national health care structure and regulation in which they 
operate. However, in most Member States there is a visible trend towards containing 
costs through health insurance reform in which health insurers receive more instru-
ments for cost control, often through the introduction of some degree of managed 
competition, such as in Switzerland, the Netherlands and Germany.  
In the European Scenario, payers are expected to develop more and more into Euro-
pean players in order to facilitate the European market when the basic European 
benefit catalogue is in full effect. When patients observe that foreign health insurers 
offer cheaper policies covering the basic European health catalogue, they will once 
again insist on their right to the free movement of services and take out insurance 
from that foreign insurer. This of course poses a large threat to where health insur-
ers and health care providers purchase their care. It is, therefore, likely that insurers 
will increasingly be more cost-aware in anticipation of the European health market, 
which is also in line with national cost-containment policy. Hence, sickness funds 
and/or private insurers will campaign to get more instruments to influence the ex-
penditures in their health care systems, for example, through more selective con-
tracting with health care providers (already a widespread practice) and by being di-
rectly responsible for the purchase of pharmaceuticals, thus influencing pharmaceu-
tical prices. This will take place in anticipation of the single European market for 
health insurance that will gradually emerge, in which the insurers are subjected to 
strong foreign competition and are increasingly expected to behave as market play-
ers. In this European health market, the European Union acts more as a facilitator 
that sets the rules concerning the benefit baskets, quality of care, patient rights and 
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accessibility than as an actively-controlling and managing institution. It may then 
turn out that this is easiest to regulate under a private set-up, which could lead to a 
privatization of the European health sector. After that, the European consolidation 
trend, as mainly seen in the supply side of the pharmaceutical market, will become 
commonplace among health insurers.  
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Discussion 
 
Methodological discussion 
To ensure the scenarios were as strong as possible and to enhance the validity and 
reliability of these scenarios, a structured approach was chosen consisting of several 
fundamental components, following the methodology of the WHO-commissioned 
handbook “Health Futures” (Garret 1999). This approach is described in more detail 
in the introduction of this thesis. In addition, the input of multiple European experts 
was incorporated through the use of the Delphi technique. Although groups are gen-
erally more accurate than individual experts, group processes can often lead to 
suboptimal judgements (Rowe and Wright 2001). Rowe and Wright (2001), there-
fore, defined several principles for using expert opinion in forecasting, which have 
implications for the selection of experts. The specific principles applying to expert 
selection are (1) use experts with appropriate domain knowledge, (2) use heteroge-
neous experts and (3) use between five to 20 experts. The former two were achieved 
by selecting the experts with the right (publishing) track record and by including ex-
pert questions in the survey to filter out those who, in fact, lack the necessary exper-
tise. Even though academics constituted the largest group of addressees and re-
spondents (14 out of 27 in the second round), this group is highly heterogeneous in 
terms of background (e.g. law, economics and public health) and expertise (e.g. vary-
ing from pricing/reimbursement to authorization). Other additional categories of 
experts included members of the pharmaceutical industry (five out of 27 in the se-
cond round), national government regulators (two out of 27 in the second round) 
and an “other” category (e.g. consultants, NGOs – four out of 27). This research con-
sulted more than 20 experts. According to research (cf. Armstrong 1985), accuracy 
ceases to improve by higher numbers. However, this number will depend on the 
number of experts available but also on the nature and quality of the feedback pro-
vided (more in-depth feedback may suggest a smaller panel). One of the key aims of 
this Delphi application, which was set up to cover a very wide range of issues on dif-
ferent levels under very divergent spheres of influence, was to receive a high num-
ber of respondents. The varying estimations of the “today” scenario (2006) seem to 
  173 
underscore the difficulty in providing answers and justifies the consultation of a large 
number of experts. Maybe the relatively high percentage (34%) of respondents that 
bowed out after the first round provides further evidence of this assumption. The 
argument that a high number of participants may decrease the effectiveness of pro-
cessing the information and giving feedback does not apply here since feedback only 
consisted of the aggregated scores (i.e. no text), which had no influence on the feed-
back load. Furthermore, although 27 respondents participated in the second round, 
the respondent sample varied from 23 to 25 participants per issue (e.g. authoriza-
tion, pricing), which is fairly close to the optimal 20 participants. Lastly, the chosen 
Delphi application was tested in a preliminary test round and described in detail in 
Chapter 5. The application can be repeated, albeit with possibly different respond-
ents and a later timeframe (i.e. 2006 would clearly not represent the “today” scenar-
io). 
It is advisable to be cautious when filling in scenarios and to be very aware of their 
methodological shortcomings. A clear methodological limitation of a Delphi study is 
the difficulty to repeat and duplicate this study with the same experts and the same 
timeframe, both which negatively affect its reliability. Research has shown, however, 
that that a degree of reliability is possible using the technique, such was found in the 
research of Felsenthal and Fuchs (1976), Dagenais (1978) and Kastein et al. (1993). 
The validity of a Delphi study depends on the quality of its design as much as on the 
nature of its panellists (Rowe and Wright 1999). The Delphi scenario is the main 
methodology when assessing possible futures and, therefore, the main instrument to 
make prospective policies. The uncertainty and complexity surrounding the course of 
European health policy warrants a scenario study (also see Chapter 5 for more in-
formation on the choice and conduct of the Delphi technique in this thesis).  
The interpretations of the data generated by the Delphi questionnaire,  which came 
in the form of numbers on a five-point Likert scale, was done using the knowledge 
and findings of an extensive review of European and national policies put in their 
historical perspectives. Both this review and the Delphi information fed into the con-
struction of these scenarios (also see Figure 1). In the analysis, the impact of these 
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scenarios was compared to the observed trends from the literature review with re-
gard to the actors in the pharmaceutical (described in Chapters 1 and 2). 
Discussion of outcomes 
The impact of the three scenarios constructed in the previous chapters led to a cou-
ple of obvious questions. First of all, how likely are these scenarios to unfold as de-
scribed in Chapter 6? The experts showed convergence with regard to most regula-
tory issues as surveyed in the Delphi. They also fit the current set of trends, showing 
one exception for the issue of post-licensing-evaluation. To realize alternative sce-
narios to this baseline scenario, the Expert Scenario was contrasted with a more pes-
simistic and a more optimistic scenario. Compared to the Expert Scenario, the Euro-
pean Crisis Scenario is a far bolder scenario, in which potentially far-fetched assump-
tions (e.g. a constitutional crisis and a pharmaceutical disaster) leads to an unlikely 
but not impossible scenario. It is worth noting that it was a pharmaceutical disaster 
(thalidomide) that spurred the first supranational involvement with pharmaceuticals 
in the European Community. Why could the same thing not happen in the opposite 
direction, i.e. starting from a relatively advanced European framework? The Europe-
an Community has also changed since its foundation in 1957, particularly with re-
spect to its size, as it now encompasses 27 Member States. Maybe supranational 
legislation is no longer the appropriate level to regulate issues in such a huge market. 
The European Scenario may not be as far-off as the European Crisis Scenario. Its de-
velopment mainly takes place along the lines of the Expert Scenario, but at a much 
faster  pace, assisted by a Europe-positive climate. It is worth looking at this scenario 
because certain aspects (e.g. the strong pro-active role of the consumers leading to 
an increasing European nature of health markets) may very well take place and 
could, therefore, provide leads for a possible future (albeit maybe not in 20 years 
from now). The review of Part I of this thesis made clear that major change is possi-
ble on the longer term. Similarly, in 1965 it may have sounded very improbable that 
there would be European authorization procedures only 30 years (1995) down the 
road.  
The next question that arises is what are the main lessons to be learned from these 
scenarios, particularly the Expert Scenario? When looking at the scenarios, a couple 
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of things become clear. The supply side of the European pharmaceutical market will 
likely see a consolidation trend that trickles down the value chain and markets will 
increasingly be harmonized through EU legislation.  
Despite European efforts to make the pharmaceutical industry more competitive, 
the current problems facing the innovative industry may not alter much in the fu-
ture. In none of the scenarios it seems likely that there will be much change with 
regard to less restrictive pricing and reimbursement decisions in the richer countries 
of the EU (i.e. fewer opportunities to retrieve investments). The expectation that 
post-licensing evaluation will become widely used also through more European col-
laboration of national competent authorities (e.g. NICE, IQWiG and Commission de 
Transparence) will unsettle the European innovative industry, to say the least. On 
the other hand, the sheer size of the European market, combined with increasingly 
European authorization and classification decisions making way for synergy effects 
regarding marketing and market launching, will make the EU a progressively indis-
pensable market for the innovative industry. If the EU seeks to foster the science 
base that the pharmaceutical innovative industry provides, it will have to come up 
with innovative policies and incentives (e.g. for science in general, framework pro-
grammes) in coordination with Member States that can compensate for the less reg-
ulated pharmaceutical markets, the US in particular and the cheaper labour of 
emerging markets. This may require more than the proposed policies. For the gener-
ic industry, the outlook may be more positive. They will not suffer as much as the 
innovative industry in bringing their products to the market. They will be helped by 
favourable generic policies, growing generic markets, especially the potential of im-
mature generic markets and will profit from faster market access through Bolar pro-
visions. On the other hand, competition is likely to increase as a result of increasing 
foreign competitive pressure, leading to more (international) consolidation. The ge-
neric market may see a strategic shift from the national market to the European 
market. Only under the European Crisis Scenario may this development be impeded 
to a certain extent. However, the EU goal of a competitive generic market with freer 
pricing seems a realistic aim for the future (as opposed to the market for POMs). 
Highly innovative NBFs have a vested interest in the continuous development of a 
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European market but are faced with the same competitiveness problems as the in-
novative industry. The loss of the (obligatory) centralized procedure under the Euro-
pean Crisis Scenario would effectively obstruct market access to (mainly smaller, less 
attractive) European countries as they are small in size and do not always possess 
the means to file a (national) authorization procedure, for which they often seek a 
multinational partner. For them to survive, that is avoiding takeovers, a large Euro-
pean market with centralized procedures is vital. However, biotech products are also 
subjected to increasingly restrictive reimbursement decisions, which are increasingly 
based on cost-effectiveness studies. This makes them especially vulnerable consider-
ing their high R&D costs. 
 The European wholesaling sector is expected to see an international consolidation 
trend, both vertically and horizontally and increased foreign competition. This im-
plies that wholesalers not only purchase and distribute within national boundaries, 
but increasingly engage in cross-border purchasing and distribution. Hence, what 
before was known as parallel trade, will become well-established through favourable 
law and converging pharmaceutical retail markets. The wholesaling sector is well-
advised to keep carving out their niche by differentiating their range of services (e.g. 
logistics) and search for partners, as pharmaceutical companies will increasingly seek 
to self-distribute their products in the hope of increasing efficiency. Another coping 
strategy is specialization on a limited range of products at competitive prices. It is 
likely that EU market liberalization will increasingly enable this practice. Only under 
the European Crisis Scenario are they able to retain their leading national position 
mostly owing to the more divergent national regulation and product range requiring 
national distribution channels.  
Pharmacies will be faced with many challenges in the next twenty years leading to a 
completely different sector. They are increasingly the subject of European (market 
liberalization) and national attention (huge profits, i.e. large cost-containment po-
tential) and it seems likely that their golden days will gradually come to an end on 
the assumption that the European Crisis Scenario does not materialize. As of yet the 
pharmacy market is one of the most regulated sectors in Europe, leaving enormous 
potential for EU market liberalization, also provided that (possibly foreign) newcom-
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ers litigate. The result will be different sorts of ownership (e.g. insurer-owned, non 
pharmacist-owned), new vertical combinations, chaining of pharmacies, abolishment 
of state monopolies and the emergence of internet pharmacies. The emergence of 
DocMorris in the German pharmacy sector could well be exemplary for many na-
tional pharmacy sectors across Europe of what they will have to cope with in the 
future. The increasingly harmonized range of products on sale in Europe will pro-
gressively enable cross-border pharmacy services, especially when mutual recogni-
tion of prescriptions becomes a fact. Internet pharmacies also pose challenges to 
legislators and policy makers as counterfeit drugs coming from rogue websites make 
their way into the distribution channel. The European Commission may use this ex-
ample as an increased need for a SEM for medicines, as this would make pharma-
covigilance more efficient. The Member States, on the other hand, will retain strong 
remit over pharmacy services concerning the way reimbursed medicines are dis-
pensed (e.g. generic substitution). But one can also think of new incentives and 
measures to make cheaper pharmaceuticals attractive to consumers and to give 
payers the instruments and thus a financial stake in cheaper pharmaceuticals, in or-
der to avoid profits from cheaper pharmaceuticals remaining in the distribution 
chain. This could be arranged, for example, through insurance policies that give dis-
counts when cheaper pharmaceuticals (e.g. generic/parallel import) are used or 
through enabling insurers to purchase their own pharmaceuticals and operating their 
own pharmacies. 
The demand side of the European pharmaceutical market still shows huge differ-
ences between Member States when compared to the supply side. It will largely re-
main within the national competence, especially where it concerns reimbursed 
pharmaceuticals. This implies a continuation of observed trends.  
The prescribers of pharmaceuticals will be under growing pressure to prescribe ra-
tionally and their freedom to prescribe as they see fit may be increasingly challenged 
through guidelines, electronic formularies and prescribing data. Although significant 
differences exist between Member States in consumption patterns, roughly along 
the lines north-south and east-west, it is likely that these will cease to exist over time 
when new accession countries develop towards EU15 average and when high con-
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sumption countries realize the cost-containment potential of rational prescribing. 
Furthermore, the observed loss of trust in the patient-prescriber relationship is not 
likely to abate. Information is readily available on the internet and will only increase, 
unfortunately also from dubious sources. The strongly organized prescribers are also 
well advised to organize at a European level, as their counterparts from other Mem-
ber States see the same challenges regarding freedom to prescribe. Looking at the 
impact of the other scenarios, the European Scenario only reinforces the necessity to 
organize at the European level, while under a European Crisis Scenario the need may 
be less essential or obvious. 
The various patients groups should bolster their organizations, not only nationally 
but also on a European level, in order to participate more efficiently in the current 
European-level discussions that may have far-reaching consequences for them. This 
will also help to counter the strong information asymmetry, especially now as supply 
side actors become larger and larger and European affairs increasingly become im-
portant to the organization and delivery of health care services. Only then can they 
fully reap the possibilities with which they are provided by an increasingly European 
market. First, patients should demand health information websites of good quality. 
Especially since it is likely that patients have more choices to make and will be in-
creasingly subjected to marketing efforts by the industry, often from dubious 
sources with an unclear distinction between patient information and advertising. 
They should play a leading role and be in dialogue with relevant European and na-
tional policy makers in the establishment of a European certification system, which is 
possible within current initiatives and frameworks. Second, the increased expecta-
tions by national governments that patients bear an increasing part of the costs, es-
pecially as treatments are more expensive and health expenditures are rising, stress-
es the need for patient organizations that monitor developments regarding quality 
and equity of access and intervene in the public debate when needed at the highest 
level. It may be interesting to have a more thorough look at the European Scenario 
as this scenario deals with consumers playing a more proactive role. There seems to 
be the potential to obtain cheaper pharmaceuticals and those that cannot be reim-
bursed in the home state through the cross-border delivery of pharmaceuticals. Pa-
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tient groups should look into these opportunities and signal them to their members. 
They could play a pioneering role, also through litigation and articulation of these 
options and force clarity in these frameworks. Whether this would lead to the emer-
gence of a European health system with a European benefit basket, as described in 
more detail in the European Scenario, depends on many factors. However, there are 
conceivable developments that could make this an inescapable solution.    
This consideration automatically leads us to the role of the payer of pharmaceutical 
products. In the Expert Scenario and the European Crisis Scenario, the impact of the-
se scenarios on the payers is negligible. Payers will develop in ways decided at a na-
tional level. Their development is likely to contain already visible national trends to 
bring some form of managed competition in the insurance market and, therefore, 
the instruments that go along with it, such as selective contracting, more financial 
responsibility and competition for customers. Under most current frameworks the 
insurer has scant influence on the containment of pharmaceutical prices as they just 
pay what is prescribed. This could be solved by some of these innovative policies. It is 
probable that in the future, payers in Europe will become more powerful players 
instead of merely administrative payers of services as still visible in many countries 
today. In addition, would the European Scenario materialize, pharmaceuticals would 
play a pioneering and catalysing role in the emergence of a European health market 
and, possibly later, a European health insurance market in which international insur-
ers offer health insurance policies for a European basic health basket. This could also 
provoke an international consolidation trend between health insurers.  
What does all this imply for the Member States? Should they fear the continuous 
Europeanization of the European pharmaceutical market? Although the European 
pharmaceutical framework in the Expert Scenario will turn European with regard to 
authorization, classification (although nationally implemented) and wholesaling, for 
example, the Member States will fully retain the regulatory overhand on vital deci-
sions in their respective health systems. This is especially visible with regard to pric-
ing and reimbursement, as overwhelmingly expected by the experts. However, all 
national legislation that interferes with non-reimbursed medicines is likely to under-
go intensified European scrutiny. Furthermore, the regulatory framework for the 
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pharmacy and wholesaling sector is expected to be liberalized over the next twenty 
years. Therefore, Member States should assess their regulatory frameworks to bring 
it more in line with European competition law and the Four Freedoms sooner rather 
than later. The expectation that in addition to the non-reimbursed (e.g. OTCs) mar-
kets also the generic market will increasingly be liberated should motivate Member 
States to assess their pricing policies in order to facilitate a competitive generic mar-
ket with free pricing. This basically also fits the national cost-containment agenda. In 
short, in the Expert Scenario it seems that all vital decision (e.g. pricing, reimburse-
ment and classification decisions) regarding the publicly covered part of the system 
are safeguarded. The expectation of the experts that national competent post-
licensing evaluation authorities will be increasingly regulated on a European level 
does not have to imply that this takes away the national competence to make their 
own decisions. Anyway, it makes sense for Member States to support this collabora-
tion (as supported by current EU policy) because it will help them carrying out this 
task more efficiently, especially small Member States that lack funds to justify such 
an agency. If the European Scenario materializes and a European health system de-
velops as a result of external factors from outside the sphere of influence of Member 
States, Member States could be forced into a European collaboration on a basic ben-
efit basket. This could be the start of a pan-European health insurance policy that 
could still leave room for national divergence through additional national catalogues, 
tailored to national needs relating to economic and cultural factors. Instead of cate-
gorically refusing the idea, it may be better to study it in order to be prepared.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Delphi pre-test 
From: Ewout van Ginneken 
Subject: TU Berlin Dep. of Health Care Management - (short!) Delphi pretest - please 
reply before JAN 11 
                                                                   
 
Delphi questionnaire ‘European pharmaceutical policy’ 
NOTE: this Delphi round is a preliminary test round, to see whether the questionnaire is 
clear and understandable. Therefore, your feedback is more than welcome and can be given 
in the comments section at the end of this questionnaire. When results are satisfactory, they 
will be used and you will be approached again in the second round. When major changes in 
the questionnaire will be necessary, you will be approached anew. Your cooperation is highly 
appreciated and should not take more than a couple of minutes. Feel free to forward. 
Thanks!!  
  
PLEASE REPLY BEFORE JANUARY 12 
  
1 Introduction 
  
This Delphi questionnaire is part of a research project on the future of the European phar-
maceutical market. The Delphi technique is a procedure aimed at obtaining a reliable con-
sensus of opinion from a group of experts through a series of questionnaires interspersed 
with controlled feedback (Garret, 1999). Aim of this Delphi questionnaire is to reach consen-
sus among a group of selected experts on whether regulation in the European pharmaceuti-
cals market will take a predominantly European or national course in the next twenty years. 
In order to achieve this, the questionnaire will be send to the experts several times, each 
time adding the results of the previous round. The individual results will not be attributed to 
the expert by name, i.e. are anonymous.  
 The survey starts off with questions about your category and expertise before going over to 
the actual Delphi part of the questionnaire. You can fill out the questionnaire in this docu-
ment by replying to this message and by answering the questions in a new (‘reply’) mail. 
Make sure you send it to: praktikant@ww.tu-berlin.de. Feel free to forward this mail to your 
colleagues. As a beginning, two Delphi rounds are planned. Additional rounds can be sched-
uled later. Filling out the questionnaire –and possibly forwarding it– should not take more 
than a couple of minutes and would attribute greatly to this project. 
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 2 General questions  
  
Category of respondent 
Please check the category that describes you best (e.g. use ‘x’). 
Pharmaceutical Industry (innovative)   National government / regulator   
Pharmaceutical Industry (generic)   European Union   
Wholesaler   Academic  
Pharmacist   Consumer organization   
Insurer/payer (NHS, sickness funds)   Other (feel free to specify)   
  
Expertise 
Please answer using numbers 1 to 3. 
 1= fully 
2= average 
3= not at all 
1.  Would you consider yourself an expert in the field of European 
Pharmaceutical policy, both on the European and national level?  
 
2. Are you familiar with the current state of the European pharmaceuti-
cal market, including its actors and developments?  
 
3. Are you familiar with European Law in regard to European health 
care, in particular the European Commission’s public health competences (as 
laid down in e.g. article 152)?  
 
4. Are you familiar with European case law, especially Kohll/Decker, 
Smits-Geraets/Peerbooms and Vanbraekel and its possible consequences?  
 
  
  3 Delphi questionnaire 
Please fill out by using numbers 1 to 5 for each year and issue in the corresponding answer-
ing box. For category ‘today’ give your estimation on the current situation. For category 
‘opinion’, give your own opinion: what would be desirable? 
 Will the following issues predominantly be regulated and implemented at a European level 
or at a national level? 
1 = fully national  
2 = predominantly national   
3 = even or 50/50   
4 = predominantly European  
5 = fully European 
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    EXPECTATION   
Issue today 2010 2015 2025 opinion 
1. Market Authorization (Licensing)      
2. Pharmacovigilance (post marketing surveil-
lance) 
     
3. Classification: Rx (Prescription only), OTC       
4. Distribution (wholesaling)      
5. Advertising: e.g. direct-to-consumer adver-
tising 
     
6. Pricing: e.g. pricing and profit controls, 
reference pricing 
     
7. Dispensing (pharmacy level): e.g. generic 
substitution, remuneration 
     
8. Prescribing: e.g. prescribing guidelines, 
budgets 
     
9. Post-licensing evaluation (comparative 
benefit/ cost-effectiveness) 
     
10. Reimbursement: by public payers, i.e. 
scope of benefit catalogue (including posi-
tive/negative list) 
     
  
  
  
Comments (not requested):  
  
 
  
  
Thank you for your cooperation. 
  
Ewout van Ginneken, Reinhard Busse, Christian Gericke, Jonas Schreyögg 
Department of Health Care Management 
University of Technology Berlin 
praktikant@ww.tu-berlin.de 
http://mig.tu-berlin.de 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Delphi round 1  
 
From:  Dept. Health Care Management 
Subject:  TU Berlin / Prof. Busse - (short!!) Delphi questionnaire - please reply 
before FEB 28! 
                            
Delphi questionnaire ‘European pharmaceutical policy’ 
   
PLEASE REPLY BEFORE FEBRUARY 28 and PLEASE FORWARD / DISTRIB-
UTE  
  
1 Introduction 
 Aim of this Delphi questionnaire is to reach consensus among a group of selected experts on 
whether regulation in the European pharmaceuticals market will take a predominantly Eu-
ropean or national course in the next twenty years. The questionnaire will be send several 
times, each time adding the results of the previous round. The individual results will not be 
attributed to the expert by name, i.e. are anonymous. You can fill out the questionnaire in 
this document by replying to this message and by answering the questions in a new (‘reply’) 
mail. Make sure you send it to: praktikant@ww.tu-berlin.de. Please forward this mail to your 
colleagues and other contacts. Two Delphi rounds are planned (second round planned for 
early March). Filling out -and forwarding- the questionnaire should not take more than a 
couple of minutes and would contribute greatly to this project. Thanks for your help! 
   
2 Category  
 Category of respondent 
Please check the category that describes you best (e.g. use ‘x’). 
  
Pharmaceutical Industry (R&D)  National government / regulator   
Pharmaceutical Industry (generic)   European Union   
Wholesaler   Academic   
Pharmacist   Consumer organization   
Insurer/payer (NHS, sickness funds)   Other (feel free to specify)   
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3 Delphi questionnaire 
Please fill out by using numbers 1 to 5 for each year and issue in the corresponding answer-
ing box. For category ‘today’, give your estimation on the current situation. For categories 
‘2010’, ‘2015’ and ‘2025’, give your future expectation for these respective years. For cate-
gory ‘opinion’, give your own opinion: what would be desirable (also 1 to 5)? 
 Will the following issues predominantly be regulated and implemented at a European level 
or at a national level? 
1 = fully national  
2 = predominantly national   
3 = even or 50/50   
4 = predominantly European  
5 = fully European 
  
    EXPECTATION   
Issue today 2010 2015 2025 opinion 
1. Market Authorization (Licensing)      
2. Pharmacovigilance (post marketing surveil-
lance) 
     
3. Classification: Rx (Prescription only), OTC       
4. Distribution (wholesaling)      
5. Advertising: e.g. direct-to-consumer adver-
tising 
     
6. Pricing: e.g. pricing and profit controls, 
reference pricing 
     
7. Dispensing (pharmacy level): e.g. generic 
substitution, remuneration 
     
8. Prescribing: e.g. prescribing guidelines, 
budgets 
     
9. Post-licensing evaluation (comparative 
benefit/ cost-effectiveness) 
     
10. Reimbursement: by public payers, i.e. 
scope of benefit catalogue (including posi-
tive/negative list) 
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4 Expertise  
 In order to possibly weigh the results, please answer these questions about your expertise, 
using numbers 1 to 3. 
1= fully 
2= average 
3= not at all 
1.  Would you consider yourself an expert in the field of European 
pharmaceutical policy, both on the European and national level?  
 
2. Are you familiar with the current state of the European pharmaceuti-
cal market, including its actors and recent developments?  
 
3. Are you familiar with European Law with regard to European health 
care, in particular the European Commission's public health competences (as 
laid down in e.g. article 152)?  
 
4. Are you familiar with European case law, especially Kohll/Decker, 
Smits-Geraets/Peerbooms and Vanbraekel and its possible consequences?  
 
  
Comments (not requested):  
  
  
  
Thank you for your cooperation. 
  
Ewout van Ginneken, Reinhard Busse, Christian Gericke, Jonas Schreyögg 
Department of Health care Management 
WHO Collaborating Centre for Health Systems Research and Management 
Berlin University of Technology 
praktikant@ww.tu-berlin.de 
http://mig.tu-berlin.de 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Delphi round 2 
 
From:  Dept. Health Care Management 
Subject:  TU Berlin / Prof. Busse - ROUND II Delphi questionnaire - please reply 
before APRIL 21 
                                 
Delphi questionnaire ‘European pharmaceutical policy’ ROUND II 
  
  
 PLEASE REPLY BEFORE APRIL 21   
 
1 Introduction 
 Thank you very much for your participation in the first round. Now we would like to ask for 
your opinion in this second round. Aim of this Delphi questionnaire is to reach consensus 
among a group of selected experts on whether regulation in the European pharmaceuticals 
market will take a predominantly European or national course in the next twenty years. In 
this second round questionnaire, the results of the first round are added. The individual re-
sults will not be attributed to the expert by name, i.e. are anonymous. You can fill out the 
questionnaire in this document by replying to this message and by answering the questions 
in a new (‘reply’) mail. If that does not work, please use the attachment. Make sure you send 
it to: praktikant@ww.tu-berlin.de. Filling out the questionnaire should not take more than a 
couple of minutes and would contribute greatly to this project. In this second round, you 
only have to fill out part 3 of the questionnaire. Thanks again for your help! 
  
2 Category  
 Category of respondents 
Results first round after selection (no need to answer) n=41 
Pharmaceutical Industry (R&D) 7 National government / regulator 3 
Pharmaceutical Industry (generic)   European Union 1 
Wholesaler 1 Academic 20 
Pharmacist   Consumer organization   
Insurer/payer (NHS, sickness funds) 1 Other (feel free to specify) 8 
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3 Delphi questionnaire 
  
Please fill out after taking notice of the results of the first round by using numbers 1 to 5 for 
each category and issue in the corresponding (grey) answering box. You can find the results 
(1 to 5) of the first round (in %) and number of respondents (n) for each answering category 
and issue under Rnd1 (%). For category ‘today’, give your estimation on the current situa-
tion. For categories ‘2010’, ‘2015’ and ‘2025’, give your future expectation for these respec-
tive years. For category ‘opinion’, we ask again to give your own opinion: what would be 
desirable (also 1 to 5)? You only have to fill out the grey boxes! 
Will the following issues predominantly be regulated and implemented at a European level 
or at a national level? 
1 = fully national  
2 = predominantly national   
3 = even or 50/50   
4 = predominantly European  
5 = fully European 
 
  
    EXPECTATION   
Issue Today 2010        2015        2025            Opinion     
Rnd1 
(%) 
Rnd2 Rnd1 
(%) 
Rnd2 Rnd1 
(%) 
Rnd2 Rnd1 
(%) 
Rnd2 Rnd1 
(%) 
Rnd2 
1. Market Author-
ization (Licensing) 
1: 08  1:  1:  1:  1:  
2: 23 2: 10 2: 2: 2: 
3: 45 3: 45 3: 20 3: 05 3: 09 
4: 25 4: 38 4: 50 4: 45 4: 25 
5:  5: 08 5: 30 5: 50 5: 66 
n=40 n=40 n=40 n=40 n=32 
2. Pharmaco-
vigilance (post 
marketing surveil-
lance) 
1: 18  1: 08  1: 05  1: 05  1:  
2: 49 2: 15 2: 05 2: 03 2: 06 
3: 28 3: 51 3: 33 3: 23 3: 22 
4: 05 4: 23 4: 44 4: 44 4: 25 
5: 5: 03 5: 13 5: 26 5: 47 
n=39 n=39 n=39 n=39 n=32 
3. Classification: 
Rx (Prescription 
only), OTC  
1: 38  1: 18  1: 08  1: 03  1: 10  
2: 38 2: 38 2: 21 2: 21 2: 13 
3: 15 3: 23 3: 31 3: 23 3: 10 
4: 05 4: 15 4: 26 4: 28 4: 32 
5: 03 5: 05 5: 15 5: 26 5: 34 
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n=39 n=39 n=39 n=39 n=31 
4. Distribution 
(wholesaling) 
1: 41  1: 15  1: 03  1: 03  1: 03  
2: 46 2: 38 2: 36 2: 26 2: 19 
3: 08 3: 33 3: 33 3: 31 3: 35 
4: 05 4: 13 4: 26 4: 26 4: 23 
5:  5:  5: 03 5: 15 5: 19 
n=39 n=39 n=39 n=39 n=31 
5. Advertising: 
e.g. direct-to-
consumer adver-
tising 
1: 41  1: 16  1: 05  1: 03  1: 13  
2: 19 2: 34 2: 18 2: 16 2: 17 
3: 14 3: 18 3: 29 3: 24 3: 23 
4: 22 4: 26 4: 26 4: 29 4: 13 
5: 03 5: 05 5: 21 5: 29 5: 33 
n=37 n=38 n=38 n=38 n=30 
6. Pricing: e.g. 
pricing and profit 
controls, refer-
ence pricing 
1: 80  1: 59  1: 34  1: 20  1: 26  
2: 15 2: 24 2: 37 2: 35 2: 16 
3: 05 3: 07 3: 12 3: 18 3: 23 
4:  4: 07 4: 12 4: 15 4: 13 
5:  5: 02 5: 05 5: 13 5: 23 
n=40 n=41 n=41 n=40 n=31 
7. Dispensing 
(pharmacy level): 
e.g. generic sub-
stitution, remu-
neration 
1: 85  1: 66  1: 44  1: 38  1: 42  
2: 10 2: 27 2: 34 2: 30 2: 26 
3: 05 3: 05 3: 17 3: 20 3: 13 
4:  4: 02 4: 02 4: 10 4: 10 
5:  5: 5: 02 5: 03 5: 10 
n=40 n=41 n=41 n=40 n=31 
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8. Prescribing: e.g. 
prescribing guide-
lines, budgets 
1: 90  1: 61  1: 41  1: 26  1: 29  
2: 10 2: 32 2: 34 2: 35 2: 23 
3:  3: 07 3: 20 3: 20 3: 23 
4:  4:  4: 05 4: 15 4: 16 
5:  5:  5:  5: 03 5: 10 
n=40 n=41 n=41 n=40 n=31 
9. Post-licensing 
evaluation (compar-
ative benefit/ cost-
effectiveness) 
1: 73  1: 34  1: 17  1: 10  1: 16  
2: 23 2: 41 2: 29 2: 25 2: 13 
3: 05 3: 22 3: 39 3: 33 3: 13 
4:  4: 02 4: 07 4: 25 4: 35 
5:  5:  5: 07 5: 08 5: 23 
n=40 n=41 n=41 n=40 n=31 
10. Reimbursement: 
by public payers, i.e. 
scope of benefit 
catalogue (including 
positive/negative 
list) 
1: 90  1: 70  1: 43  1: 28  1: 32  
2: 10 2: 20 2: 38 2: 45 2: 28 
3:  3: 10 3: 15 3: 13 3: 22 
4:  4:  4: 05 4: 15 4: 10 
5:  5:  5:  5:  5: 06 
n=40 n=40 n=40 n=40 n=31 
  
Comments (not requested):  
  
  
  
Thank you for your cooperation. 
  
Ewout van Ginneken; Prof. Dr. Reinhard Busse, Dr. Christian Gericke, Dr. Jonas Schreyögg 
Department of Health Care Management 
WHO Collaborating Centre for Health Systems Research and Management 
Berlin University of Technology 
  
  
  
 
